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ABSTRACT
This study proposes citywide policy planning as a way of improving
the practice of urban design in American cities. Citywide policy
planning involves the formulation of citywide urban design goals,
objectives, and policies to guide decisions affecting the physical form
and character of the city. This activity also prepares for the official
adoption of citywide urban design policies and helps begin their imple-
mentation. A series of background studies covering the entire city
usually supports this activity.
Despite the fundamental importance of what a city looks like and
how it feels to many people, urban design has been seldom extended
beyond the conceptualization of individual projects and into the arena
of policy planning to be carried out citywide. At the same time, urban
design has been largely divorced from the rationality that has been
common in city planning: articulating goals, making decision-making
criteria explicit, informing decisions with the empirical data, etc.
A planning report survey conducted as part of this study confirms these
observations: only several cities have ever studied their form and
character systematically; among major cities, only a few have ever formu-
lated citywide urban design policies. The promise of citywide policy
planning is great; its practicability and merit are not yet clear.
Chapter I through IIIreport case studies of citywide policy planning
efforts in three cities. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, citywide
urban design policies have been actually formulated and officially
adopted. In Dallas, staff efforts fell short of policy formulation,
but a series of citywide studies were carried out.
Chapter IV discusses a set of common themes emerging from the case
studies. Urban designers in the three cities expressed four kinds of
intent which as a set distinguish their approaches from more tradi-
tional ways of practicing urban design: improving the perceptual and
behavioral quality of the physical environment; studying citywide issues
and overall city strategies; responding to the needs of the people who
live in the city and its neighborhoods; and increasing overall
rationality in approach to urban design. Of strategic importance to
those urban designers were the development of an empirical data base
and the formulation of citywide urban design policies.
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Chapter V discusses the benefits of citywide policy planning.
Potential benefits are reviewed in terms of fundamental functions, uses,
implementation, and effects. Cases in the three cities are not defini-
tive, but overall successes with citywide policy planning, development
projects and design controls that worked within a framework of citywide
urban design policies, problems that emerged in specific situations with-
out initial policy discussions, and the potential for improving present
practice by having citywide urban design policies formulated and agreed
upon, together, provide initial confirmation as to the actual benefits
of conducting citywide policy planning.
The three case studies generally support the practicability of
citywide policy planning in certain situations. Chapter VI reviews
the factors that affect the practicability, use, and effect of citywide
policy planning: the theories and techniques of city design policy
formulation; the governmental context; and the context of citizen
participation and the role government urban designers play in the plan-
ning process. Various difficulties as experienced in the three cities
should not entirely prohibit citywide policy planning.
The last part of the thesis speculates where citywide policy
planning could be useful and where it mightbe applied. Not all cities
in which this activity could be beneficial would support it. The poli-
tical and business leaders of the community might even see the very
purpose of citywide policy planning (e.g. to guide the development of
the perceptual form of the city) inconsistent with what they consider
the important business of their community (e.g. to remove constraints
on real estate development).
At present, there is much uncertainty as to whether citywide
policy planning can be successfully practiced in each city. Each urban
designer entering this new area of practice must necessarily search his
own way as part of efforts to devise the process of urban design that
is adapted to his community.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary Arthur Hack
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Design
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INTRODUCTION
Problems of Traditional Urban Design Practice
Urban design defined generally is a discipline concerned with
and the process of giving form to ensembles of structure, to whole
neighborhoods, or to the city at large so as to make an urban area
comprehensible, functional, and aesthetically pleasing (Abrams, 1971:
329). The primary concern of urban design could be just form giving,
while I believe its true concern has to do with human experience in
urban environment -- something more than aesthetics or visual quality
alone. The origin of urban design can be traced back in the history
of cities. However, the concept of urban design as a public planning
function to be assumed by city governments, with which this study is
concerned, is relatively new in this country; it began to emerge only
around the late 60s to the early 70s (Urbonas, 1969; Barnett, 1974;
and Kaiser et al., 1974).1
Traditionally, urban design has been practiced dominantly as
project planning or project design. Project planning or "project
design" (Lynch, 1968: 249) means planning or design of a defined
geographical area in which there is a definite group of clients, a
concrete program, and a foreseeable time of completion. This type
of activity assumes the existence of effective controls over the
significant aspects of environment. Examples are a housing project,
an urban renewal project and, perhaps, a small new town. (Note that
"project planning" or "project design" here is not the development
of a project management plan or work program.) While most urban
designers are strong in project design, project design-oriented
practice has drawn various criticisms. At first, criticisms to
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"disjointed-incrementalism" in city planning generally apply. Without
an overall framework to see to it that individual projects are carried
out in view of citywide intentions for the form and character of the
city, economic efficiency and overall rationality in approach are
questionable. The effect of one project often detracts from that of
another. Long and repeated public controversies over individual pro-
jects, studies and restudies, and delays in project execution often
result. Resources could be wasted in this way.
Second, urban design carried out in individual projects is usually
no more than a stock of techniques to get development projects done
or an art of giving form to projects, schematic or detailed. Without
explicit definition of the quality of the environment to be pursued,
there is no assurance that projects really make the environment better
even if certain general values such as aesthetics and functional
efficiency are implicit in the mind of designers. More generally,
urban designers designing projects more often than not neglect or
fail to articulate goals or value premises of urban design. Goals
or value premises, if articulated, are often dissociated from actual
decisions. The effect of this is arbitrariness of criteria for
decision-making. Without explicit criteria, it is difficult to have
reasonable public debate. Urban design in this sense remains to be
a personal art of professional urban designers. Superficiality of
analysis and lack of accumulation of real knowledge are often the
result.
Allied with the special importance urban designers give to their
artistic skills is a lack of real concern with the people who live or
use the place, the neighborhood, and the city. Without faithful
efforts to secure inputs from groups of people which have a stake in
the project, there is no assurance that urban design will be responsive
to the needs and wishes of the people of the city. Good design
(aesthetics functional efficiency) from a professional point of view
is often unperceived by people whom the project is supposed to serve.
Urban designers in this way invite public criticism that their pursuit
is "elitist" and irrelevant.
In projects, planning goals/objectives and basic concepts are
often imposed by others because projects are conceived as means of
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implementing more comprehensive plans. Thus, project design creates
little demand for articulating broad goals or objectives for the
urban environment or specific criteria for decision-making. More-
over, good urban design demands artistic skills of designers and
their professional devotion. Demands to serve the wishes of people
and to make design criteria explicit so as to allow broad participa-
tion in decision-making are not inconsistent with this demand but they
are often lost, subjected to all-or-nothing choices. In this way,
problems with traditional practice derive partly from the nature of
projects and partly from the nature of urban design. However, what
is really in question is the context in which project design has been
carried out (e.g. without any citywide policy framework).
There are few new constructs in urban design that depart from
the project design-oriented bias. The notion of urban design as
public policy (Barnett, 1974) is one. Observing its practice in
New York City, it has operated in two ways: district-level design
controls (e.g. special district zoning) and, to a lesser extent,
citywide design controls to deal with specific systems or areas of
concern (e.g. housing quality: Urban Design Council of the City of
New York, 1973). In either case, it is implementation (development
of specific design controls and its enactment) rather than policy
planning that has been emphasized. Thus, "urban design as public
policy" in fact has been urban design as public "programs" or
"regulation" (cf. policy as program, Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:
vix). With weak emphasis on policy planning, responsiveness to the
overall neeeds of people may be questioned as in project design-oriented
practice. Being incrementalism in its own way, overall rationality
and effect on the overall form and character of the city are doubtful.
The construct of architectural and environmental programming (including
user needs assessment) that has been emerging from around the mid 70s
is another. This represents efforts to make the design of physical
settings responsive to the needs and wishes of people who live or
use them.2 However, we see little application of this concept at a
scale of major district or city as a whole. Most of the research has
taken place for project or system design (cf. some efforts by Alexander
et al., 1979). 3
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At present, we lack a general-state-of-the-art survey of urban
design practice in this country to confirm these impressions of the
"domination of project-centered urban design practice". (What we
have at present are a few studies of cases that are exemplary rather
than common or dominant (e.g. Hack, 1980; Ray, 1979). However,
criticisms outlined above seem to correctly identify the basic nature
of traditional and dominant ways of practicing urban design.
Citywide Policy Planning as a Response
There would be many ways to respond to these problems commonly
associated with urban design practice on an individual project or
control basis. But, as a set, they seem to be best dealt with by
introducing into the government urban design program "citywide policy
planning" which reflects important concerns about urban design. Those
concerns should include at least the- following:
- Urban design has not dealt with the perceptual and behavioral
quality of the physical environment broadly;
- Urban design has not dealt with citywide issues and overall
city strategies for urban design directly;
- Urban design has not been responsive to the needs of the
people who live in the city and its neighborhoods (suggesting
a need to incorporate surveys, citizen participation, and
other means of eliciting inputs from citizens and commnicating
with them); and
- Urban design has been largely divorced from the rationality
that has been common in city planning for some time, such
as articulating goals, making decision-making criteria
explicit, and informing decisions with the empirical data.
I use "citywide policy planning" loosely here. I only suggest that
its core should be the formulation of city design policy without sug-
gesting its boundaries. City design policy is a set of goals,
objectives, and policies to gudie decisions affecting the physical
from and character of the city. Ideally, it should be adopted as
official city policy but it could be internal policy of the planning
agency made explicit andused publicly. Closely allied with the
formulation of city design policy are activities 1) to prepare for
its official adoption by the decision-making body (the planning
commission or the city council or both) and 2) to begin its imple-
mentation. Implementation can be made part of citywide policy planning,
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but it does not need to be. This is because of the nature of policy
implementation; implementation has a logic of its own (the politics
of implementation). Moreover, implementation does not need to be
carried out citywide while most of essential activities in citywide
policy planning take place on a citywide basis.5 A series of studies
would be carried out citywide or perhaps in an additive way encompas-
sing the entire city. Their purposes are to support city design policy
formulation and to allow informed decisions on city development by
urban designers, decision-makers and, perhaps, citizens at large.
The promise of citywide policy planning seems great. At first, it
is a response to major criticisms to the kind of urban design people
have seen in many places to date. In fact, its important benefits
seem to derive from the very way it responds to those criticisms.
For example, formulating policies and subjecting them to public dis-
cussion following the formal process of decision-making in the community
means better incorporation of the various interests of the community
in planning and development (response to the needs of people). Once
adopted and used as a decision framework (overall city strategies
for urban design), city design policy would guide public and private
actions to further efforts to achieve community goals. As public
statement of what a good city is in the community (explicit decision-
making criteria), it would put public and private interests on notice
of the intent of the city (Kent's (1964) "communication"), increase
public awareness of urban design-related issues, and stimulate public
and private improvement activities ("education"). A bonus of such
an effort would be increased staff experience and a better basis for
project-level urban design (e.g. data bases and informed citizens).
An idea of extending urban design to the arena of policy planning
to be carried out on a citywide basis is ambitious; its practicability
and actual merit are not yet clear. There seem to be many obstacles,
including the everpresent danger of duplicating efforts of more
traditional city planning in policy setting and the political reality
which generally favors short-range, opportunistic programming.
Moreover, urban design has problems of its own:
- Relatively undeveloped theories and techniques of urban
design; technical issues of policy formulation (e.g. How
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can urban designers define the "elusive" qualities of the envi-
ronment? How can a policy be a decision guide specific enough
to choose among alternatives at hand, yet general enough
to deal with numerous project proposals over years?
- Issues of the city government as it defines the status, role
and client of urban design or urban designers (e.g. How
can urban designers deal with city officials if the latter
view urban design only as a tool of getting development
projects done, and argue for citywide policy planning? How
can they justify a new set of government controls -- various
design controls which would stem from city design policy
as well as city design policy itself as a form of control
through communication?); and
- Issues of citizen participation and the role of government
urban designers in relating to interests of various groups
of people in the city (e.g. How can urban designers discuss
design-related issues with lay citizens if they are not
supportive of good urban design or appreciative of urban
designers' principles of good design?).
Questions thus arise: Is citywide policy planning as suggested
here actually happening in cities? Does the promise of citywide
policy planning match the actual merit of conducting it in practice?
Is citywide policy planning practicable in cities given various
obstacles? How have urban designers attempting citywide policy
planning dealt with those obstacles? How can they make citywide
policy planning work? This study is an attempt to answer these
questions in a general way on the basis of in-depth case studies of
citywide policy planning efforts in three cities and to develop a
framework for studying citywide policy planning. A section to follow
at first examines citywide policy planning in its historical context
and in theory.
Citywide Policy Planning: An Emerging Area of Practice
Historical context
In the early development of American cities, urban design,
especially aesthetics, was given little consideration. Sanitation,
drainage, transportation, street extension, and police and fire
protection were among more important concerns of growing cities.
In the mid 19th century, an interest began to emerge in romantic
landscapes. Frederic Law Olmsted designed Central Park in New York
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City in the 1860s and landscaped the grounds of the Capitol in
Washington, D.C. in the early 1870s, but without an immediate impact
in stimulating formal beautification programs in cities (Wrenn, 1980).
But an idea of designing a city as a whole, or at least a major part
of it, is not totally alien to American cities. The initial pattern
of development in cities like Philadelphia and Savannah was set by
the design of great minds (William Penn and John Oglethorpe).
The Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago gave birth to the
City Beautiful Movement. The depression of the 1890s delayed the
movement for a while but, with recovering economy, the early 20th
century brought grand schemes of street and park systems to many
cities throughout this century. Cities then lost their ambition in
the face of financial difficulties and shifting national priorities
during the two great wars, economic depression, progress of suburban-
ization and deterioration of downtown and inner-city neighborhoods
in the post-war era.
Major public efforts to design cities came back with the federal
urban renewal program in the 50s and the 60s. Exercise of strong
public power -- condemnation and redevelopment -- enabled good urban
design in some large areas of cities but results were not always
enviable. Big-scale architecture often created sterile environments.
The process of urban renewal projects was often problematic, and design
programs seldom made value premises and reasoning about the basis for
specific forms explicit. The art of urban design remained largely
a domain of personal skill of urban designers. More importantly, the
influence of urban renewal projects on the overall design of cities
was limited except in a few cities where a "critical mass" had been
created by massive public investment. As a positive impact, urban
renewal created new opportunities for architectural design and
stimulated the development of imaginary schemes to renew cities or
create entirely new ones. Urban design became viewed among architects
as the art of relating a single building to surrounding ones and streets
in the 60s. English townscape designers, especially Gordon Cullen
(1960) helped architects to expand their views and to think about
buildings as they related to streets, plazas, and other buildings.
However, the art of designing townscapes remained unrelated to broader
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social concerns which city planners had to deal with in guiding the
development of the visual form of the city.
Recent interest in city-scale urban design owes much to Kevin
Lynch's research. In his book, The Image of the City, Lynch (1960).
demonstrated that a seemingly elusive subject of urban design could
be informed by data and discussed as a matter of public interest.
As a result, the role of urban design in city planning became more
legitimate. The book provided urban designers with a host of ammuni-
tion to deal with urban design as a matter of public policy -- a set
of clear premises (legibility, or imageability; identity, structure,
and meaning), models of city form and image of the environment (made up
of elements such as landmarks, paths, and nodes), design concepts
(e.g. strategically locating highrises as man-made landmarks), survey
methods (especially, image map drawing) and, most importantly, a new
way of viewing the city environment and a new philosophy of urban
design.
The federal Community Renewal Program gave government urban
designers the first opportunities to try out city-scale urban design.
A few cities thus embarked on citywide urban design studies in the
mid 60s (Brookline, Mass. -- Lynch, 1965; Minneapolis, 1965-70). This
program, however, was not entirely supportive of systematic citywide
studies because of its emphasis in identifying short-range improvement
needs to deal with physical deterioration in selected areas (urban
renewal, rehabilitation, code enforcement, etc.).
The major impetus for citywide urban design studies came with
an extension of the federal Comprehensive Planning Assistance Program
(the so-called 701 Program) to large cities during the late 60s and
the early 70s. With few strings concerning the substance of compre-
hensive planning, the program allowed several cities to conduct
innovative citywide urban design studies (Oakland, Ca., 1968, 1969;
Jacksonville, Fla., 1971, 1972; Los Angeles, Ca., 1971; San Francisco,
Ca., 1968-70, 1971; Seattle, Wash., 1971; and Dallas, Tex., 1974;
cf. Appendix).
The federal Highway Beautification Program, beginning in 1965,
encouraged many cities, large and small, to prepare citywide beauti-
fication (or appearance) plans and programs. Some cities incorporated
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their plans as an element of their comprehensive plans, but their
scope was quite limited, largely determined by the federal guidelines
for funding. Moreover, the emphasis in beautification and appearance
studies was on the preparation of a short-range improvement program
and they seldom involved systematic analysis and articulation of a set
of goals, objectives, and policies. This program is nevertheless
significant because it raised the level of public support for city
beautification nationwide and created a ground for urban designers'
initiative to plan on a citywide basis.
Nation-wide interest in city beautification, increased public
awareness of the quality of urban life, and grass-root efforts for
historic preservation, among other things, convinced some cities that
assuring the quality of their city environment should be a high
priority concern of city government (.e.g. San Francisco DCP, 1971b:
132). A notion of urban design as an arena for public policy (Bar-
nett, 1974) began to emerge in this context. In the face of immediate
demands, the primary attention of government urban designers was
directed primarily to short-range programs, opportunistic intervention,
and downtown where important public and private investments were
taking place. Citywide policy planning seldom happened. While impor-
tant innovation in techniques of urban design control (e.g. incentive
zoning, special district zoning, and transfer of development rights)
took place to support the work of urban designers, the theoretical
and methodological underpinning of citywide policy planning had to
come at first from outside the group of new government urban designers
(cf. Lynch, 1960).
Theories
Until recently, very little has been known about city-scale urban
design. It is thus not clear if citywide policy planning is happening
in cities. The literature that has existed is small, offering
nothing more than a brief account of the best-known urban design reports
and plans (Lynch, 1976; Kaiser et al., 1974; Gulak, 1978; Southworth and
Southworth, 1973; Jacobs, 1971). Only few people have examined imple-
mentation and use of citywide urban design plans (O'Hern, 1973; Staten,
1973; and Svirsky, 1973). A few case reports have recently been
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published to offer us in-depth accounts of cases that are considered
to be exemplary in this country (Jacobs, 1978a, b; Lu, 1979; cf.
Skaff, 1978). While some attempt has been made to develop a general,
theoretical framework (Lu, 1979; Lynch, 1968, 1976, including a
brief discussion on "area policy"; Kent, 1964, including a discussion
on the civic design element of the urban general plan), theory of
city-scale urban design is yet to be developed with more cross-case
knowledge. Theories in related fields (including city planning,
especially comprehensive planning and planning theory) are of limited
use given little substantive knowledge we have on urban design
practice at a scale of city.
6
In the past several years, we have been observing two contrasting
trends in urban design without knowing what is actually happening in
cities. On the one hand, the 70s saw increasing emphasis on neighbor-
hoods, imcrementalism, and opportunistic improvements in city planning.
Some observers of the planning scene thus conclude that it is not the
time for citywide things today. On the other hand, the 70s was a
decade of rediscovery of comprehensive planning. Some states mandated
municipal comprehensive plans and created a good ground for increasing
faith in comprehensive planning (California, Minnesota, and Florida).
Not only a renewed interest in citywide urban design plans came from
those who led the most successful urban design programs in this country
(Jacobs, 1978a, b; and Lu, 1979), but also there are some observers
who saw citywide urban design studies as part of process-oriented
approach a cutting edge of environmental quality management practice
(Kaiser et al., 1974). In the face of these contradictory descriptions,
there is a need to survey the general state of the art of citywide
urban design studies and plans at first.
The general state of the art of citywide urban design studies
In the summer of 1979, I conducted a survey of citywide urban
design study reports and plans prepared in American cities since 1960.
(The results of this survey are discussed in more detail in Appendix.)
This survey generally confirmed observations Lynch (1976) and others
made: among major U.S. cities, only a few cities have ever
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formulated a citywide urban design plan or a set of goals, objectives,
and policies that are more than a beautification plan and incorporated
it into their decision-making process by officially adopting it. Only
several cities have conducted in-depth studies of their physical form
and character on a citywide basis.
Traditionally, urban designers have been preoccupied with studies
of the quality of the existing physical environment. They have seldom
attempted to define the desirable urban design management system
(decision-making processes) and explored ways of achieving or approach-
7
ing it. Worse, many citywide urban design studies stopped short of
formulating policies to define the desirable quality of the environ-
ment and chart action strategies after completing surveys of the existing
form and character of the city. Changing priorities of the city and
resource problems of the planning agency, among other problems, have
often prevented urban designers from going one step further. The
relatively undeveloped theories and techniques of city-scale urban
design (e.g. without any standard procedure) must have made it dif-
ficult for urban designers to know what to do next. As a result,
resources tended to be allocated to surveys and analyses at a cost
of neglecting policy and action strategy formulation. In some cases,
too much emphasis was placed on simply publishing the data. In others,
urban designers considered it inappropriate to define the desirable
quality of the environment for their city whether in general policy
terms or as specific blueprints. (Defining the quality of the environ-
ment was often equated to drawing up a blueprint of a future city.)
Numerous beautification and appearance plans may be included in this
category. They surveyed the city's appearance, diagnosed problems,
resources, and potentials, and directly went on to prescribe specific
actions to be taken within the next three to five years. General,
long-range urban design policies for the city were seldom formulated.
Among several exemplary cities, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and
Dallas have emerged as cities which deserve in-depth case studies.
These cities have tried major citywide urban design studies, putting
real faith in policy planning. The planning staff in San Francisco
viewed the city-wide urban design plan defining the quality of the
environment as the beginning of their urban design program. As the
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result of two years of concentrated efforts, they completed such a
plan and sought and received early adoption of it by the planning
commission as an element of the comprehensive plan (the Urban Design
Plan of 1971). In Minneapolis, citywide policy planning began almost
at the beginning of its urban design program (the CIP Urban Design
Study, 1965-ca. 1970, following the Southeast Minneapolis Planning
Study, 1961-64). A citywide urban design plan was drafted in an
adoptable form in 1971, although its adoption had to wait until 1976
(the Visual Design Framework). The Visual Quality Plan recently
adopted incorporates policies for design management as well as those
for the physical environment. The urban design staff in Dallas have
not gone beyond the survey and analysis phase in their citywide
studies. Without studies specifically aimed at formulation of city
design policy, Dallas has been without overall citywide policy plan-
ning (my definition). However, the staff made much effort to introduce
citywide policy planning into their urban design program throughout
the 70s: they continued their work to prepare the citywide urban
design framework which would set forth policies for the quality of
the environment. Also, the staff did policy planning in a few spe-
cific areas of concern (e.g. escarpment area design guidelines and
flood plain management policies). Articles in professional and popular
journals suggest that these cities have built their own urban design
capability and have been achieving good results in urban design for
some ten years or so.
The in-depth case studies which follow do not cover cities with-
out any citywide policy planning effort. This is because situations
with and without citywide urban design policies ought to be compared
in cases in which it is practicable in one way or another. In a
context in which citywide policy planning is very difficult to prac-
tice, problems with the urban design program might not be attributable
to the lack of citywide policy planning. The same context could make
the practice of urban design difficult and create those problems;
citywide policy planning might not make differences. Without a theory
defining situations that demand and support citywide policy planning
at the outset, I have chosen cities in which it has been tried.
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The Organization of This Thesis
Chapters I through III report cases of citywide policy planning
efforts in the three cities (Chapters I - III). Attention is given
to the theories and techniques and their evolution over time, results,
issues of practice, and factors that might have affected the urban
designer's approach and the effectiveness of citywide policy planning.
Chapter IV discusses common themes that have emerged from the three
case studies. Citywide policy planning for the physical environment
has been actually tried fully in Minneapolis and San Francisco and
partially in Dallas. Chapter V examines the actual benefits of having
citywide urban design policies formulated and debated, contrasting
experience in the three case cities with the promise of citywide
policy planning. Cases in the three cities provide initial confirma-
tion as to the merit of conducting citywide policy planning. To
describe the promise, this chapter develops a general framework for
defining the effectiveness (use and effect) of citywide policy
planning.
The three case studies generally support the practicability of
citywide policy planning in certain situations. The last chapter
considers important factors that affect the practicability and
effectiveness of citywide policy planning in terms of 1) the theories
and techniques of city design policy formulation, 2) the governmental
context, and 3) the context of citizen participation and the role of
government urban designers in the planning process. While three case
studies are not sufficient to make broad generalizations, it is
possible to speculate where citywide policy planning might be useful
and where it could be applied. The final section of this thesis thus
discusses the prospect for citywide policy planning.
CHAPTER I
CASE STUDY 1: CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING IN MINNEAPOLIS
Introduction
Minneapolis has been known for its urban design achievements for
more than a decade. The Nicollet Mall project designed by Lawrence
Halprin is the first and best-known example: it has become one of the
most successful examples of downtown malls in this country, contributed
greatly to downtown revitalization, and created a sense of place,
beauty, and identity in the downtown retail area. A skyway system, a
series of second-level pedestrian passageways to link retail and office
spaces in the downtown core has grown into the most extensive system
in this country and become a model of similar development in other
cities. While it is a superb response to a severe Minnesota climate
during the winter, it is not just an expression of pragmatism of
Minneapolitans. It created a marvelous center piece of Minneapolis
urban design as well: the Crystal Court at the foot of the IDS Tower
designed by Phillip Johnson in the early 70s. Finally, Metro Center
'85, one of the most successful downtown development plans in this
country, received much attention from the professional community.
On the other hand, little is known about citywide studies which
underlie Minneapolis' approach to urban design (cf. a brief account
in Lynch, 1976: 82; Lu, 1979). We learn how the city's recent compre-
hensive planning effort began in the late 50s through Alan Altshuler's
(1965) case study but little is known about urban design within the
context of city planning in the 60s and the 70s. This case study is
an attempt to illustrate how systematic studies carried out citywide
to formulate city design policy and to make the process of urban
design work better during the formative era of the Minneapolis urban
design program helped the development of the theories and techniques
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of urban design in this city and prepared a ground for integrating
urban design into the process of planning and development.
The Minneapolis urban design program is quite complex. It has
evolved over some twenty years through several citywide and district-
level studies and programs. To place its evolution in a perspective,
I suggest two phases of development in the theories and techniques of
urban design in this city. The first phase began with a few urban
designers in the planning department (to be called the urban design
staff hereafter) applying their new idea of urban design at first at
a planning district level (the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study,
1961-64) and, then, at a citywide scale (the CIP Urban Design Study,
1965-ca. 1970). In this phase, the theories and techniques of urban
design were developed primarily in respect to the technical aspect
of city design policy formulation -- methods of studying the quality
of environment, design concepts, and form of city design plan. The
publication of the second downtown plan Metro Center '85 in 1970
marked the culmination of this phase of development.
During the first half of the 70s, the urban design staff did
studies and projects identified in the CIP Urban Design Study
(reiterated in Metro Center '85). Systematic studies were no more
carried out at a scale of district or beyond. Efforts to formulate
city design policy were made without further studies of the quality
of environment and research about citizen concerns. Meantime, the con-
text of urban design changed gradually. In 1976, three events took
place and made the need for further development of the theories and
techniques of urban design clear: At first, the Visual Design Frame-
work proposal developed over five years had to be completely revised
as a result of intensive neighborhood review in a several-month period.
Second, the master design district ordinance proposal did not take off
the ground after several rounds of revisions to incorporate neighborhood
groups' wishes. Finally, the Minneapolis voters approved administrative
reorganization to move the planning department away from the city
coordinator's development function. The second phase of development
should allow the urban design staff to increase their sophistication
in ways of communicating with people and influencing decisions of a
plural set of actors inside and outside city government. This phase
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has just begun through the Metro Center '90 program, 1977-78, and
comprehensive planning for the 80s.
City planning behind the progress
Minneapolis is a mature Midwestern city of 434,400 (as of 1970)
with its relatively small territory (59 square miles) confined by
surrounding communities. Together with Saint Paul, the city forms the
heart of the Twin Cities metropolitan area, a region with 2.0 million
people. The city was initially established in 1849 at St. Anthony on
the east bank of the Mississippi River and grew into a regional center
for lumbering and milling with the coming of railroads during 1860-75.
The city today is the economic center for the entire region, and the
home for major national industries and businesses. Minneapolis as the
"City of Lakes" owes much to landscape architect H. W. S. Cleveland's
visionary master park plan of the late 1880s which guided the subsequent
acquisition and development of the land around lakes. The city's park
system linking lake, creek, and river areas has a profound effect on
the form and image of the city today.(Minneapolis P&D, 1970a: 10)
The City Planning Commission was created in 1919. The commission
occupied a rather prominent place in city government in the 1920s but
a series of events including the Depression and the withdrawal of busi-
nessmen from civic activity after the 1933-34 strike brought an end to
the period of prominence.(Altshuler, 1965: 200) Plans were prepared
to accomodate the already established city form to new needs -- espe-
cially automobile traffic -- but their impact was very little before
World War II.(Minneapolis P&D, 1970a)
In the early 50s, Minneapolis was behind the progress of city
planning in this country. The role of the planning department was
in many ways vague and city officials were not supportive of long-range
planning. This owed much to the very design of the Minneapolis government. The
city's somewhat antiquated government structure was determined by the
1920 charter which provided for a weak mayor-strong council form of
government. Highly decentralized nature of city government was
paralleled by extremely weak political party organization.(Altshuler,
1965: 191-2)
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Planning department rejuvenation
Minneapolis' downtown saw its speculative peaks in the 1920s.
The Depression and World War II halted investment and business activity
in downtown began to lag behind other places in the region from around
the mid 50s. Inner-city decay and other factors contributed to migra-
tion of city residents to the suburbs. Spacious outlying areas
attracted the city's industries and businesses away as well.
In August 1955, concerned business leaders formed the Downtown
Council and began an impending campaign for downtown revitalization.
Studies to assess the effect of freeways on the Minneapolis CBD followed
its initial attention to the Lower Loop urban renewal project. City
planning began to draw sudden attention in this context (Altshuler,
1965: 200). George Barton and Associates working with a city planning
consultant Frederic T. Aschman evaluated the State Highway Department's
proposals from a local point of view and found deficiency in the city's
planning programs that would be necessary in harmonizing freeways with
the city's street system. Barton and Aschman thus convinced the Down-
town Council and the city engineer the role city planners ought to play.
Subsequently, Aschman did a study of the general state of city planning
in the city, recommending the city to strengthen the planning depart-
ment. Among his recommendations were hiring of a planning director and
fivefold budget increase. This brought the city a successful administra-
tor-planner Lawrence Irvin from Columbus, Ohio.(Altshuler, 1965: 203,
205)
Irvin came to Minneapolis on March 1958. He was with a ready-made
constituency: the business community had induced several prominent
businessmen to accept membership of the planning commission. There were
no vocal opponents.(Altshuler, 1965: 205) The planning director saw his
small planning staff and budget (increased three times) further increased
over the next few years.
Urban design in early comprehensive planning efforts
The planning director at first concentrated on a downtown plan for
the business community and saw the completion of the first downtown plan,
First Report on the Central Minneapolis Plan, in 1959 (Minneapolis CPC,
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1959b). Studies were also initiated within six months of his arrival
to develop a new citywide zoning ordinance, a new citywide industrial
land use plan, and three neighborhood plans. Neither the business
community nor the city council was particularly interested in compre-
hensive planning but the planning director made an early commitment to
comprehensive planning and a program to revise the city's official plan
(comprehensive plan or master plan) was initiated in 1961. According
to Lu (1979: 7), the history of planning in Minneapolis after the
planning department rejuvenation closely followed the national trend:
the first focus on public housing; then on urban renewal; then on free-
way systems, joint land use-transportation planning, and community
renewal programs in the mid 60s; and, finally, on model cities programs,
social services and health care planning, and human resources develop-
ment in the late 60s and the early 70s.
It was only in the early 70s that a separate urban design office
was established within the planning department and "urban designer"
became official position in Minneapolis. However, a few urban designers
(including Weiming Lu, principal planner) began to work as part of the
planning staff back in the late 50s. Planning for the downtown area
already incorporated urban design considerations. For example, Goals
for Central Minneapolis: Its Functions and Design (Minneapolis CPC,
1959a) included "appearance" along with land use and transportation
in "design goals which [would] most fully enable Central Minneapolis
to perform its proper functions." The report recommended that the under-
lying goal for appearance should be:
In all matters of the design and location of physical features
in or relating to Central Minneapolis, the effects of such
features on the appearance of the area should be taken into
account so as to create the most rewarding, stimulating and
memorable environment. {Emphasis mine.]
Three specific goals relating to distinctiveness, unity, and variety
were recommended. These goals not only found their way into the down-
town plan but also remained important in the second downtown plan
Metro Center '85 (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a) and its revision Metro Center
'90 (Minneapolis P&D, 1978a-d). It is also important to note that
design-related goals were defined in terms of image and behavior at this
point (e.g. "memorable" environment, "understandable" layout, and focal
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poinAts as "points of reference"). Urban design was not just a matter
of fine views or formal order. However, it took a few more years for
the urban design staff to fully articulate these new value premises in
urban design and operationalize their definitions. Moreover, no work
was done to formulate policies and programs for urban design in response
to once articulated goals. On the contrary, the 1959 downtown plan did
not deal with design issues directly (Lu, 1974: 80).
Comprehensive planning on a citywide basis, begun in 1959, produced
the official city plan in the fall of 1962 (Minneapolis CPC, 1962).
Urban design considerations were integrated into some parts of the plan
but urban design goals were not articulated except in a few sections.
As in the first downtown plan, formulation of policies and programs for
urban design was not possible. Clear articulation of urban design goals
came at first in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study. To formulate
urban design policies, the urban design staff had to continue their
exploration till the end of the 60s.
From the Beginning to Early Maturity
An emerging approach in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study
A significant change in the status of urban design took place
in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study. In 1961, the planning
commission began a program of comprehensive planning for Southeast
Minneapolis upon the request of citizens and businessmen of the com-
munity (official planning district in Minneapolis). The program was
concluded in the spring of 1964 with the publication of A Workable Plan
for the Active Conservation and Orderly Development of Southeast
Minneapolis (Minneapolis CPC, 1964). This program had five important
characteristics which distinguished it from previous studies in
Minneapolis and most of the studies that were carried out in this
country around that time:
- Substantial involvement of citizens and businessmen took place
in the community;
- Urban design was recognized as a distinct element of the
comprehensive plan for a planning district; 1
- Urban design was defined at goal, plan, and data levels;
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- Urban design was defined in terms of image and behavior;2 and
- The comprehensive plan was conceived as a framework or process-
oriented tool.
The progress in the development of the theories and techniques
of urban design the staff made in this study is significant. Basic
approach, important goals, and key concepts were developed for reuse
and refinement in later studies. On the other hand, finding prescrip-
tions for a good environment and stating them in policy terms remained
to be a problem. Policy recommendations in the plan were ambiguous as
in the following examples:
- Some of the existing landmarks including churches, schools
and other significant structures, are hidden. They need to
be brought out and be properly presented.
- A number of new landmarks including high-rise apartments,
campus office buildings and other tall structures of distinc-
tion may be created and strategically located.
- -Particular attention should be given to the general grouping
of buildings, the relationship between building and parking
space and streets and buildings.
The urban design staff needed to know how to determine what would consti-
tute "proper presentation" or "strategic location" or "particular
attention". At the same time, the staff needed to learn to balance
generality with specificity in policy statement, knowing what would make
the environment better. Also, they needed to study the urban design
management system that would be essential in incorporating urban design
considerations into the process of planning and development. All these
point to a need for more studies. It was good however that the urban
design staff demonstrated the level of their sophistication. With suc-
cessful completion of a plan and community acceptance of urban design
in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study, the staff perhaps force-
fully argued for a legitimacy of urban design within city planning
(comprehensive planning). Introduction of an urban design component in
the Minneapolis Community Improvement Program (CIP) in 1965 when the
program was half way through should be viewed in this context. As we
shall see, issues the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study raised were
taken up in the CIP Urban Design Study.3
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The first citywide urban design study
* The Minneapolis Community Improvement Program (CIP)
The 1962 official city plan was conceived as an interim plan.
The planning department needed time and resources to develop a data
base on which systematic research of goals and policies for the city
and its communities should be based. In March 1961, the city applied
to the Housing and Home Finance Agency for a Community Renewal Grant.
With the federal grant, the Minneapolis Community Renewal Program
(CIP) commenced in 1962.
The purpose of the CIP Study was to determine the best means of
eliminating and preventing blight in the city. The city planning
commission administered the program under the direction and approval
of the city council to the point where plans became action. The
Citizens Advisory Committee was established for the program with various
subcommittees, both citywide and community-level. This committee was
charged to recommend a comprehensive program of action for the commu-
nity's immediate and long-range improvement, evaluating.the existing
conditions of each community'and identifying its assets, liabilities,
problems, and potentials.(Minneapolis CPC, 1965)
* The CIP Urban Design Study
In 1965, an urban design study component was formally introduced
into the CIP Study as a new addition. The primary goal of the urban
design study was "to provide readily acceptable image of the city's
environment, emphasizing its function, and fostering the observer's
sense of civic pride in that environment" (Minneapolis CPC, 1965).
The study was to develop an urban design plan called citywide "design
framework" setting forth an overall design policy for the city and out-
lining an action program for its implementation. The study, in the
second phase, was also to examine the process of decision-making and
identify "missing links in the legislative framework" (Lu, 1979: 14).
The urban design staff had a clear idea of what they wanted from the
outset, if not a clear image of the product they should produce. An
initial work program for the first-phase study (pilot study) was
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issued in January 1965 and approved in February with some revisions.
The pilot study started in March and ended in about twenty weeks.
Since the last phase of the CIP Study to put together final recommen-
dations was soon to begin, the pilot study had to be completed before
the end of June 1965. The second-phase study work program proposing
a twelve-month study was issued in January and October of 1966.
* The first-phase study (pilot study)
The pilot study focussed on surveys of the city's visual form and
image and prototype case studies. Selected for study were a freeway
corridor, a residential renewal area, two business/commercial centers,
and a changing industrial area. The Urban Design Committee was formed
to direct the urban design study as one of the CIP subcommittees. The
study was administered by the Design Coordinater (Weiming Lu, principal
planner) under the overall supervision of the planning director and the
Minneapolis Chapter of the American Institute of Architects. Almost
all the individual studies were contracted out to local consultants.
This was due to funding and staffing constraints and a decision to
involve the local architect- and art communities (Lu, 1979: 8).
Seminars and exhibits were planned during the study period. A
major exhibition called "Toward a New City" was organized during
September 21 - October 24, 1965 to present the results of the pilot
study to the public. A series of program events -- lectures, panel
discussions, film presentations, and "city planning workshops" --
accompanied the exhibit at the Walker Art Center. The exhibition and
its program events were well attended. Press coverage of the progress
and the results of the pilot study suggests increasing public awareness
of urban design and expectation for a "New City".5 A report to conclude
the pilot study, Toward a New City: A Preliminary Report on Minneapolis'
Urban Design Study, was issued in December 1965. This report summarized
all the individual studies of the pilot study (except one). The Pre-
liminary City Design Policy Plan and the Powderhorn Community Design
Plan are important in understanding the evolution of the theories and
techniques of city design policy formulation in Minneapolis.
The Preliminary City Design Plan as presented in the December 1965
report contained the following sections:
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- Twelve basic design issues (relating to the city's identity,
lake-side highrises, views from freeways, and aesthetics as
standardsin neighborhood design among others);6
- Four basic planning goals for the city (such as a "balanced"
population and the ideal community);
- Fourteen specific design goals (such as "integration of free-
ways to the city form", "new identity for old neighborhoods",
"careful location of highrise structures", and "preservation
of historic buildings"); and
- Preliminary city design plan (sixteen recommendations and
mapped visual image and form structures without any comment).
The plan was sketchy, suggesting only general approaches to deal
with general design issues. For example, one recommendation aimed at
guiding proposed development was:
We should permit highrise apartment development in carefully
selected locations which are accessible, near employment
centers, and near parks, providing they are compatible with
existing and future land use.
This, like many others, not only failed to respond to the initial
question (Should social, aesthetic considerations be given equal
emphasis in determining the placement of highrises?) but also left
much ambiguity as to procedures and criteria (e.g. How do you determine
'carefully selected locations" and "compatible with ... future land
use"?). Generally, the plan did not discuss the study team's reasoning
as to how their recommendations would respond to issues and implement
goals. The plan also failed to clearly state its basic value premises.
The purpose of the CIP Urban Design Study was to enhance the city's
visual image. Yet, the plan did not define what a good city image would
be as the Southeast Minneapolis Plan did. The urban design staff was
aware of the preliminary nature of the plan and the refinement of goals,
policies, etc. became an important part of the second-phase study.
Other case studies of the pilot study, except one for a freeway
corridor and another for the Powderhorn Community, had little immediate
impact on city design policy formulation and changes that actually took
place in the physical environment. The former study was initiated from
concerns about the visual impact of freeways upon the city's landscape
(from a point of view of travellers through freeways) and carried out
drawing upon a set of methods and concepts that had been developed by
a group of urban design researchers working with Kevin Lynch at MIT
(Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer, 1964). The latter, a community design
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study, was carried out "for building a more attractive, stable Powder-
horn Community" (Minneapolis CIP, 1965j). This study made significant
headway toward development of the concept of "the design framework".
It analyzed major forces and trends in the community, surveyed visual
forms and residents' images drawing upon Lynch's methods, and proposed
a design plan setting forth the visual image and form structures for the
community. Its proposals include a zoning control system for visual
character, setting categories defining the city's visual scene in terms
of mass, light, spacing, etc. Design control (design guidance) was to
be exercised according to several levels ranging from design control
more potent than the existing zoning in visually strategic areas to
freedom in design greater than the existing zoning in other areas.
The concept of the "design framework" had been well developed by
the end of the pilot study. While the Preliminary City Design Policy
Plan did not clearly articulate this concept, its theoretical basis was
established in an introduction to the December 1965 report (Minneapolis
CIP, 1965k) and reiterated in Lu's (1966) paper. At a community level,
this concept saw its application in a primitive form in the Southeast Min-
neapolis Plan (the basic"urban design structure", Minneapolis CPC, 1964)
and, then, fully in the Powderhorn Community Design Plan (Minneapolis
CIP, 1965j). The term "design framework" derives from the concept of
the plan as a "framework" or "guide" for design and change, allowing
"freedom of expression" and "work toward a common goal" at the same time
(Minneapolis CPC, 1964). The design framework in Minneapolis would
especially attempt to "set up a systematic design approach" which will
guide public action -- urban renewal and caiptal improvements so as to
"enable public improvement to serve as an effective incentive for
private investment" (Lu, 1966) -- as well as private constructions
(Minneapolis CIP, 1965j). The design framework could have informational
and educational uses as well:
- The power of "the framework" is expected to be in its uncom-
plicated new insights of existing systems of predictions and
urban socio-economic reality.(Minneapolis CIP, 1965j)
- This design framework is necessarily to create both a keen
awareness of the central-area form and a strong visual identity
... .(Minneapolis P&D, 1970a)
Several requirements and orientations characterize the design framework:
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- A fifteen-year time frame (with flexible and expandable
design proposals) (Lu, 1966);
- A balance between specificity (to solve problems of today)
and generality (to meet the needs of tomorrow);
- Both imaginative (to inspire the creativity of designers)
and realistic (to attract the confidence of farsighted
builders); and
- Attention to certain key elements of city form: tighter
controls of strategic elements and more freedom in the
design of the rest of the city (Lu, 1966; Minneapolis CIP,
1965j).
Urban designers in Minneapolis learned much from Lynch's theory.
According to Lynch (1960), legibility and its three components --
identity, structure, and meaning -- were among the fundamental values
in the city environment and those qualities could be managed by way of
influencing key visual image elements (landmarks, paths, nodes, edges,
and districts). This led to an idea of controlling those key elements
while leaving the rest of the city relatively free in design. This is
what the design framework as device for control was for. It is quite
natural, then, that urban designers in Minneapolis associated the design
framework closely with achievement of certain qualities (e.g. a vivid
and coherent image of the city) rather than others.
The ideal was high but it was difficult to achieve. As we shall
see, the urban design staff had to learn more over the next ten to fif-
teen years in order to have their city design policy proposals officially
adopted. Over years, the concept of design framework received transfor-
mation as members of the urban design staff changed.
* The second-phase study
The second-phase CIP Urban Design Study began in 1966. The primary
focus of this study was on the decision-making process. A study on
urban design legislation was conducted by Richard Babcock with a presti-
geous law firm Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock, McDugale and Parsons
(e.g. enabling legislation for historic preservation, design district,
and development district). Barton-Aschman Associates (1970) worked on
a study of organization, administration, programming, and financing.
Work on the urban design framework continued, adding a few more
case studies "to put our design framework into the form of more specific
standards and principles for guiding future urban renewal and freeway
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design" (Minneapolis CIP, 1966b). Another freeway corridor was taken
for a case study. A prominent architect, Ralph Rapson at the University
of Minnesota, worked on a design plan for the Phillips Neighborhood and
proposals for specific design control. Some studies were continued from
the pilot study: a survey of historic buildings and further analysis of
image survey and livability study.
About one-fifth of the total budget of the second-phase study was
allocated to further work onthe citywide urban design framework itself.
Robert Isaacson reviewed the city's socio-economic goals and formulated
new goals and policies for urban design. Dennis Grebner reviewed pro-
posed design standards and principles to make specific proposals for
necessary revisions (Community Planning and Design Associates, Inc.,
1969). Finally, Weiming Lu and Robert Isaacson reviewed design issues
identified earlier and proposed specific policies and design structures
to deal with those issues.
During 1966, the design coordinator produced a series of notes but
the first few years since the commencement of the second-phase study saw
little progress in the development of the citywide design framework.
Meantime, the environmental design study for Metro Center '85 began and
the design coordinator put much of his time in directing this second
downtown planning program. The design coordinator's two-volume draft
report "Design Framework for Minneapolis" and "Design Process for
Minneapolis" was completed only in May 1970.
* The status of urban design in Minneapolis
Community Improvement Program
Around February-April 1966 when the urban design staff was beginning
the second-phase urban design study, the planning commission issued
Goals and Policies for Comprehensive Programming for Community Improve-
ment as one of a series of reports to synthesize the whole results of the
CIP Study (Minneapolis CIP, 1966a). The report recommended policies in
eighteen areas for discussion purposes. Urban design was not recognized
as a distinct policy area in this report. Neither was there any general
or specific urban design policy included excepting a policy to continue
and expand a strategy for city development which would encourage "versa-
tility of city design".. The results of the pilot study did find their
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way into the report, however. A fine drawing of a proposed design struc-
ture for the I-35W corridor illustrated one side of the table of contents
without comments. A few sketches and plans from the West Broadway Plan
(one of business center case studies) were presented in a section pre-
senting policies for commercial facilities as "Urban Design for
Commercial Areas", again without comments. Urban design was thus no
more than an art of policy implementation.
In 1967, the Executive Committee of the Citizens Advisory Committee
completed the CIP Summary Report putting together all the recommendations
for the Minneapolis Community Improvement Program (Minneapolis CIP,
1967a). The planning commission and the city council adopted the docu-
ment along with a small brochure, Decision '67, as a guide for city
development. The CIP Study was concluded at this point except for a
continuing urban design study. (The Urban Design Committee was dissolved
perhaps at this point.) The Summary Report set forth eight major goals
and outlined city development strategies (policies, programs, and
actions), available resources, and the decision-making process. No
urban design goal was included. Only few of urban design concepts
developed in the urban design study were officially recognized as the
city's policies (e.g. a policy for transportation corridor landscaping),
although some policies adopted have important urban design implications.
The Five-Year Community Improvement Program ended in 1971. The
planning department issued a report highlighting the accomplishments of
the program since its commencement in 1962 and directions for future
actions (Minneapolis CIP, 1971). This report confirmed the status of
urban design in CIP primarily as an area of implementation program.
Urban design -- "Citywide Urban Design Framework" -- was given one
sub-section in the report but only in a section called "Action Programs
Instituted".
Urban design in CIP was in this way a lower-level means (programs
and actions rather than policies) without its own goals. The urban
design staff had to give up the status of urban design once acquired in
the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study. This has serious implications.
Like comprehensive planning programs, CIP emphasized systematic pursuit
of each goal in community improvement. The Summary Report stated:
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Progress is determined, not just by our actions, but by the
goals toward which we act -- not just by how we shape the
land, but by the people and the productive ends for which
we shape. Our decisions as to why, when, and where we apply
our time, money, and energy to improvement actions will
determine the efficiency and excellence of our progress.
(Minneapolis CIP, 1967a: 62)
That is, urban design without a set of goals and policies of its own
had to remain incremental and, perhaps, fragmented. To raise the status
of urban design, the urban design staff had to do more work to refine
their urban design framework.
* Impact of the CIP Urban Design Study
The CIP Urban Design Study did not produce a citywide urban design
framework in an adoptable form. It did not give urban design a new
status -- an area of public policy that was more than an art of policy
implementation. The impact of the study was nevertheless significant
at least in four areas:
- Policies and actions for the environment;
- Effects on the process or urban design;
- Educational effects; and
- Increased urban design staff capability.
At first, it produced a number of design concepts. A few of them
were formally adopted by the city council as the city's community
improvement policy. Even before such an official action was taken,
the urban design study in progress had begun to influence the I-35W
freeway corridor design. A special design team made up of the Design
Coordinator of the CIP Urban Design Study as chairman, and representa-
tives from the State Highway Department, Park Board, and consulting
landscape architects was formed to prepare a plan for improving the
design of the corridor. Subsequently, the Highway Department made a
substantial commitment to improve landscaping in accordance with the
beautification plan, with the result of an increase in landscape expen-
ditures of thirteen to fourteen times the amount orginally programmed.
(Minneapolis CIP, 1967a)
The urban design study also developed important ideas to improve
the process of urban design. The establishment of CUE in 1968, and
the passage of state laws to enable Minneapolis historic preservation,
design review (design districts), and tax increment financing
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(development districts), represent the most important impact in this
area. Inside the City Hall, recognition of the use of urban design
resulted in increase in the size of the urban design staff following
the 1968 administrative reorganization. The quality of urban design
incorporated in studies was markedly improved around the late 60s and
the early 70s. Metro Center '85 is the best example. Also, use of
inter-agency interdisciplinary task forces (like the one for the I-35W
corridor beautification plan) became a normal operating procedure in
dealing with complex urban design problems. The city coordinator played
an important role in eliciting cooperation from other city departments
for the urban design staff. Also important was the city's adoption of
a policy to develop a design framework component for each urban renewal
project plan (not in effect today). This allowed the staff to improve
the techniques of developing urban design frameworks through experience
and design considerations were promoted in urban renewal, model cities,
code enforcement, and neighborhood improvement progrsm.(Lu, 1979)
Invaluable was the educational effect. Wide publicity of the
urban design study, city sponsorship of exhibitions, design conferences,
planning worshops, etc. beside CUE's contribution helped the urban
design staff educate the public in urban design. Community and neighbor-
hood design studies increased the staff's contact with neighborhood
leaders and helped the staff to demonstrate the use of urban design
in neighborhoods. The result was increased public recognition of
urban design and design awareness (e.g. Star, October 22, 1965). The
urban design study also resulted in appreciation of their roles in urban
design on the part of several education and cultural institutions in the
city which were involved in the pilot study. This effect varies
according to institutions. The Walker Art Center has held exhibitions
and conferences in the area of urban design from time to time since the
urban design study. On the other hand, the rest of the institutions
such as the Minneapolis College of Arts and Design and the University
of Minnesota's School of Architecture are not active in this area any
more. Similarly, the urban design study created an opportunity for
local architects and landscape architects to work together and develop
their ideas about city-scale urban design. The effect was training and
increased urban design-consciousness on the part of those design
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professionals.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the urban design staff laid
out a foundation for the later initiative. The basic approach to urban
design studies, which involved analysis of visual images and forms and
formulation of design frameworks, had been established in a general way
and was waiting for refinement. Important issues had been identified
to direct future efforts and, in fact, the agenda set in the urban
design study was reiterated in Metro Center '85 and largely followed
by later projects and programs. Also important was increased aware-
ness of the need for a systematic approach to urban design among local
planners. The research on city design policy (the urban design frame-
work) that was proposed in the second-phase study continued throughout
the late 60s and was carried on to the Metro Center '85 Environmental
Design Program during 1968-69. At the beginning of a comprehensive
planning program in 1971, the City Design Framework became an element
of the comprehensive plan to be prepared. It took another five years
before its adoption (the Visual Design Framework of 1976) but the CIP
Urban Design Study opened a way to integrate urban design into the
comprehensive planning process and to make urban design principles
fully a part of the city's official polciy.
Basic as these may seem, there had been no such technical exper-
tise, understanding, and recognition when a few urban designers began
their work in the late 50s and the early 60s. It is rather surprising
that the whole effect of the CIP Urban Design Study has been largely
unnoticed by most observers of the Minneapolis urban design scene.
Usually, observers attention to systematic approach begins with Metro
Center '85.
The Minneapolis urban design program coming to maturity;
Metro Center '85
* The planning director as an assistant city coordinator
A change in government organization took place in February 1968:
the city council established the City Coordinator as the city's chief
administrative officer. The primary impetus came as a result of
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recognition that the city needed to improve administrative capacity to
effect the newly adopted CIP city strategy. This reorganization brought
under the city coordinator physical, social service, and human resource
planning and development, and regulatory, budgeting, and general adminis-
trative functions. The city coordinator with expanded staff support
thus played a significant role in guiding and coordinating the city's
planning and development programs in the next ten years.
This administrative reorganization made the planning director
(now the Director of Planning and Development) one of assistant city
coordinators. Planning thus became part of the city's central decision-
making process. The role of the planning department expanded at the same
time to include such activities as social and employment planning and
development coordination as well as physical planning in a tradition
sense (hence, Minneapolis Planning and Development [Division]). Planning
was tied closely to the city's development functions, all in one office.
Thus, after 1968, high priority plans saw early implementation (e.g.
the 1969 parking ring plan calling for parking ramps on the downtown
fringe) (Lu, 1979: 12).
o The Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program
In 1967, the city council authorized the preparation of a new
downtown plan under the Decision '67 Program. The plan was initiated
because of the need to assess new forces and trends affecting downtown
to guide its development some ten years after the first downtown plan-
ing effort. Despite its strategic importance, the downtown was beginning
to lose its people, especially families, in the late 60s when the Twin
Cities region was growing. Downtown development was staggering and
businesses were no more expanding. The skyway system began to grow and
Nicollet Mall was soon to open but various projects were being carried
out without much coordination.
The work on the Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program began
in 1968 under the leadership of the newly established city coordinator.
It was to develop a comprehensive plan with a program and priorities
for downtown development for the next fifteen years. Weiming Lu,
principal planner, directed the interdisciplinary design team under the
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general policy direction of the city coordinator and the planning
director. The design team's approach was systematic. The chief of
the team wrote:
The team believed that in trying to solve a problem, it was
important first to list all the problems, then focus on them,
take them apart, and then put them back together piece by
piece, until an intelligent decision was reached.(Lu, 1974)
Thus, the eighteen-month study involved 98 work items such as land use
survey, landmark survey, visual image survey, and visual form analysis.
Some 400 problems were identified and more than 200 alternative solutions
were developed. The scale of the downtown community was manageable,
allowing the design team to conduct a thorough study of its design
features. The team, for example, systematically inventoried signs on
streets, developed design concepts for them, and prepared recommendations
for street-name signs.8
The comprehensive downtown development plan, Metro Center '85, was
completed in 1969 and published in March 1970 (Minneapolis P&D, 1970a).
It is significant that urban design entered the plan in all key com-
ponents of plan: goal, policy (plan), program, and data. Moreover,
urban design was an important part of the purpose of the program. It
was a program to improve the physical environment, to strengthen the
economic vitality, and to enhance the visual identity of the downtown
area (Lu, 1974: 78). Urban design considerations were integrated into
all the physical planning components of the plan, suggesting the use
or urban design as a "stitching" or "integrating" element of the plan.
The urban design staff's approach to plan-making had been firmly
established in this study. The urban (visual) design plan of Metro
Center '85 was a two-tier system consisting of the visual image and
visual form frameworks. At first, the visual image framework set forth
the visual image structure that was desired for the downtown. The
visual image framework was a form of goal or "guidelines" expressed in
terms of spatial relationships among image elements -- open spaces,
gateways, and Lynch's five elements (landmarks, nodes, edges, paths,
and districts). It was an attempt to create a vivid and coherent visual
image by giving some places a sense of entrance, others a sense of focal
point, etc.9
Metro Center '85 then proposed the visual form framework. This
- 33 -
framework defined basic relationships among important form elements
which would reflect the existing form, character, heritage, and topo-
graphy of the downtown and realize the desired visual image. The idea
was that individual actions, if taken in accordance with guidelines
of the visual from framework, would help to achieve the visual image
framework and create a strong visual identity over years. The visual
form framework in Metro Center '85 consisted of the following
components:
- The visual district description: including proposals to
strengthen visual districts (compact sub-areas with identity)
and visual sequence in travel;
- The skyline and building illumination plan; and
- The street design framework: including cross section and
spatial framework design; the street lighting plan, principles
and standards; the landscaping plan; and principles and
standards for public and private signs and street furniture.
The visual form framework was not that different from conventional urban
design plans setting forth design principles, standards, prototype
designs, etc. except for one special feature: it directed its primary
attention to those elements of the enivronment that were strategically
important. Strategic elements were to be determined on the basis of
visual image survey data and according to Lynch's theory.
* Impact of Metro Center '85
The planning commission adopted Metro Center '85 but the city
council took no action. The plan, however, became a useful guide to
policy-making and civic action in the downtown area. This owed much to
strong support from the downtown business community and a new adminis-
trative structure which put city planning and development functions under
one administrative head. Metro Center '85 proved to be a very success-
ful plan. At first, it won recognition of the national profession
community a few years after its publication (a HUD Design Award).
Recognition by the fellow professionals was substantiated by the plan's
implementation.
Metro Center '85 saw many of its recommendations being carried out
in the next eight years. In fact, the most important progress toward
implementation was made within a few years after its publication. Pri-
vate development in downtown was affected much by national and regional
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economy but active development which began to take place in the late
70s suggests that the plan was successful in creating the confidence in
downtown. The skyway system developed further and, later in the 70s,
connection to the system became an important factor of locational deci-
sions. This owed much to systematic studies carried out to develop a
10
major implementation program.
Eight years later when the plan was revised, little addition
was necessary to its basic contents (goals, principles, standards,
implementation devices). This attests the significance of the progress
Metro Center '85 had made in defining the quality of the downtown
environment for the future and devising strategies for achieving it.
Essential programming devices (including design districts, historic
preservation, and development districts) and administrative mechanisms
(e.g. strengthening of CUE and creation of the Heritage Preservation
Committee) had already been identified in this plan and many of them
realized to improve the process of development.
The chief of the environment design team later wrote that Metro
Center '85's contribution to city planning and urban design in
Minneapolis was perhaps in the following three areas:
- The strategy it developed for coordinating public and private
actions;
- The acquisition of legal tools to enable it to happen; and
- The process it followed.
(Lu, 1974)
In regard to the last point, Metro Center '85 marked an important
milestone in the Minneapolis urban design program. The environmental
design study offered the urban design staff a chance for integrating
urban design considerations into a major planning program and a new
focus -- to develop an urban design framework and an urban design
management system for the downtown community. Many of the design
concepts and approaches developed earlier were refined in this study on
the basis of intensive studies of the downtown environment. The agenda
-- projects and studies to be carried out -- became clear. With the
creation of a permanent design office (the Urban Design Studio) in the
planning department, specific projects and studies were actively
carried out to put recommendations of Metro Center '85 forward. In this
way, the urban design staff acquired a firm basis on which to work on
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the urban design framework for the entire city later. All these were
possible because the CIP Urban Design Study prepared the urban design
staff for this study. In fact, the most significant impact of the CIP
Urban Design Study seems to be the success of the Metro Center '85
Environmental Design Program.
A New Phase of Development
Demand for further development of the theories
and techniques of urban design
* An overview
In early 1976, the first public hearing was held before the
planning commission to consider a proposed citywide urban design frame-
work. This public hearing revealed that neighborhood groups had not
been consulted about the proposal during five years of "public review
and comment". Upon neighborhood groups' request, a process of neigh-
borhood review and revision began. The result was the staff proposal
virtually replaced by neighborhood groups'. This and public controversy
over the proposed master design district ordinance suggest deficiencies
that existed in the planning process at the time. In a word, the plan-
ning process allowed city design policy to be developed without firm
knowledge of the concerns and wishes of people in neighborhoods.
Moreover, the process of city design policy formulation did not offer
a forum for public discussion on isues that were basically policy
matters like the role of design review in the process of development.
The mid 70s was the time of rising neighborhood interests in
Minneapolis. Neighborhood groups' opposition to these two proposals
began to make such a problematic nature of the process of urban design
visible.
At the same time, public sentiment was increasing that the city
coordinator had concentrated too much power in one office. Subsequently,
in 1976, the Minneapolis voters approved government reorganization
moving the power of the city coordinator to plan and budget to the mayor.
This event suggests that the whole orientation of city government in
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planning and development -- to facilitate coordination and development
from top down -- was in question, not just a matter of what to propose
and how to incorpoate citizens' wishes in planning proposals.
The government reorganization implemented in 1978 drastically
changed the context of city planning and urban design. The planning
department was no more at a single decision center. The public was
demanding more responsiveness from city government at the same time.
This made the improvement of the process of urban design and the theories
and techniques of urban design of immediate necessity. Above all, the
planning department had to develop sophistication in means of communica-
tion and control in planning and implementation.
0 The Visual Design Framework
In May 1970, Weiming Lu completed a two-volume draft report to
conclude the CIP Urban Design Study -- "Design Framework for Minneapolis"
and "Design Process for Minneapolis". The first volume presented issues,
goals, objectives, and policies for the citywide urban design framework
in seven strategic areas (e.g. preservation and enhancement of natural
resources; improving housing and living environment; and working environ-
ment) among other things. The second volume discussed legal tools (e.g.
zoning, street design, and design review), administrative process (e.g.
zoning and building process, design review, and capital program process),
and the private sector's roles (e.g. education, design professionals,
and news media).
Without waiting long, the urban design staff was able to go ahead
with the preparation of a citywide urban design framework for official
action. In 1971, the planning commission set out to frame a new city
plan as part of work to revise the comprehensive municipal plan. The
project was to develop goals, objectives, and principal policies as a
guiding instrument through which functional elements and area develop-
ment policies would be developed. In the fall of 1971, the planning
department produced a discussion draft for the Program Policies and the
Area Development Guide, the latter including the City Design Framework.
Gordon Wagner, principal planner, headed the project team and worked on
the City Design Framework himself. Weiming Lu moved to Dallas in 1971
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to head a newly established urban design division. Wagner's strategy
was to draft the City Design Framework as a summary of the "Design Frame-
work for Minneapolis". Neither additional surveys nor citizen
involvement was called for.
Around 1972, the Program Policies and the Area Development Guide
were subjected to public review and revised upon comments received.
In May 1974, the planning commission adopted the Program Policies as
revision of goals, objectives, and principal policies of the comprehen-
sive municipal plan. The city council followed the planning commission
in amending the comprehensive municipal plan later in February 1975.11
The planning staff continued their work on the Area Development
Guide. During 1975, some of its sections were adopted after three public
hearings. On March 18, 1976, the first public hearings were held before
the planning commission to specifically consider the City Design Frame-
work as the first supplement to the Area Development Guide. In this
hearing, the staff suddenly found problems with the planning process.
Upon neighborhood groups' request, the planning commission resolved that
the staff be directed to redraft the document and distribute it to
neighborhood groups (especially PDCAC's) and interested organizations
for comment. The staff also had to assess how their proposals would
fit into neighborhood plans, since the official community-level citizen
planning groups called Planning District Citizens Advisory Committees
(PDCAC's) had been conducting needs assessment of communities upon the
city's request.
An intensive neighborhood review process began. A few public
hearings were held during June and September only to reveal that the
staff was not responsive enough to satisfy neighborhood groups. For
example, on September 23, Ted Horowitz, Calhoun-Isles PDCAC, speaking
on behalf of the Council of Community Councils, expressed concerns of
neighborhood groups while Normal Olson, Chairperson of CUE, regretted
that the first section "Overview" "had been lost because it put people
back on their own in defining urban design" (Minneapolis CPC Minutes,
September 23, 1976). The neighborhood review process was almost over
when the staff completed the October 4 draft of the urban design frame-
work, now renamed the Visual Design Framework. This draft was
significantly different from ones that had been prepared before May 6,
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1976. Some sections received major revisions, even wholesome replace-
ment, while others minor ones. Before the planning commission's
unanimous action to adopt the proposal on November 23, 1976, the Visual
Design Framework was laid over a few more times for further revisions
but no significant changes were made in its substance.
The fact that changes that were made before May 6, 1976 are rela-
tively minor suggests that little input was secured from neighborhood
groups early in the process of drafting and public review. It is
problematic that some five years of "public discussion" neither allowed
the urban design staff to understand the way people in neighborhoods
defined design-related issues nor prepared the staff for effective
dealing with their wishes. The staff drafted the Visual Design Frame-
work without up-to-date knowledge of what people wanted in neighborhoods
to begin with. These problems in the planning process derived from
inbalance in the development of the theories and techniques of urban
design by this time. On the one hand, the form of city design plan
("design framework"), design concepts, and technical means of developing
plans (including citizen image surveys) had been refined well. On the
other hand, mechanisms of collecting up-to-date information as to how
people in neighborhoods saw design-related issues and wanted their
environment to be and, perhaps, more actively communicating with them
on a regular and citywide basis had been virtually non-existent.
Successes in the Southeast Minneapolis Planning Study and the Metro
Center '85 Environment Design Study in creating such mechanisms were
not repeated.
Changes that took place reflect a change in viewpoint -- from one
of the urban design staff to one of people in neighborhoods. The Visual
Design Framework became more responsive to the wishes neighborhood
groups expressed. A problem here is that the urban design staff was
not successful in balancing neighborhood groups' wishes with their
professional judgement. The effect was to have the value premise of
the Visual Design Framework and the purpose of taking each course of
action proposed in policies obscured. Policies lost the goal-like
quality to encourage research and exploration. The Visual Design
Framework became like a wish list of more or less specific courses of
action. Specific solutions dominated general approaches, strategies,
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procedures, and planning programs. This must be a problem with the
process of urban design and the theories and techniques which supported
it.
It is significant that the Visual Design Framework recognized
urban design as major part of the city's official policy for the first
time in this city. However, urban design was without goals of its own;
the Area Development Policies were a set of middle-range policies (five-
to ten-year time frame) to implement goals set elsewhere (in ten- to
twenty-year time frame). Moreover, value premises were not made
explicit in the Visual Design Framework.12
0 The master design district ordinance
Two of the three major legal tools for urban design that had been
developed in the CIP Urban Design Study -- development districts and
historic preservation procedures -- became part of the process of urban
design and development in the early 70s. Design districts, however,
remained unimplemented even in the mid 70s while their distinct advantage
had been recognized -by the urban design staff: they would allow design
review to deal with key issues of design quality in each district (Lu,
1979: 15). Many of neighborhoods in Minneapolis were ordinary and
diverse, rejecting uniform design controls to mandate a high level of
design. Earlier, Metro Center '85 and Weiming Lu's draft report on
the urban design process called for establishment of design districts.
There was much outside expectation for design districts as well: the
state enabling legislation for the establishment of design review boards
and design districts was passed and approved in 1971 with broad support.
Meantime, many U.S. cities started to use Minneapolis's proposed ordi-
nance as a model for their own. Thus, establishment of design districts
became an internal mandate of the urban design office in the mid 70s.
Earlier in 1974, the city received a matched grant from the
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to work on a comprehensive city
design framework and city design process. A later phase of the study
was to create specific, highly detailed design guidelines for the areas
where potential for implementation was highest. The urban design staff
chose to work in the Whittier East area after considering several areas
identified as possible design districts in 1973 -- the downtown area
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around the Hennepin Country Government Center, Nicollet Island,
Seward East, and Whittier East.
Whittier East was a subneighborhood of Whittier. The area had
distinctive character and its location had strategic importance to the
city because it surrounded the Minneapolis Institute of Arts, the
Minneapolis College of Art and Design, and Washburn Fair Oak Park. At
the same time, the area needed some planning attention as it was
experiencing substantial social and physical changes (Minneapolis P&D,
1976b: 4). In Febraury 1975, the city council authorized the city
planners to begin considering how to designate Whitter East as a design
district. The Whitter East Design Study was thus begun.
The area residents and others interested in the design study
started to meet on a regular basis in February 1975, right at the
beginning of the study. While there was "a pocket of resistance", the
staff found the study attracting "support from a broad spectrum of
interest within the proposed boundaries" (Star, August 12, 1975). The
urban design staff concluded their work with the area residents in the
spring of 1976. The final report, Whittier East Design Study, including
recommendations for design district designation and design review
guidelines was completed and presented to the planning commission and
the area residents in December 1976.
Meantime, revisions of the master ordinance for design districts
was in progress. Back in April 1975, a temporary citizen advisory
group in Whittier East was reviewing the latest proposal. A draft dated
July 10, 1975 already incorporated "community comments". However, when
the first public hearing on the proposed ordinance was held on October
28, 1976, the planning commission found it necessary to refer it back
to the Comprehensive Plan Committee with a request that the staff hold
a working session with concerned citizens to resolve objections raised.
Major opposition came from neighborhood groups including those in the
Whittier East area.
Debate continued. The planning commission once having delayed its
action in November 1976, endorsed the proposed ordinance as revised, 6 to
3, on January 27, 1977 after heated debate. The revised ordinance pro-
posal significantly incorported neighborhood groups' demands: especially,
the design review board was to be established with four district members
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representing property owners, residents, proprietors and their
employees along with three citywide members appointed by the city
council and CUE. Initially, the board was conceived as a technical
advisory committee made up of design experts and was authorized as such
by the state enabling law. The ordinance proposal forwarded to the city
council began to draw opposition from two sides. Some neighborhood
groups were pushing the city council to allow better representation of
neighborhood residents on the design review board -- more district
members and election rather than appointment. Urban designers and
others, on the other hand, were worried about neighborhood groups taking
over control to maintain the status quo in neighborhoods (e.g. Dewey
Thorbeck, chairman of the Urban Design Committee, CUE, in Tribune,March 11,
1978). Basic issues such as adding another layer of burden on develop-
ment and displacement of low-income residents had remained unresolved.
The ordinance proposal had to go back and forth between the planning
commission and the Community Development Committee of the city council,
until the committee tabled it indefinitely upon the request of CUE in
early 1978. In the course of public debate, various new factors entered
the scene. Most important, however, was perhaps a sense that a polari-
zation had developed to lead proponents of the ordinance nowhere (Dewey
Thorbeck and Mike Sindt, chairman of the Standish Neighborhood Council,
in Tribune, March 11, 1978).
This case raises various issues:
- Implications of the way the purpose and scope of the study
was initially defined (a "design district" study) or the way
urban design was packaged in a planning program;
- Issues around control: the urban design staff's control over
the planning process vs. neighborhood groups' demand for
control over the whole process of physical development and
change in neighborhoods; and
- Implications of the strength of neighborhood groups and
rising neighborhood interests in the mid 70s; among others.
However, what I am most concerned with here is the process of urban
design that was followed. It is problematic in two ways. At first,
looking at the process of developing and adopting the ordinance itself,
the urban design staff was not effective in measuring neighborhood
feelings toward design review and design districts, citywide and early
in the process. Neither were they effective in reaching neighborhood
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groups and guiding public discussion toward the building of a broad
consensus early. It became increasingly difficult to make tradeoffs
and compromises as more and more details were set. Ironically, the
circle of discussion (participation) became larger as time passed.
Initially, the proposed ordinance was reviewed by a temporary advisory
committee and the Whittier East area residents, both in conjunction with
the Whittier East Design Study. A series of working sessions with
"concerned citizens" then began upon a request of the planning commission.
Finally, the ordinance had to be carried out to each PDCAC's and
neighborhood organizations upon a request of the city council. All these
took place in the face of rising neighborhood power.
Second, viewing a larger context, a fact that a specific ordinance
was proposed without initial public consensus as to the desirability of
establishing design districts and the role design review ought to play
in the process of development may be taken as an issue. The concept
of design district was at first developed in the CIP Urban Design Study
as a tool for implementing urban design frameworks and, then, reiterated
in the implementation program of Metro Center '85. No broad citizen
participation took place to discus.s this concept of a citywide basis.
Neither the process of developing and adopting the Visual Design Frame-
work offered a forum for elaborating this concept. The Visual Design
Framework proposed during 1971 - mid 1976 had no mention of design dis-
tricts. Once a policy to "consider the use of design districts to
protect areas of critical visual importance" so as to "support individual
neighborhoods in determining the best means for improving visual quality"
(an action policy; cf. Chapter VI) was incorporated into the proposal,
public discussion did not go further to define the nature and role of
design review to be exercised in design districts (no design management
policy). The process of debating the Visual Design Framework thus did
not materialize an opportunity for creating broad public consensus on
these issues. The process of adopting the master design district
ordinance had to carry the burden of creating such consensus.
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* Administrative reorganization of 1978
In 1976, another event took place to signal the change that was
taking place in the context of city planning and urban design in
Minneapolis: in a referendum, voters approved charter amendments for
administrative reorganization. This involved relocation of planning
and finance departments from the city coordinator's office to the
mayor's office. Reducing the power of the city coordinator and
strengthening the mayor to balance the two wings of government was the
intent of this move.
The root of this reorganization was deep. At first, the State of
Minnesota has had no home-rule charter. Each city has to petition the
legislature to see its wishes through. This had created a demand for
political efficiency and accessibility to city government. At the same
time, there has been a long tradition of "good government" in Minnesota
cities. A system of checks and balances to insure no one individual
or office has too much power and decisions are made through open dis-
cussion has been considered to be of special importance. On the other
hand, a sentiment was increasing in the mid 70s that the consolidation
of all the planning and development functions under the city coordinator
resulted in too much power in one office.
The Minneapolis Citizens League and other influential civic leaders
led the general public and lobbied for a Charter Commission. In the
early 70s, the commission was established to find an alternative struc-
ture for city government. The commission concluded that the public
needed to know who was advocating things on their behalf and who was
deciding them. The whole orientation of city government in planning
and development --- to facilitate coordination and development from top
down -- was in question. City government was expected to be more
responsive to the needs and wishes of people. The 1976 referendum was
the commission's solution. The effect of this administrative reorgani-
zation was the splitting of the powerful planning function combining
long-range planning and development programming down in the middle. To
develop plans and implement them, the two wings of government have to
negotiate more openly. The planning department (to be the Mayor's City
Planning Department in 1978) had to adjust to this new context.
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A new phase of development in the theories and techniques of urban
design: comprehensive planning for the 80s
The Metropolitan Land Planning Act of 1976 created a carrot and
stick for completing a comprehensive plan. This act required that a
comprehensive plan be submitted to the Metropolitan Council by July
1980 for review and, then, adopted by the city council by January
1981. A local comprehensive planning assistance grant was available
from the Metropolitan Council. At the same time, a new context of
government after administrative reorganization demanded that the mayor
and planning staff put a real faith in comprehensive planning. The
new administrative organization made city planning linking policies
and plans to budget the primary source of the power of the mayor. It
was essential that the mayor and planning staff develop sophistication
in ways of communication and control in order to get their wishes
through. They had to influence decisions of city departments that were
outside the sphere of the mayor as well as those of actors outside city
government. This was a demand for a new phase of development in the
theories and techniques of urban design as well. Long-awaited work
on the comprehensive plan was thus begun. At first, the staff worked
on a program to revise Metro Center '85 during September 1977 - August
1978. Work on the entire comprehensive plan waited till a new mayor
took his office on January 1, 1978.
The city expanded the scope of the comprehensive plan and did more
than what was mandated by the state. The city wanted to prepare a plan
which would take community and neighborhood concerns into consideration
and to make it useful for influencing day-to-day decisions about city
development.(Minneapolis PD, 1979a) A four-step planning process began
in February 1978 with a series of meetings in planning districts under
the sponsorship of the mayor and the planning commission. The process
went through identification of issues (the first step), formulation of
goals and policies (the second step), and development of specific plans
(the third step). The third step ended with the planning commission
adoption of the Plan for the 80s on July 26, 1979 after five public
hearings. At the time of my field visit, the city was going through
the last step -- the Metropolitan Council's review and the city council
action. Under the mayor's leadership, citizen participation received
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much emphasis. Citizens were involved broadly (e.g. several rounds of
community and neighborhood meetings) and substantively (e.g. drafting of
community plans by PDCAC's). According to the Hearing Draft of the
Plan for the 80s, the document drew upon the contribution of 8,000 to
9,000 people who had attended over 500 meetings during an eighteen-
month period (Minneapolis PD, 1979a).
The Plan for the 80s as adopted by the planning commission consists
of twenty chapters.13 The first chapter is an overview which summarizes
the rest of the chapters. The next seven chapters are citywide plans
for functional elements such as housing, economic development, and
property services (including water treatment and supply, sewers, and
solid waste collection and disposal). Then come eleven community plans.
The last chapter defines general management and implementation strategies.
The Plan for the 80s includes two separate sections (plans) to deal
specifically with urban design concerns -- heritage preservation and the
visual quality in the physical environment chapter. The Heritage
Preservation Plan sets forth a rather specific goal of "preserv[ing] his-
toric and significant buildings and districts allowing modifications
for contemporary use" and discusses the process by which the city's
architectural and historic heritage can best be saved. Other aspects of
a more comprehensive urban design perspective are discussed in other
parts of the plan, though, like in individual community plans, without
clear articulation of urban design concerns and explicit reference to
value premises of urban design.
The Plan for the 80s makes the Visual Quality Plan the key urban
design element. This follows the precedent of the Visual Design Frame-
work. While many of the basic ideas and concepts adopted in the Visual
Quality Plan were in earlier plans, it has done several things for the
first time in Minneapolis at the same time, suggesting an important
change that has taken place in the official status of urban design in
this city:
- It has given recognition to the strategic importance of the
visual quality to the city as a whole as part of official
policy statement;
- It has made a goal for visual design part of the city's
goals: "to protect and enhance the visual quality of the
natural and man-made environment in Minneapolis";
- It has articulated basic value premises in visual design
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explicitly as part of official policy statement: three
"basic visual design principles";14
- It has incorporated legibility (identity, structure, and
meaning) into basic value premises in visual design: e.g.
"recognizable" functional areas, "understandable" city, and
"reflect functions and activities"; and
- It has incorporated a set of policies for the decision-making
process as well as each of four kinds of environment
(residential, commercial, and industrial areas and scenic
assets).
Earlier, the Visual Design Framework lost explicit reference to city
images (legibility, identity, and structure) and city-scale views in the pro-
cess of neighborhood review. Design for the purpose of these has regained
its legitimacy in the Visual Quality Plan (cf. the three "basic visual
design principles" and Policy 18). The official status of urban design
in Minneapolis means more than simple designing for "visual amenities"
of neighborhoods or beautification of places to be made without reference
to the overall visual structure of the city.
The Visual Quality Plan recognizes that it is difficult to find an
agreement on what the city should look like while the goal of a more
attractive and livable Minneapolis is widely supported and that the
visual image of the city in a private market economy continually evolves
as a result of many individual development decisions (Minneapolis PD,
1979a: IV-79). The plan thus emphasizes "policies and strategies" for
guiding this evolutionary process to enhance visual quality. It follows
that policies of the plan ought to be used and implemented. Naturally,
the plan puts much substance in its Action program ("Implementation
Strategy" and "Priority Framework"15).
The Visual Quality Plan is a success in several respects:
- The staff proposal (the Discussion Statement) proved to be
responsive to the concerns and wishes of people, especially
neighborhood groups; it thus received little change in its
substance, yet represents good professional judgement for the
following reasons;
- It has value premises explicitly stated in terms of concepts
that were once removed from the staff proposal for the Visual
Design Framework (legibility, identity, structure, and meaning);
and
- It has allowed the formation of a general community agreement
(i.e. city policy) as to the use of design review in the pro-
cess of urban design and the role of the design review board
(accepting the CUE's role as the design review board) --
issues that were extremely controversial at the time the
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proposed master design district ordinance was considered;
in conjunction with this,
- It has allowed the formulation of a general community agree-
ment as to the need to define desirable qualities of
environment in communities and to develop design principles
for citywide systems such as street lighting and traffic
signs, policies and guidelines for sign removal and consoli-
dation, and design review guidelines (Policy 33 and the
Implementation Strategy, Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-94,
98-100, and 102); and
- It has made highrises outside the downtown less of an issue
by adopting a policy to develop height limits in areas outside
the downtown (Policy 33).
The process of preparing the Visual Quality Plan differs greatly
from that of the Visual Design Framework except in one respect: the
basis for the plan was already there at the beginning of the planning
(drafting) process -- the "Design Framework for Minneapolis" in a case
of the Visual Design Framework, and the Visual Design Framework
(publicly debated and adopted only a year or so before) in the case of
the Visual Quality Plan. The Discussion Statement of the Visual Quality
Plan issued in December 1978 as a section of "Protecting the Environment
through the 1980s" was subjected to broad public review along with
other elements of the comprehensive plan. Hard questions were asked:
Should the city use a design review process or develop other suitable
guidelines and incentives to encourage and educate towards good design?
If the city decides to develop a design review board, should CUE be that
agency? What should the city's stand be on stricter sign control? To
what extent should the city's approach and plan for visual quality be
more aggressive, gutsy and integrated into the other elements of the
plan? ... (The Independent-Republican Caucus of the City Council,
Minneapolis, 1979) The Hearing Draft issued in June 1979 saw little
change from the Discussion Statement in the substance (basic concepts in
principles, goals, objectives, and policies). It is important to note
that the process of comprehensive planning for the 80s allowed the pro-
ject staff to have a good idea of the concerns and wishes of people
in neighborhoods from the outset. Issues in neighborhoods were identi-
fied with extensive citizen involvement (the first step). Community
planners were reporting what they were getting while PDCAC's were
drafting community plans (the second step). Moreover, the staff was
already fully aware of specifics that would make policy proposals
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controversial (e.g. highrises and freeways) after much debate with
neighborhood groups during the process of revising the Visual Design
Framework. The Visual Quality Plan was thus drafted to be ready for
adoption. It is too early to assess the effect of the Visual Quality
Plan now. However, it would be appropriate to see that this plan
along with the Visual Design Framework and the master design district
ordinance proposals has put the staff on the road toward a new phase
of development in the theories and techniques of urban design in
Minneapolis.
Epilogue
Issues around Minneapolis' approach
In Minneapolis, a citywide urban design study to formulate city
design policy began in 1965, almost at the beginning of its urban design
program, and a preliminary city design plan was drafted within a year
(the Preliminary City Design Policy Plan of 1966). However, it took six
years for the staff to propose a city design plan in an adoptable form
(the City Design Framework, discussion draft, 1971) and eleven years to
have city design policy officially adopted (the Visual Design Framework
of 1976). The staff did several major urban design studies but the
progress toward the completion of an official city design plan was
gradual.
While the Minneapolis urban design program is exemplary in many
ways, it was only the Visual Quality Plan of 1979 that made urban design
a full element of the comprehensive plan with a goal, objectives, and
policies of its own. Up to this point, the status of urban design
changed gradually from 1) a rather undefinable area of city planning
(the first downtown plan of the late 50s) to 2) primarily an area of
implementation programs and actions (the CIP), and further to 3) an
area of policy without its own goals officially adopted (the Visual
Design Framework). Observing the nature of major studies and plans, the
general trend was:
- From district-level to citywide (from the Southeast
Minneapolis Planning Study to the CIP Urban Design Study;
from the Metro Center '85 downtown plan to the Visual
Design Framework);
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- From unofficial plans to official plans (from the 1959 down-
town plan to Metro Center '85; from the Preliminary City
Design Policy Plan to the Visual Design Framework);
- From internal-technical development (in the 60s and the
early 70s) to formal-political development with substantial
citizen participation (since the mid-70s); and
- From initial completion to cmoprehensive revision (from the
Visual Design Framework to the Visual Quality Plan).
This form of prolonged process of city design policy formulation
maintaining important aspects of the one-time comprehensive study has
merit of its own. Above all, urban designers can learn through expe-
rience. They can do much exploration over time, and problems at one
time (e.g. the loss of the urban design staff's proposals in the Visual
Design Framework) could be corrected later (e.g. the recovery of impor-
tant urban design concepts in the Visual Quality Plan). This is thus
a trial-and-error approach. When citizen inputs are assured as in
Minneapolis in the late 70s, citizens can learn during the process as
well and the result would be city design policy responsive to their
concerns and wishes while balancing them with professional judgement
(e.g. the Visual Quality Plan).
This strategy, on the other hand, had forced the urban design
staff to stay with incomplete (at least unofficial) products and uncer-
tain status of urban design (i.e. a city design plan only in the mind
of urban designers or in the urban design office) till they got their
plans completed at a small scale (Metro Center '85) and, then, with it
till a city design plan is adopted (the Visual Design Framework and the
Visual Quality Plan). It is rather surprising that urban design in
Minneapolis during the first half of the 70s functioned reasonably well
in areas where city design policy could make a difference. (There were
other problems like a difficulty of getting development districts going
during a time of economic slump.)
Problems had to surface later, however. Interim products inter-
nally developed became obsolete over time while untested with citizen
inputs. The Visual Design Framework as proposed by the staff was
inconsistent with the aspiration of people in neighborhoods and
criticized by neighborhood groups as "oriented to the 1960s ideals"
(Charles Warner, the Council of Community Councils, Minneapolis CPC
Minutes, June 17, 1976). Various circumstances seem to have prevented
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the staff from completing their city design plan early despite their
wishes. (At first, they wanted to prepare the citywide urban design
framework in the CIP Urban Design Study. Second, the City (Visual)
Design Framework was drafted in an adoptable form within several months
once a program to revise the comprehensive municipal plan began in
1971 while it took some five years to see its official adoption.)
Reflecting the context of the Minneapolis urban design program
Presented below is a brief discussion of the following factors as
they relate to the status of urban design and the progress toward the
completion of the city design plan:
- The theories and techniques of city design policy formulation;
- The general social-political environment: little demand and
support from the people of the city; and
- The governmental context: opportunities but little demand for
sophistication.
In Minneapolis, the most important factor seems to be the theories
and techniques of city design policy formulation. Urban designers had
been part of the planning staff since the planning department rejuvena-
tion in the late 50s. But they had to wait for some years so that 'their
awareness of the role urban design should play in city planning could
could match the development of the theories and techniques of urban
design. By the mid 60s, necessary technical expertise had been developed
in the field. Kevin Lynch's work provided the urban design staff with
theoretical and methodological guidance. New concepts and methods in
Lynch (1960) and Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer (1964) helped the urban
design staff articulate goals and policies for urban design and allowed
conscious pursuit of the purpose of urban design as a matter more than
personal taste and artistic skill.
However, the urban design staff needed to do much exploration and
learning themselves through. experience. They knew what their approach
should be (formulation of city design policy as a framework for decision-
making and design control) and what they wanted (an urban design
framework for the city) in general but they had to find out exactly what
city design policy should state and how it should address urban design
issues. Thus, they spent considerable time during the latter half of
the 60s in refining policies once formulated preliminarily. (Given
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limited resources, they had to do this with a weak data base. No
extensive visual form inventory was made on a citywide basis.) The
concept of urban design as public policy was yet to be articulated in
this country then. The Minneapolis urban design staff were ahead of
the national progress in the field. Viewed this way, more money and
staff (implying public support and favorable governmental contex) would
have helped but they would not have reduced the need for exploration
and learning through experience.
Also, the urban design staff capability per se was not an issue.
It is true that a few urban designers dispersed in the planning depart-
ment allowed only limited in-house development of the theories and
techniques of urban design. But this was an asset as well: The CIP
Urban Design Study was benefited greatly by broad participation of
urban design talents in and outside the city. Limited leadership from
the top, the administrator-planning director, seems inevitable given
the level of sophistication in the theories and techniques of urban
design. There was much uncertainty about the capability of urban
design (rather than the urban design staff) to deliver and the use of
the product of citywide urban design studies. Drawing examples from
precedents is a powerful way to argue in this field without a strong
theory but there was virtually no precedent of citywide studies at the
time.
Neither was there any strong outside pressure on city government
to deal with urban design or demand for improving the theories and
techniques of urban design (not urban development). A city like
Minneapolis in the late 50s and the early 60s that was experiencing
little physical change did not make urban design so much an issue,
although urban design to create an attractive city could do something
about staggering economy and deterioration of the central city gradually
in progress. It is only in the 70s that some specific urban design-
related concerns, especially freeways and highrises, began to be
important issues of the city. Minneapolis, being an ordinary mid-
Western city, the level of design consciousness on the part of
citizens was not high. The city's physical environment was neither
so good nor so bad to make a need for good urban design visible.
Moreover, without much physical and economic development happening
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in this city, people, especially city officials and businessmen, were
not inclined to support strong design controls. The city wanted
development. Thus, except in downtown, there was little immediate
demand, pressure, or support for good urban design. The downtown
business community was supportive of good design, if tangible improve-
ment was assured without too much extra cost (e.g. Nicollet Mall).
The governmental context in Minneapolis has been generally
favorable to urban design, though in different ways at different times.
The governmental context seems important especially during 1968-77
because it created little demand for sophisticated means of communica-
tion and control in urban design like city design policy at the time
when the Minneapolis urban design program was maturing. Going back
in the history of urban design in Minneapolis, the planning department
was already winning the status of city planning within city government
around the late 50s and the early 60s. There remained much skepticism
about city planning, especially in the city council, in the late 50s,
but the planning department was beginning to establish its firm posi-
tion within city government through its work in downtown planning and
comprehensive planning. Initial confidence was won from some neighbor-
hood groups and the downtown business community, the very group which
had persuaded the city to strengthen the planning deparment. Stimula-
ting private development and reversing the trend of declining population
and business in the city and its downtown had become the major concern
of city government in Minneapolis since the mid 50s. City planning in
this climate received much support. At the same time, the importance
of good design in downtown was well recognized by the business community.
City planning in Minneapolis thus created a place for urban design.16
As it entered the mid-60s, the locus of city planning in the
administrative structure meant little since the planning commission
began to develop close ties with the city council which oversaw
community improvement activities. The Minneapolis Community Improve-
ment Program allowed the planning staff to conduct a series of studies
at citywide and district ("community") levels and to develop goals,
objectives, and policies for the improvement of the city. This gave
the urban design staff an opportunity to conduct a citywide urban
design study as a later addition to the CIP Study when it was half way
- 53 -
through. Increasing ties between city planning and development func-
tions were formalized in the government reorganization of 1968.
Creation of the office of the city coordinator with a strong, combined
planning and development function, along with the creation of a small
urban design office within the planning department, facilitated the
promotion of urban design in the city's planning and development
programs. Urban design became a forceful tool of city development.
Ironcially, however, a favorable climate for urban design in the
office of the city coordinator created little demand for sophisticated
mechanisms of communication and control in urban design. With a close
link to the city coordinator's function to coordinate and develop,
there was little need for city design policy as a tool of communication,
decision-making, and design control. Important city decisions took
place within the city coordinator's office. Also, the city's interest
in getting development projects done diverted the city's attention from
long-range policy planning on a citywide basis to middle-range program-
ming (e.g. the Metro Center '85 comprehensive downtown development plan)
and opportunistic intervention in strategic projects. Also, the
governmental context which put the urban design staff at the city's
decision center did not encourage sophistication in ways of dealing
with multiple interests of the community in the plan-making process.
The form and substance of the urban design framework has been refined,
but ways of incorporating inputs from citizens (especially neighbor-
hood groups) and communicating with them had not. Thus, the theories
and techniques of urban design became a problem in another way in the
mid 70s, at the time of rising neighborhood interests.
The 1978 administrative reorganization is thus very important. It
made the practice of urban design difficult but in a way it facilitates
the development of the overall theories and techniques of urban design --
broadening of the base of urban design to meet challenges in neighbor-
hoods and sophistication in formulation and use of city design policy
to deal with a plural set of actors inside and outside city government.
Considering all these factors, Minneapolis' strategy for city design
policy formulation may be viewed as one-time comprehensive study
repeated several times -- unsuccessfully initially (with no formal plan
adoption) and successfully later. Cyclic process (repeated studies on
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a citywide basis and in a few strategic districts) does not seem to be
the result of the urban design staff's first choice.
CHAPTER II
CASE STUDY 2: THE SAN FRANCISCO URBAN DESIGN PLAN
Introduction
In 1968, the San Francisco Department of City Planning embarked on
a total revision of the comprehensive plan (master plan) for the City
and County of San Francisco for the first time in twenty-five years.
The work of revision was separated into a series of elements, each
representing a category of city concenrs or facilities such as resi-
dence, education, social services, transportation, and urban design.
(San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3) The work began at first on the urban
design element and a citywide urban design plan was completed in
May 1971.
The Urban Design Plan marks significant innovation in urban design
in this country. It sets forth as public policy for the entire city a
broad definition of the desirable quality of physical environment devel-
oped on the basis of systematic studies of the quality of enviornment
and implementation approach. Urban designers in San Francisco and other
cities at the time knew no precedent dealing with the form and charac-
ter of a major city so extensively. Even today, this plan remains to
be one of the most extensive public statement of principles of good
design for a city.
The Urban Design Plan was also a success. Within a few months of
its publication, the City Planning Commission adopted it with signifi-
cant citizen support. Some policies set forth in the plan saw early
legislative actions for implementation and the whole document has be-
come an important basis for day-to-day decision-making of the planning
commission and its staff. Citizens use the plan as common terms of
reference in discussing design-related issues in the city. In view of
its broad acceptance and widespread use, it is perhaps one of the most
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successful comprehensive plan elements ever formulated in this country.
It has become a model in some other cities as well (e.g. Spartanburg,
S.C., and San Diego, Ca.).
The planning staff in San Francisco held a view that the whole
process of urban design had to begin with a comprehensive plan, in
this case, a citywide urban design plan. This is a view that is or-
thodox in planning thinking but rarely implemented successfully in
actual practice (cf. comprehensive plans prepared to be shelved). This
chapter discusses the intent and nature of the planning staff's approach
to urban design, especially looking at the following in the context of
their practice:
- The status of urban design: an element of the comprehensive
plan;
- The urban design plan as a definition of the desirable qual-
ity of environment;
- The urban design plan as a systematic response to design-
related issues of the city;
- The substance of the urban design plan: policy;
- The role of the urban design plan: a process-oriented tool;
and
- The relationship of the urban design plan to decision-making
and implementation.-
Mad rush toward the sky1
San Francisco abounds with image evoking natural and man-made fea-
tures. This is a city built at the head of peninsula endowed with
rolling-hills between the sea and distant mountains. A sweeping pattern
of streets and small-scale buildings follow the natural topography of
hills and valleys, giving the city color, texture, and views. Its
history brought various groups of people together and added to its
rich image and character: the initial establishment as a Spanish mission
in 1776; Mexican rule during 1821-46; seizure by the U.S. naval force in
1846 and naming of the town as San Francisco in 1847; the gold ruch
following the discovery of gold in California in 1848; development of
the town as a terminus of trans-continental railroad since 1869 and as
a gateway to the Far East, receiving waves of immigrants; rise of trade
and finance to become the banking and shipping capital of the West,
quickly recovering from the great earthquake and fire of 1906; the United
Nations Conference on International Organization in 1945 ... . In this
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way, San Francisco has grown into a cosmopolitan city, and, at the
same time, a city of neighborhoods. The vitality and charm of this
city owe much to its neighborhoods with various cultural traditions
and life styles as well as its unsurpassed physical setting. Some
150 active neighborhood organizations, along with several major
educational institutions in and around the city, add special sophis-
tication to this city.
In 1966, a Gallup poll named San Francisco the city that most
people would like to live in and the city with the most beautiful
setting. It is said that every American who has travelled from coast
to coast claims two cities -- his own and San Francisco. San Francis-
cans have been well aware of their rich natural and cultural endowment
and have been very proud of their city. Views, images, character,
beauty, aesthetics, livability, the quality of life -- all about urban
design -- matter in this city (Jacobs, 1971: 27; Herb Caen in Chronicle,
January 4, 1970, quoted in San Francisco DCP, 1969d).
Naturally, most of major planning issues in San Francisco have
involved urban design questions for some time (Svirsky, 1973: 9). The
city has only a small area of 45.4 square miles with most of its area
already developed, yet it is still growing. Growth, however, has been
posing serious questions on the future of this city. Growth in an
already built-up city inevitably means loss of familiar, small-scale
buildings and taking of valuable open spaces to make way for larger
buildings, generally out of scale and character of the existing areas.
In the 60s, an awareness was growing that with each new building the
beloved quality of the city, its fine texture or human scale, was being
lost. Negative effects of growth were becoming quite visible. A dra-
matic change in downtown skyline during the 60s more than anything
else told San Franciscans the progress of an alarming situation in the
face of strong pressure for development. The image of the city was
being threatened: "Once there was a San Francisco that was light and
pastel, hilly, open and inviting," said Alvin Duskin's coloring book
(ca. 1970), "Then rich men built tall buildings and San Francisco
began to look stiff and forbidding like any other American city."
People started to fear the consequence of continued growth which in
many other cities had led to extremes inconsistent with the traditions
- 58 -
that were valued in San Francisco -- "Manhattanization".
San Franciscans expected their city to be a good place to live and
experience. As they cared much about their city, they were willing to
do a battle if its image and character, beauty and tradition, were
threatened. The world-famous "freeway revolt" in the late 60s is a
dramatic example. A list of individual development proposals which
resulted in confrontations -- like Fontana Apartments and Inter-
national Market Center -- grew throughout the 60s. At the same time,
neighborhood residents were increasing their sophistication throughout
the 60s and mounted protests to all sorts of projects that might offend
them (Jacobs, 1978b: 190-1).
It is important to note that San Franciscans thought of their city
as a whole. The city had rich images. It had a fine skyline. The
small scale of the entire city, matured stage of urbanization, and
topographic form, all made city-scale views of special importance in
this city. But not all design-related issues were inherently city-
scale or citywide. There were many other concerns that were basically
small-scale and local in nature but were important citywide: traffic,
open space, and the quality and maintenance of streets and properties
among other things (Jacobs, 1971: 27). Neither did all of physical
problems come from growth. The counter-trend of deterioration plagued
some areas of the city (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 2).
Citizen concerns about these issues and about the image and char-
acter of the city did not take an expression of explicit demand for
city planning, however. Individual groups protested specific projects
before them, and those groups tended to be dissolved soon, exhausting
themselves in the battle. Moreover, protests against specific projects
did not take care of the very sources of important issues. Public
conflicts persisted.
Urban design in the late 60s
"Urban design" had already been a part of the city planners' vocabu-
lary in this city in the late 60s and there was a good ground for a
strong urban design program. In 1963, for example, the planning
department and an architectural consultant, Mario J. Ciampi, prepared
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a general plan and design plan for the downtown and a few concepts
developed in those plans became the planning department's policy (San
Francisco DCP, 1969c). The Market Street design study carried out
for the planning department was also an important urban design study
(Mario J. Ciampi and John Carl Warnecke and Associates, 1967). This
study represents a major attempt at urban beautification in conjunc-
tion with BART construction. A $24 million bond issue was approved
by the San Francisco voters in 1968 and the study's beautification
proposals were actually carried out. Today, many observers of the
San Francisco urban design scene regard the Market Street improvement
project as one of the most significant urban design accomplishments
in the city in the recent years in terms of the quality of design and
the scale of project.
Urban design considerations were also an important part of the
downtown zoning study, which was completed in 1966 by the planning
staff with the aid of consultants (San Francisco DCP, 1966; Jacobs,
1971: 24). A new planning director found much problem with the study:
the proposed zoning was not tied to any explicit plan while some kind
of plan was implicit (e.g. to create a more compact, transit-oriented
downtown). However, he went along with the study which had been com-
pleted after two years and one-half of staff work. Amendments to the
planning code involving major rezoning of the downtown area were
approved by the Board of Supervisors in 1968.
However active the practice of urban design may have been, prin-
ciples of good city planning process were not followed in this way and
incorporation of urban design considerations was made haphazardly.
The city had not articulated urban design guidelines citywide except
a general height and form envelope which was implicit in the zoning
ordinance. Moreover, there had been a general preoccupation with the
area in and around the downtown and only limited attention had been
given to design of the rest of the city (San Francisco DCP, 1969c:
47, 48).
The planning staff later observed that, just as there was no
overall plan for urban design, there was no overall administrative
(implementation) system, no authorized hierarchy of standards and pro-
cedures (San Francisco DCP, 1969e: 6). For example, strong public
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interest in the views, skyline, and character of development along
the northern waterfront had resulted in a series of height limits since
1963. It is only in June 1969, however, that those height limits were
related with other development criteria and, together, incorporated
into a plan (the Northern Waterfront Plan adopted as an element of the
comprehensive plan, San Francisco DCP, 1971d). Street vacation had
been controversial for some time, but the city had no standard for giv-
ing up street space. Similarly, the city established the process of
historic landmark preservation with the Landmarks Preservation Advisory
Board in 1967, but the status of historic preservation within urban de-
sign objectives and the place of its process within an overall process
of urban design were left uncharted.
Without an orderly process to guide development, many of major
development projects in the late 60s created conflicts and confronta-
tions between private developers and neighborhood residents and between
private developers and city planners. This was problematic since "the
results of repeated showdowns [would] almost inevitably be poor design
solutions, arbitrary standards and public frustrations". (San Francisco
DCP, 1970e: 11)
Without a public statement of what the city should look like
(Jacobs, 1978b: 190), design as a matter of personal taste prevailed
over urban design as a matter of public interest and there was no way
of realizing an orderly process of urban design.2 Little preparation
on the part of city planners matched haphazard reaction of citizens.
Allan Jacobs, who had arrived in San Francisco to head the planning
department in 1967, immediately saw the problem (Jacobs, 1978b: 190).
His approach was to prepare a citywide urban design plan.
Preparation and Adoption of the Urban Design Plan
The purpose and nature of a citywide urban design plan
The purpose and nature of a citywide urban design to be prepared
can be stated in a few ways. Basically, the planning staff conceived
it as a public statement defining the quality of environment for the
city. It would address important design-related issues that the city
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was likely to face so that it could become a means of expressing public
concerns and a basis for community agreement for a better city.
Adopted as part of the city's master plan, it would be used as a guide
for decision-making in the process of urban design and physical change
and help create a sound process in government. The planning staff
especially expected that it would provide a framework for private devel-
opment that would help eliminate costly and divisive conflicts that
were becoming characteristic of major building proposals at the time.
Beginning the urban design study
Actual work on a citywide urban design plan began more than a
year after Allan Jacobs came to San Francisco, but preparation for the
work began without waiting long. There were some pressure and support
for such a plan. Many of private design professionals -- architects,
landscape architects, and planners -- were calling for a plan both they
and their clients would be expected to observe. A Joint Urban Design
Committee made up of these professionals urged in late 1966 that with-
out a plan and process for urban design, "San Francisco [was] rapidly
throwing away its reputation as the Nation's most beautiful city by
following trends that eventually [would] make it unpleasant, either to
live or to visit". (Quoted in San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 7) The plan-
ning commission was sympathetic, being sensitive to criticism that it
was overly concerned with two-dimensional land-use matters (Jacobs,
1978b: 191). It was also the time when Robert Weaver, Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, said in San Fran-
cisco, "This city and every city long ago should have documented for
itself and its citizenry a clear and unequivocal physical design for
how the city should look and live and feel and breathe". 3
In 1967, the planning staff, having considered several alterna-
tive approaches, decided to undertake a study to prepare a citywide
urban design plan which would become a major part of the city's com-
prehensive plan. The planning department made requests to Mayor
Shelly and the Board of Supervisors to hire new staff members with
urban design expertise. They responded favorably and the department
started to form an urban design team.
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Securing funds for the study was a major problem. The planning
staff saw no chance of the mayor or Board of Supervisors approving the
total cost of the study. However, they soon learned that San Francisco
as a county was eligible for the federal comprehensive planning assis-
tance grant (the HUD 701 program). They prepared more detailed study
outlines and cost estimates and came up with a proposal for a two-year
study costing about $270,000 ($70,000 of local share $90,000 by
assignment of the existing staff, and $20,000 from the mayor and Board
of Supervisors). It proved to be difficult to obtain even $20,000
from the board, but the board finally approved the budget request in
early 1968. An application for the 701 money was approved in June
1968, approximately one year after the decision to undertake an urban
design study. Contracts were signed and work commenced at the end of
1968. (Jacobs, 1978b: 194-6)
The urban design study
Jacobs (1978b) offers us a detailed account of the Urban Design
Study. According to him, the planning staff had some general idea
about the Urban Design Study -- what they would like to do and what
they wanted, if not a complete image of the form and content of the
final product. They wanted to study the city's natural and man-made
physical elements, including topography, views, landmarks, building
height, land cover, open space, and transportation systems. The study
would be carried out at citywide, district, and neighborhood scales to
ultimately produce a citywide urban design plan with objectives, poli-
cies, and principles. Research on means of implementing the plan would
be an essential part of the study.
The study was carried out in three phases during December 1968 and
October 1970. Eight preliminary reports and three special studies
marked the completion of important steps in the study. A citizen
advisory committee called the Urban Design Advisory Committee was
formed at the beginning of the study and played an important role in
guiding the study. The committee, regularly meeting to review and criti-
cize the staff's work, acted as a sounding board for the ideas of the
staff and eventually became influential in determining the outcome of
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the study.4
During the early period of the study, the staff had to feel out
their way and get various studies going. They spent considerable time
in preparing detailed study outlines and work programs, considering
consultants to be hired, starting hiring special staff for the project
(seven individuals), and beginning ground work. Thus, the planning
department issued only three preliminary reports during a one-year
period of the first-phase study while detailed research by staff and
consultants was underway. Those three preliminary reports defined
study format, organized available information, and drew up preliminary
goals, objectives, and policies to guide the study (San Francisco DCP,
1969a, c, d).
The second phase was to develop and analyze new information in
order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of existing physical
features and resources in the city (cf. especially Preliminary Report
No. 4), the needs and desires of people (cf. especially Preliminary
Report No. 6 and the Open Space Study), and the measures that could and
should be taken to preserve and improve the urban design character of
the city and its districts (cf. especially Preliminary Report No. 5).
The fourth preliminary report published in January 1970 marked the
beginning of this phase. Much of research by staff and consultants
started earlier was contained in this 207-page report consisting of
the following four sections (San Francisco DCP, 1970a):
- Quality of environment;
- Internal pattern and image;
- Road environment; and
- External form and image.
The staff had to do much exploration in the search for their direc-
tion by this time. The planning director observed in late 1969:
Outside of the meetings [of the Urban Design Advisory Com-
mittee], neither committee members nor staff did much to
publicize their work. Everyone seemed to be feeling out
his way and not too rapidly at that. The work at this point
was like a very large pot of stew slowly simmering on a
back burner, continually being changed by new additions.
(Jacobs, 1978b: 201)
Even after basic data had been compiled (the fourth preliminary report)
and an initial direction of the study had been suggested (the third
preliminary report), no one knew for sure where the study was heading:
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Still, the members [of the Urban Design Advisory Committee]
had a hard time digesting and some of them wondered aloud
what to do with it [the fourth preliminary report]. If
the staff at that point was none too sure, no one let on.
(Jacobs, 1978b: 202)
While the ideal of citywide policy planning must be to develop poli-
cies and principles upon the analysis of physical inventory data,
concerns or issues identified, and goals and objectives articulated at
least preliminarily. However, the urban design study team without a
clear sense of where they were heading favored a short cut: a set of
"fundamental rules of achieving aesthetic and functional urban design
goals and objectives for San Francisco" were developed as personal
observations of a consultant, Thomas R. Aidala who worked with the plan-
ning staff, largely unrelated to the data developed by this time (the
fifth preliminary report; San Francisco DCP, 1970b). 5
The presentation of the fifth preliminary report in July 1970
nevertheless (or for this reason) marked a turning point in the study.
The planning director found people accepting the proposals of the
report as "design truth" about the city. The reaction of the Urban
Design Advisory Committee and of the planning commission was enthusi-
astic and a slide presentation of the report at the annual meeting of
the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR) met
with similar approval. By the summer of 1970, the planning director
felt sure that the final plan would represent "top-notch professional
work" while he could not yet anticipate the details or the form of it
(Jacobs, 1978b: 205). A "social reconnaissance survey" and a few
special studies -- the Open Space Study and the Street Livability
Study -- were conducted around this time as well (San Francisco DCP,
1970c; Okamoto/Liskamm, 1969a,b; Appleyard, 1976).
In the third phase, preliminary citywide urban design plans were
developed along with district- and sub-neighborhood level studies.
October of 1970 saw the following reports:
- Preliminary Report No. 7: Implementation Approach (San Fran-
cisco DCP, 1970e);
- District and Sub-Neighborhood Studies; and
- Preliminary Report No. 8: Citywide Urban Design Plans (San
Francisco DCP, 1970f).
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Toward the end of 1970, most of the scheduled research and analy-
sis had been completed and final plan proposals were underway. There
was a three-month period since the publication of the last preliminary
report (citywide urban design plans) for public comments to assist in
revisions. A questionnaire distributed with the report brought "a
preponderance of responses to the effect that the policies and guide-
lines were reasonable as proposed" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 155).
(The response to the questionnaire was light, according to Jacobs
(1978b: 207).) A significant number of responses stated that there
should be more restriction than that proposed and, in the case of the
guidelines for building height and bulk, a majority felt that greater
restriction was called for (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 155). This was
around the time anti-highrise movement was building up.6
Adopting the urban design plan
The staff made major decisions as to the form and presentation of
the final proposal as 1970 came to a close. As to the substance of the
plan, the staff reviewed all the reports and other materials previously
prepared in the study, as well as the opinions and responses given at
public meetings, through questionnaires, and by other means. The ear-
lier materials were reorganized, supplemented, and re-expressed to form
a unified plan to be proposed in an adoptable form (San Francisco DCP,
1971b: 155).
On May 20, 1971, the planning department made its first presenta-
tion of the final proposal, The Urban Design Plan for the Comprehensive
Plan of San Francisco (San Francisco DCP, 1971b), before an invited
audience including the mayor, members of the Board of Supervisors, the
planning commission, and citizen advisory committee along with depart-
ment heads and officers of neighborhood associations. Three more
presentations that followed made it clear that the planning department
was a winner. Some 1,300 people attended the initial four presenta-
tions -- with some people coming back for the second time. Standing
room audience cheered at the conclusion of each presentation. Mayor
Joseph Alioto praised the plan himself. In June and July, the plan
was presented to neighborhood and citywide organizations. During July
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or August, the planning commission held three public hearings on the
plan and over 100 people and organizations aired their views or sub-
mitted written comments. The plan received generally favorable
responses throughout. The planning director observed as follows:
Although many minor changes would be made as a result of
the hearings, the testimony was not so much concerned with
the substance of the plan as it was with implementation.
Many people seemed to be saying, "Well of course, but what
are you going to do about it? What are you, the commission
and staff, going to do to make the plan a reality?" There
was a ring of challenge to their words. (Jacobs, 1978b: 214)
The staff had given much thought about possible actions to imple-
ment the plan. Given strong citizen concerns on a matter of building
height, immediate action to control the height and bulk of buildings
citywide was due. The idea was for the staff to make a formal proposal
that the planning commission hold hearings on zoning proposals that
would reflect the plan's height and bulk guidelines. In San Francisco,
a simple resolution of the commission could put the height and bulk
guidelines of the plan into immediate force as interim legal controls.
The staff would then be given six months to prepare specific zoning
standards and maps.
Seven months earlier, members of the planning commission had
favored a "go slow" approach for legislating height and bulk controls.
However, since Alvin Duskin's first height limit initiative had been
placed on the November 1971 ballot (Proposition T), immediate pressure
was created for strict citywide height controls. The initiative, if
passed, would limit the entire area of the city to six stories or 72
feet in height. They had also seen broad acceptance of the plan.
Thus, they were generally positive toward the idea of going ahead with
height and bulk controls. In the meeting Commission President Walter
Newman arranged on the morning of August 26, Mayor Alioto expressed to
the planning director all sorts of reservations about the proposal.
However, he did not oppose further after it has been found that two labor
leaders were not in opposition. On the same day, the planning commission
adopted the Urban Design Plan as an element of the comprehensive plan
and, to a surprise to the public, put interim controls on height and
bulk of buildings in force in a separate action.
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The Urban Design Plan
The final proposal, The Urban Design Plan for the Comprehensive
Plan of San Francisco, contained a proposed citywide urban design plan
itself along with three brief sections -- "Introduction", "Background",
and "Implementing the Plan". An appendix outlined the process and
method of the Urban Design Study. The planning commission adopted the
plan itself after necessary revisions. The Urban Design Plan as
adopted (San Francisco DCP, 1972a) was organized according to four
categories of concerns (issues): city pattern, conservation, major new
development, and neighborhood environment. In each category, the plan
defined essential human needs, set forth an overall objective, and
established fundamental principles and policies. Each overall objec-
tive was a response to a corresponding set of human needs and the
general purpose of recognizing, enhancing, and conserving the special
quality of the city. Fundamental principles, expressed as a verbal
statement with graphic illustrations described "the measurable and
critical design relationships among parts of the environment such as
open spaces, buildings, hills and streets". A series of policies were
formulated to provide a continuing guide and direction for public and
private decisions pursuant to the plan. Altogether, the plan contained
four objectives, eighty-six principles, and forty-five policies. No
implementation program was prepared for adoption or endorsement, but
the "Implementing the Plan" section of the May 1971 document offered a
general guide for implementation.
The Urban Design Plan marked a significant change from the plans
that had been prepared in San Francisco and in other cities to deal
with the design of a city in several respects:
- Urban design was recognized as a major element of the
comprehensive plan;
- Urban design was defined in terms of image and behavior;
- The plan was conceived as a policy plan to be used as a
process-oriented tool;
- The plan was conceived as a definition of the quality of
environment; and
- The plan was prepared as a systematic response to design-
related issues of the city.
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The fourth characteristic was rather unique to this plan, while the
rest of characteristics were shared by some plans prepared in Minne-
apolis during the mid 60s and the early 70s.
o Urban design as an element of the comprehensive plan
The planning staff in San Francisco believed that, while city
planning operated at many levels of environment and in different
degrees of scope and time duration, it was most effective and meaning-
ful when it fitted within the city's comprehensive plan (San Francisco
DCP, 1971b: 3). Given a strategic importance of the comprehensive
plan, it is significant that they considered urban design as a dis-
tinct element of the comprehensive plan for the first time in this
city. Adoption of the Urban Design Plan by the planning commission
as an element of the comprehensive plan meant public recognition and
official use of urban design as an area of public policy.7
o Urban design defined in terms of image and behavior
In the Urban Design Plan, urban design was defined in terms of
image and behavior:
[Urban design] has to do, above all, with the visual and
other sensory relationships between people and their
environment, with their feelings of time and place and
their sense of well-being. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3)
Some ten years after the publication of The Image of the City, the con-
cepts and methods Lynch (1960) had presented in the book had already
been applied in some American cities. More importantly, his concepts
had become an important part of urban designers' way of thinking about
the design of the city (e.g. Okamoto and Williams, 1969; Okamoto/
Liskamm, 1970a,b). Also a former co-worker of Lynch at MIT, Donald
Appelyard, was available for the Urban Design Study as a consultant.
It seems natural that Lynch's value premises, concepts, and methods
became an important part of the stock of ideas and techniques assembled
and applied in the Urban Design Study.8 Important but difficult task
of articulating "sensory relationships between people and their envi-
ronment" in credible terms (more than as a matter of personal taste)
was facilitated by Lynch's theory more than anything else.9
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To define urban design in terms of public image and behavior
meant that urban design became a response to important human needs.
This, along with attention to the form structure of the whole city,
gave urban design a significant role to play in the entire process of
city planning:
Application of good urban design produces a logic and
cohesion in the physical form of the city, and a respect
for the salient features that give character to the city
and its districts. ... In a city such as San Francisco,
urban design is inseparable from economic and social
vitality, and it has a major role in making the city at
the same time more noble and more bearable. (San Fran-
cisco DCP, 1971b: 3)
* A policy plan as a process-oriented tool
The planning staff in San Francisco considered that central to
any citywide plan were basic principles and policies. Policy, the
substance of the Urban Design Plan, was a guide for decisions and a
directive for courses of action affecting the city's.physical environ-
ment. Thus, unlike a development plan or program to determine
precisely what should be done or when or where, the Urban Design Plan
was "all-inclusive but more general, indicating types of programs,
stating rules, and outlining the nature of appropriate controls" (San
Francisco DCP, 1971b: 4). The staff did not include any illustrative
plan that would give an architectural expression of what the city
might look like at some future date, or from which models could be
made, because they thought architectural drawings and models tended
to draw attention from those central elements (Jacobs, 1978b: 211).
It follows that the Urban Design Plan had to be used and imple-
mented. Use and implementation means such things as follows.
Incorporated into the city's comprehensive plan, it should become a
lasting set of reference points for rational decision-making in chang-
ing the city. It should be a working tool to generate and judge many
individual projects, programs, and studies. It should also be a tool
to help realize a sound process in government, timely inputs of pro-
fessional judgement, and adequate means for expressing public
concerns -- all that would be essential in bringing problems in plan-
ning and urban design, even the most difficult ones, under control
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(Jacobs, 1971: 32). Jacobs (1978b: 220), speculating reasons for
successful completion, widespread acceptance, adoption, and early use
of the Urban Design Plan, wrote as follows:
It was important to focus on the plan as a policy document.
Specific project designs might have diverted attention from
the debate about visual aspects of the environment. Even
detailed examples of ways to divert or slow neighborhood
traffic were placed in a policy context. ... The public was
aware of the policy-setting role of the plan ... .
O A definition of the quality of physical environment
The planning staff in San Francisco saw their urban design plan as
a definition of a good environment and urban design as a part of the
process of defining the desirable quality of physical environment for
a community (Jacobs, 1971: 27; 1978b: 209; San Francisco DCP, 1971b:
3; 1972a: 1). To define quality meant to determine such things as:
- What exists that is good;
- What should be conserved;
- What needs to be improved;
- In what respects changes should be made;
- Where and how future development might occur; and
- What criteria should be applied to proposed changes.
(San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 11; Svirksy, 1973; Jacobs,
1971: 27)
Policy as "a general course of action leading to the realization
of objectives and goals" (San Francisco DCP, 1969a: 25) would not be
the best means to convey a definition of the quality of environment.
It only suggests the quality which the course of action is intended to
bring about. For example, the following policy of the Urban Design
Plan says in effect that a good environment in San Francisco is the one
in which buildings, when seen together, produce a total effect that
characterizes the city and its districts but not directly:
Recognize that buildings, when seen together, produce a
total effect that characterizes the city and its dis-
tricts. (Policy for City Pattern 3, San Francisco DCP,
1972a)
In the Urban Design Plan, it is "fundamental principles" that assumed
a primary role of defining the quality of environment. Stated in terms
of "what is good or bad" or "what does good or bad things", they
expressed directly what sort of quality the city wanted in its environ-
ment (e.g. Fundamental Principles for Major New Development in fig.
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2-1).10
Principles, like standards, are sometimes included in comprehen-
sive plans. However, the Urban Design Plan as a definition of the
quality of environment seems to make incorporation of principles
especially effective. Two technical aspects of principles are impor-
tant in this respect. At first, principles are not mandates ("should"
of policy or law). Policies are "necessary" in achieving or approaching
the objectives (San Francisco DCP, 1972a: 1), suggesting strong inten-
tion for action and readiness for public control. Principles, on the
other hand, are suggested courses of action or alternatives ("can"),
though maybe essential in some specific context. They educate people
and serve as sources of ideas for creative design. Principles in the
Urban Design Plan were presented just to "describe" measurable and
critical urban design relationships reflecting the needs and character-
istics with which the plan was concerned.
The second technical aspect of principles derives from the first
one: they can go with examples or situations presented by means of
photographs and sketches as in the Urban Design Plan. Commonly used
to present design guidelines, illustrations seldom find their way into
presentation of policies except in the places where graphic presenta-
tion is essential in defining dimensions, locational relationships,
etc. Graphic illustrations of specific examples or situations, like
models, sketches, and illustrative plans to suggest architectural
expression of a future city, tend to be in conflict with an idea of
presenting basic design concepts or action directives in policy terms.
On the other hand, graphic illustrations can be used to help visualize
the verbal definition of principles. They facilitate rather than harm
the presentation of basic ideas of principles and make the whole docu-
ment readable.
Together, these two characteristics of principles helped the
planning staff describe important urban design relationships that made
the environment of their city desirable. Issues around the visual and
sensory quality of the environment, very illusive perhaps, could not
have been successfully addressed by policies alone. Extensive use of
illustrated principles, then, was an innovation in defining the quality
of environment in comprehensive plans.
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1
The relationship of a building's size and shape
to its visibility in the cityscape, to important
natural features and to existing development
determines whether it will have a pleasing or a
disruptive effect on the image and character
of the city.
A: Tall, slender buildings near the crown
of a hill emphasize the form of the hill and
preserve views.
B: Extremely massive buildings on or near
hills can overwhelm the natural land forms,
block views, and generally disrupt the char-
acter of the city.
buildings
7 hill
/.0 n o w \
00P~
C: Low, smaller-scale buildings on the
slopes of hills, at their base and in the
valleys between complement topographic
forms and permit uninterrupted views.
Fig. 2-1.
D: Low buildings along the waterfront
contribute to the gradual tapering of height
from hilltops to water that is characteristic
of San Francisco and allows views of the
Ocean and the Bay.
h. -
E: Larger, taller buildings can blend pleas-
antly with small-scaled areas if the change
in scale is not excessive and if their form or
surface pattern is articulated to reflect the
existing scale.
\-1
J!
Fundamental Principle for Major New Development 1,
the Urban Design Plan (San Francisco DCP, 1972a: 32)
-4 ri
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The idea of making the fundamental design principles that have
created the desirable form and character of the city explicit and
returning to those principles reminds us of Christopher Alexander's
theory of pattern language. Fundamental principles of the Urban
Design Plan, viewed as "patterns" should guide individual decisions
of public and private actors so that they may be made more sensitive
to the form and character of the city and, collectively, result in a
coherent pattern of physical environment.
o A systematic response to design-related issues of the city
The Urban Design Plan may be viewed as a response to important
issues of the community which fell within the framework of urban
design (Jacobs, 1978b: 190). In fact, the plan in its final form was
organized according to an overall framework of four general categories
of issues -- city pattern, conservation, major new development, and
neighborhood environment. Viewed this way, systematic studies of
citizen concerns and physical features that defined the form and char-
acter of the city were necessary in making the plan responsive to
issues which the city was likely to face.
It is important to note, however, that the issue framework of the
final plan was not what led the planning staff in the Urban Design
Study. Earlier reports were organized according to different frame-
works without explicit reference to issues, suggesting that the
four-category issue framework came about only at the time of final
presentation.12 A view of the plan as a systematic response to impor-
tant issues of a community, even if implicit earlier in the process,
is nevertheless important since it is consistent with the planning
staff's basic orientation to urban design. It must be a view that
underlay the importance of citizen inputs throughout the planning pro-
cess and influenced the staff's choice of approaches to citizen
participation and surveys:
If a plan is to be useful and its impact significant, it
must be responsive to citizen concerns. Therefore, one of
the foremost efforts in the Urban Design Study was to deter-
mine what the people of the city identify as the relevant
issues. (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 5)
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Implementation
The planning staff's orientation to implementation
Since the Urban Design Plan was policy in its substance, it ought
to be implemented. Thus, the planning staff drew up their plan with
an intent that every policy would be implemented (Svirsky, 1973: 13).
Specifically, the staff made a study of "Implementation Approach" a
major part of the Urban Design Study. To use a word of Svirsky (1973:
10), the seventh preliminary report "took stock of the various city
powers in urban design questions... . In the case of each power, the
process of public involvement was reviewed and the relevant parties
and their decisions were identified." Means of implementation were
reviewed in respect to controls over private development (including
zoning and other formal and informal controls) and direct city actions
relating to streets (including street improvements and vacation or other
release of streets) and other public development (including street
priorities, site selection, and facility design). Thus, "this ... re-
port helped to gear the study to practical actions by which the plan
would later be carried out". (Svirsky, 1973: 10)
Moreover, the planning staff thought continually about means of
achieving desired ends by asking two questions over and over again
throughout the Urban Design Study: "How would you carry it out?" and
"How realistic is the proposal in terms of its being implemented?"
(Jacobs, 1978b: 219-220) The most illuminating example is a case of
the height and bulk guidelines in the plan that saw an early legisla-
tive action for implementation. The staff was especially careful to
make them readily convertible to zoning concepts. They knew that sound
zoning concepts had a reasonable chance for enactment since the adminis-
trative structure to carry it out was well established.
Finally, the "Implementing the Plan" section of the May 1971
document defined a general approach to implementation (e.g. premises for
effective implementation and the need for a "planning-development pro-
cess") and outlined for the staff and other public and private agencies
major actions that should be carried out to implement the plan.
Recommendations for more specific courses of action were included as
well as general directions for implementation (e.g. education programs
and coordination with federal agencies):
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- Public projects: carrying out the Plan for Street Landscaping
and Lighting in future programs ... ("Emphasis on City
Pattern: Orientation for Travel");
- Support effort to establish a Golden Gate National Recreation
area ("Conservation of Resources: Natural Areas");
- Legislation: designation of historic districts, with immediate
action upon the Jackson Square area; and adopt street vacation
ordinance ("Conservation of Resources: Richness of Past
Development");
- Legislation: develop precise proposals for regulation of
height and bulk, using the Guidelines of the Plan
("Moderation of Major New Development: Height and Bulk");
and
- Carry out the Protected Residential Area Plan: detailed
planning and execution, preceding design of prototypes and
demonstration ("Improvement of Neighborhood Environment:
Health and Safety").
Actual use, implementation, and effect of
the Urban Design Plan
Over the past ten years since the adoption of the Urban Design
Plan, many things happened as consequence of the plan or in relation
to it. While they may be discussed in a few different frameworks, I
choose the following based on types of action across issue areas and
actors:
- Dealing with the quality of environment directly (use and
implementation of policies for environment);
- Dealing with the process of urban design (use and implemen-
tation of policies for design management system);
- Responding to directives of policies and implementation
strategies (use and implementation of policies for action
and action strategies); and
- Overall effect.
Since each policy cannot always be classified uniquely into one for
environment, management system, or action (cf. Chapter VI), there would
be some overlaps between the first three categories. These categories
are nevertheless important because they correspond to three essential
factors of urban design which policies could define.
* Dealing with the quality of environment
Given an initial definition of the Urban Design Plan as a defini-
tion of the quality of environment, the strategically most important
actions are those to deal with the quality of environment directly.
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Generally, four kinds of actions were taken in this category:
- Legislation of legal standards;
- Implementation through design review;
- Influence -- persuasion and education; and
- Most items in the third category (responding to directives
of policies and implementation strategies);
. Translating down to public improvement projects; and
. Seeking better linkage between the plan and implementa-
tion through area planning, prototype design, and
development of more specific design guidelines and
data.
The first two kinds of action were dominantly directed to private
actors. This is understandable given relative importance of private
development in San Francisco on the one hand, and orientation of the
planning department toward matters that could be controlled by them-
selves -- legislation and influence as means (Jacobs, 1978b: 223) on
the other.13 Public sector actors become important in the third and
fourth kinds of action.
At first, policies were translated into legal controls, especially
as additions or revisions to the City Planning Code (zoning ordinance):
- The height and bulk ordinance, 1972 (to be discussed below-);
- The bay window ordinance, 1973 *(Jacobs, 1978b: 217; Staten,
1973; Solomon et al., 1978: 24);
- Comprehensive revision of residential zoning provisions,
1973-78 (San Francisco DCP, 1978a: 136; Jacobs, 1978b:
216-7); and
- Creation of the Jackson Square Historic District (also an
action to deal with the process of urban design).
The most illuminating case is the action of the planning commission
to put interim citywide height and bulk controls into effect, which
subsequently led to the approval of the height and bulk ordinance by
the Board of Supervisors in July 1972 "with dispatch" (Jacobs, 1978b:
216). The permanent controls became in effect in September 1972.
The adoption of the height and bulk ordinance was a highly sig-
nificant event. At first, it was a response to an overriding community
concern at the time as testified by heated public debate over two
Duskin initiatives, one on the November 1971 ballot (Proposition T)
and another on the June 1972 ballot. The event impressed people of
the Urban Design Plan at work. As such, it was commonly stated by the
public that the Board of Supervisors had "adopted the Urban Design
Plan" (Svirsky, 1973: 14). Second, the process of public review and
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adoption of the ordinance had an effect of promoting the use of the
plan in public debate. The process demonstrated before the public how
useful to have common terms of reference in considering matters of
urban design (Svirsky, 1973: 13; Jacobs, 1978b: 220). Finally, the
passage of the ordinance was an important step forward in implementing
the whole Urban Design Plan. The height and bulk guidelines of the
plan and the ordinance were drawn up to incorporate objectives, prin-
ciples, and policies of the plan (e.g. moderating the effect of major
new development and respecting the richness of past development), as
well as more specific considerations for relating the height and bulk
of buildings to the important attributes of the city pattern (e.g.
topography, skyline form, clustering, and views) and height, scale,
and character of existing development (cf. Policy for Major New Devel-
opment 5 and 6). As a result, for example, the ordinance contributed
to. the conservation of the unique and livable character of Telegraph
Hill. The ordinance continued the existing strict limitation of
heights on and around the hill and, by stepping down heights from the
downtown commercial areas across to the hill, aided in containing the
downtown growth and directing it away from the hill (Staten, 1973).
It so happened that the planning department proposal for height
and bulk controls hit a middle ground between anti-highrise groups
(cf. the two Duskin proposals) and business/development interests
(e.g. the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce). You might see some
parallelism to Catanese's (1974: 105-7) Cui Bono (the Naive Theory)
case. The planning staff's success might not have been so much to do
with the technical quality of studies leading to the adoption of the
ordinance or the content of it as some other "true reasons" that allowed
support from the two sides. In fact, several years later, some problems
with the ordinance became quite visible in downtown (Skaff, 1978), 14
and the city saw another height-limit initiative attempting to curb the
growth of the city and its downtown (Proposition 0 on the November 1979
ballot). I however argue that the long-term effect of the height and
bulk ordinance does not tell us much about the effectiveness or ineffec-
tiveness of the Urban Design Plan and citywide policy planning which
produced it. The Urban Design Plan and citywide policy planning created
a place for the ordinance. To develop and adopt the ordinance is better
- 78 -
viewed as another set of activities. In fact, the ordinance, while having
stemmed from the height and bulk guidelines of the Urban Design Plan, was
developed on the basis of much additional work and public discussion.15
The second important kind of actions to implement the Urban Design
Plan is use of its principles and policies in formal and informal
review procedures applied in "a positive and creative manner" to assure
visual harmony of major new development (San Francisco DCP, 1971b:
147). Generally, project review means the review of plans for build-
ings and other projects proposed by either a government agency or a
private party in order to determine the urban design implications of
those plans and recommend any change that will bring the plans into
closer conformity with the Urban Design Plan (San Francisco DCP, 1971b:
136). Specifically, the planning commission and the planning department
have been exercising the following kinds of review:
- Master Plan referrals;
- Review of capital improvement projects;
- State-mandated environmental review in accordance with the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) of 1970;
- Review of cases arising under the provisions of the planning
code (especially, conditional uses and discretionary reviews
of the planning commission); and
- Project reviews carried out on a less formal basis by the
planning department, including provision of urban design
terms of reference to interested developers and regular
communication with developers throughout the review process.
Project review is important at least for three reasons. At first,
it puts the city planners in a strategic position to help implement
their plan (Jacobs, 1978b: 217). Second, it could be made primarily
through extension of existing procedures rather than imposition of new
and potentially arbitrary forms of architectural controls (San Francisco
DCP, 1971b: 147). Finally, it could address design considerations that
are difficult to enforce as legal standards, thus, those considerations
that are not incorporated into the planning code. Thus, project review
helps promote such design considerations as:
- Harmony in the visual relationships and transitions between
new and old buildings (Policy for Major New Development 1);
- Contrasts in color, shape, and other characteristics (Policy
for Major New Development 2); and
- General efforts to achieve high quality of design (for
buildings to be constructed at prominent locations) (Policy
for Major New Development 3).
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Project review has been successful in implementing some principles
and policies of the Urban Design Plan but not others that are supposed
to be implemented through project review. This is partly due to the
very assumption of the plan: the plan should not mandate principles and
policies and allow tradeoffs among them. However, more important are
tradeoffs developers make between urban design and economic considera-
tions. Conceivably, project review alone would not be successful in
encouraging developers to respect the principles and policies of the
plan if they mean additional costs to them, but the plan has not
resulted in any revision of the downtown zoning bonus provisions or
other new incentives.16
The effect of the third kind of actions -- influence, persuasion,
and education -- is less visible but important. At first, the planning
staff thought that the Urban Design Plan ought to have an educational
effect on developers, builders, and architects, that the plan would
alert them of the city's design concerns (San Francisco DCP, 1970b:
2-3). Most people in my interviews agreed that education had been the
most significant impact of the plan. On the other hand, insightful
observers of the professional practice indicated much doubt about an
idea that architects and developers would specifically consult the
plan in doing their projects. The plan is general and rather volumi-
nous -- with 155 pages as initially proposed (San Francisco DCP, 1971b)
and 57 pages as printed for wide distribution in 1972 (San Francisco
DCP, 1972a). Direct communication with the planning staff through
project review and informal advice seems to have been more important.
Also, in the past several years, the planning department has been
increasing the use of design guidelines put together for specific uses
rather than the plan itself (San Francisco DCP, 1975b; 1976b; 1979a;
and "Design Guidelines for New Development in Downtown" in preparation
at the time of my field visit).
The Urban Design Plan was intended for use by all city departments
and agencies on matters of urban design in conducting design reviews,
developing projects and programs, and making decisions affecting the
city (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 2-3). An example is a case Jacobs
(1978b: 217) reports: Designers of a major sewer construction project
indicated to him in 1977 that they were sensitive to the principles
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and policies of the plan. Important as such use of the plan by other
city departments and agencies may be, my interviews suggest that the
impact of the plan in this area is minimal.
More important has been the educational effect of the plan on
the public at large. Jacobs (1978b: 218) wrote:
The plan is significant as an educational document. It
was widely distributed and apparently widely read.
Following its adoption it was quoted in detail by citizens
at public meetings to support or to oppose all sorts of
planning proposals and new projects. It proved to be a
worthwhile aid to citizens in helping to determine the
kind of community they wanted.
This is what the planning staff in the Urban Design Study meant by the
use of the plan as a "general educational document calling public
attention to the city's many design problems and issues" (San Francisco
DCP, 1970b: 2-3) and "widespread agreement on points or terms of refer-
ence" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135). Especially significant is the
fact that some neighborhood groups planned for themselves, heavily
drawing from the Urban Design Plan (e.g. Planning Association for the
Richmond, 1972; Mission Housing Development Corporation, 1974; and
Community Design Center, 1979).
* Dealing with the process of urban design
It seems natural that we see only few actions to deal with the
process of urban design, given the definition of the Urban Design Plan
as "a definition of the quality of environment". Important actions
were taken in the following areas:
- City policy formulation:
The Urban Design Plan (and its background studies) as
an input into other elements of the comprehensive plan
(e.g. transportation; recreation and open space; and
environmental protection: San Francisco DCP, 1972b,
1973b, 1974);
- Legislation of legal procedures:
Designation of the Jackson Square Historic District
(San Francisco DCP, 1971c; Staten, 1973; Jacobs,
1978b: 216);
The street vacation ordinance (recommended in the May
1971 document but not actually proposed) (Svirsky, 1973:
14); and
- Administrative procedures:
e.g. Progress in historic preservation.
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Especially important was city policy formulation because the
general approach to implementation as the planning staff reasoned was
dependent on processes in planning. In what they called a "planning-
development process", the initial definition of objectives and
policies (especially preparation and adoption of master plan elements)
should play a crucial role (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135). A case in
point is the recreation and open space element prepared during mid
1970 to mid 1973. This element amplified much of what the Urban Design
Plan said about open space (Svirsky, 1973: 14) and led to the establish-
ment of an open space acquisition and park renovation program. This
program provides for acquisition of open space, development of new
parks and recreational facilities, and renovation of existing proper-
ties under the jurisdiction of the Recreation and Park Department as
authorized by the San Francisco voters upon the passage of Proposition
J in November 1974. Thus, it has much to contribute to the implementa-
tion of the Urban Design Plan. Priorities for open space acquisition
and renovation were developed as part of the Urban Design Study to
begin with (i.e. the Open Space Study).17
* Responding to directive of policies and
implementation strategies
The Urban Design Plan itself did not offer much in way of explicit
directives for action, but the implementation strategies outlined in
the May 1971 document included many that would be necessary in actively
translating the plan into actual practice in development and preserva-
tion. They included the following kinds of action:
- More studies to link the plan to implementation:
Neighborhood planning;
Prototype design;
Development of more specific design guidelines (San
Francisco DCP, 1975b, 1976b, 1979a, and in progress,
for project review; San Francisco DCP, 1977a, for
education);
Development of data bases for better decision-making
(e.g. a citywide architectural inventory survey --
San Francisco DCP Annual Report, 1976-77: 10; Ray,
1979: 152);
Studies of development controls (not active); and
- Public improvement projects.
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Allan Jacobs has considered it important to have an urban design
element (or section) in each area plans (in an interview with me,
March 1980). As the planning director during 1967-74, he generally
practiced according to this conviction (e.g. San Francisco DCP, 1969b;
1971d). Contrasting with this early orientation to urban design in
neighborhood planning is that of the planning department in the mid
to late 70s, which is characterized by unpretentiousness. At a
neighborhood or district level, urban design was not recognized as a
distinct area of concern as housing, recreation and open space, com-
munity facilities, economic development, transportation, and land use/
zoning were. Generally, neighborhood planners did not think they had
systematically considered urban design or specifically attempted to
incorporate principles and policies of the Urban Design Plan in their
work. There was little way to do so in the first place. Generally,
they were not trained in urban design and the staffing situation that
became increasingly tight in the 70s took urban designers' time away
from neighborhood planning.
. Thus, it is surprising to find plans, upon close examination, did
incorporate some of the important principles and policies of the Urban
Design Plan in their recommended strategies and actions. Examples
are as follows:
- Consistent use of one kind of street trees on thoroughfares
surrounding a neighborhood to emphasize the edges of
traditional neighborhood boundaries (San Francisco DCP,
1977d: 25) (cf. Policy for City Pattern 5);
- Creation of street mini-plazas (widening of sidewalks at
intersections -- "bulbs") to slow traffic and increase
recreational use of streets (San Francisco DCP, 1977d: 47)
(cf. Policy for Neighborhood Environment 11); and
- Upgrade streets and alleys to increase pedestrian safety
and amenities (cf. Policy for Neighborhood Environment 4):
Create special assessment districts to improve alleys (San
Francisco DCP, 1977c: 12, 61) (cf. Fundamental Principle
for Neighborhood Environment 18).
Two factors seem important. At first, principles of the Urban Design
Plan had perhaps become an important part of neighborhood planners'
working knowledge of neighborhood improvement techniques. Also,
materials put in earlier plans in which the planning staff consciously
incorporated urban design considerations must have been handed down
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to neighborhood planners who worked on subsequent neighborhood plans.
Second, there must have been public acceptance of urban design-related
objectives and policies to support planners' proposals for strategies
and actions that derived from principles of the Urban Design Plan and,
perhaps, even demand for incorporating them into neighborhood plans.
The Urban Design Plan from which many decisions, actions, and projects
stem has been at work in this way.
Given limited resources, the planning staff worked to assist
efforts of various neighborhood groups as requests came more than they
did neighborhood planning on their own to implement the Urban Design
Plan. To take a case of the Plan for Protected Residential Areas, a
high-priority and major departmental program that encompassed many
aspects of conservation and improvement, the staff's work in the early
to mid 70s focused on development of a series of detail sheets further
amplifying the prototypes given in the Urban Design Plan with addition
of cost estimates. The purpose of this activity was to assist neigh-
borhood groups interested in studying their own areas and developing
plans with basic data and design alternatives.(Staten, 1973) Once
neighborhood groups' efforts began, the staff's role was to provide
design concepts, cost estimates, and other technical advice as needed,
as well as plan review and critique. The staff also tried to play a
coordinative role between neighborhood groups and appropriate city
agencies and explored all possible ways to secure funding and action.
Actual implementation of protected residential area projects was the
responsibility of the Department of Public Works and the planning
department's role in coordination was limited. While "demonstration"
was especially important in stimulating community interest in new con-
cepts like this (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 136), the planning department
had to wait for opportunities -- neighborhood groups' requests and
funding.
As a case of the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood planning study sug-
gests, neighborhood planning is more than simple detailing or
application of principles and policies of the comprehensive plan to a
specific context.18 To make neighborhood planning a way of linking
the comprehensive plan to specific programs and projects, it must be
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viewed as a process of creating support and commitment for a better
neighborhood on the part of neighborhood residents. Viewed this way,
it can be expected that neighborhood planning is more successful in
cases in which neighborhood groups request the city to do planning for
them or, better, they do planning on their own. Cases- in point are
programs of the Planning Association for the Richmond (1972) and the
Mission Housing Development Corporation (1974). The Jordan Park
Improvement Association developed specifically a protected residential
area plan for their district building upon the Urban Design Plan and
detail sheets (Staten, 1973). In these cases, the planning staff's
ideal of comprehensive planning (preparation of a citywide urban design
plan) followed by neighborhood planning, which in turn would clear ways
for specific projects to implement urban design policies, was realized
well. The most important projects were those to implement the pro-
tected residential area concept. In cases of the Richmond and Inner
Mission Districts, the planning department did follow-up studies (San
Francisco DCP, 1975a; 1975c; 1976a). This helped move neighborhood
groups' recommendations forward to implementation.19
Besides some protected residential area projects, there were not
many public improvement projects worth noting. Redevelopment, urban
beautification, code enforcement, and rehabilitation programs all
slowed in the mid 70s (Jacobs, 1978b: 217). There were no major road
projects. Moreover, public improvement projects depended much on
availability of funds and priorities that were set outside the sphere
of influence of the planning commission and staff. Generally, imple-
mentation that dealt with capital improvements and programs that
required continuing coordination among city and regional agencies or
which depended upon federal funding were difficult (Staten, 1973).
The planning department's role in these cases had to be one of advo-
cate and coordinator who in fact was rather weakly empowered. It
seems appropriate to see that, in most cases of projects that were
actually executed, the planning department's efforts or the influence
of the Urban Design Plan followed rather than preceded.20 The Urban
Design Plan, however, has been a valuable guide for the city planners
deciding upon project proposals even if they were initiated and con-
trolled by outside agencies (e.g. master plan referrals).
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0 Overall Effect
In assessing the overall effect of the Urban Design Plan, it is
important to note that the contribution of the plan is all relative to
what used to be, however deficient the plan itself and specific measures
like project reviews that have been taken to implement it may be. What
seems most significant is the institutionalization of a set of urban
design objectives, principles, and policies in the process of decision-
making administered by the planning commission and the planning
department. The plan has been used as a guide for a great variety of
decisions by the city planners with much citizen support and participa-
tion (e.g. public hearings). It is such that even critics of the plan
(e.g. anti-highrise groups like San Francisco Tomorrow and San Fran-
ciscans for Reasonable Growth) use the plan in their argument before
the planning commission when specific projects are considered. In
addition, it has become an important part of the way San Franciscans
see the environment of the city, discuss about it, and plan for it.
The effect of this has been an overall improvement of the process of
development as the planning staff in the Urban Design Study hoped --
better incorporation of the important community values into develop-
ment decisions, more timely input of professional judgement from
government urban designers, etc.21 Public controversies over develop-
ment projects -- especially those that are related to design
characteristics of the city, its neighborhoods, and buildings -- have
been significantly reduced. Also, developers and architects seem to
have become more aware of public concerns and ready to cooperate with
the planning staff (Jacobs, 1978b: 250).
Visible use of the Urban Design Plan seems to have been reduced
significantly several years after its adoption. Copies of the plan
have been no more available in the past few years to begin with.
Viewed another way, this is an indication of the institutionalization
that has taken place within several years after its adoption in the forms
of zoning standards, specific design guidelines, neighborhood plans,
and the way citizens discuss about their environment. If the plan
really helps the staff in assuring that decisions are made in "the
best long-range interests" of the city as they hope (Jacobs, 1978b:
250), that seems to be a bonus, although that was in fact the primary
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impetus to comprehensive planning.
Epilogue
Issues around San Francisco's approach
Exemplary as it is, the Urban Design Plan is not free from prob-
lems. Some of them are problems of the plan itself. Obviously,
there are design-related concerns that were or have become impor-
tant but were not addressed in the plan (e.g. factors of ground-level
pedestrian amenity; bulk of building groups and districts). Also,
there are important relationships that were not considered in the plan
(e.g. between building bulk and shape -- problems of seemingly bulkier
octagonal plan). Given that some of these problems could be resolved
as a matter of detailing, the fact that not much area planning, espe-
cially downtown planning, has taken place in the city compounds these
problems.
Other problems of the Urban Design Plan, perhaps more important
ones, are those of the entire comprehensive plan. It should be
reminded that the Urban Design Plan was developed primarily according
to principles of visual design. Once completed, they were not
adjusted to incorporate considerations that were made in other elements
of the comprehensive plan. Moreover, the entire comprehensive plan did
not systematically address some important issues -- issues of develop-
ment and growth of the city and its downtown, especially. Highrises
were more than a matter of views and images and the whole amount of
development that could take place in the city and its downtown was in
question. However, growth implications of the height and bulk con-
trols, social and economic, were not directly addressed in studies to
develop the height and bulk guidelines and the subsequent ordinance.
Thus, highrise issues, which appeared to have been calmed down with
the adoption of the Urban Design Plan and the passage of the height and
bulk ordinance, had to emerge again, this time much more clearly as
issues of development and growth (cf. the SPUR's highrise report in
1975 and the Proposition 0 in the November 1979 ballot). Given that
many urban design issues (e.g. sunlight on sidewalks and plazas) were
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reflection of much deeper issues of development and growth, it seems
natural that the Urban Design Plan in the face of strong development
pressure downtown has been rather powerless in dealing with them.
Finally, ineffectiveness of the Urban Design Plan as it has been
used and implemented owes much to ineffectiveness of specific design
controls (implementation measures) -- things other than overall
approach to urban design (e.g. comprehensive planning vs. incremental-
ism). Taking the downtown zoning bonus system as a case, until
recently bonuses had been offered to plazas that were located to the
north of buildings, creating rather unusable shady places at the
cost of more building, more shadow, more traffic congestion, etc.
The height and bulk ordinance offers us another case. There is an
apparent looseness or slack in the height envelope. An important
assumption, creating "downtown hill", has not been successfully
realized because buildings have fallen short of the envelope at the
downtown core and risen higher than expected at its periphery. There
are also some unaddressed questions: Why do you control bulk of indi-
vidual buildings, while leaving spacing of buildings and an overall
bulk of the district unregulated?
To put it another way, problems of the Urban Design Plan are
problems of the way it has been used and implemented. A part of the
ideal in city planning is comprehensive-plan making followed by area
planning, which would link policy to specific projects and programs
to implement it. In San Francisco, active neighborhood groups have
helped bring the reality close to this ideal but the planning depart-
ment did little itself. Implementation through public improvement
projects has had to remain opportunistic. Similarly, another part
of the ideal -- from comprehensive plans to specific controls -- has
not been followed in crucial areas. The result, for example, was
rather uncoordinated sets of controls in downtown: the zoning bonus
system and the height and bulk ordinance. Less than systematic
methods like various kinds of project reviews that are made case by
case have barely mitigated this problem. To see the years that fol-
lowed the adoption of the Urban Design Plan in a perspective,
significant actions to implement it took place only in the first half
of the 70s. We see the comprehensive revision of the residential
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zoning provisions and the beginning of the open space acquisition and
park renovation program in the late 70s but they were initiated around
1973-74.
Finally, the intent of the city planners who prepared the 1968
downtown zoning revision, the Urban Design Plan, and the height and
bulk ordinance was to frequently monitor their effects along with
development trends. This has not been realized. Without monitoring
the effect of earlier plans and controls, effective learning through
experience has not taken place. It has taken more time to see emerg-
ing problems clearly (e.g. amenities of the downtown environment) and
the planning department has had little way of dealing with them as
they become visible.
The city planners are not to be blamed. The planning department
with the increasingly tightening budget and staffing situation has
had no resources to maintain an active program of implementation and
monitoring. In fact, the whole thing called "research and development"
in private sector terms that must be required for the city to remain
competitive has been neglected, especially in the late 70s (Rai
Okamoto, planning director, in San Francisco DCP Annual Report 1978-
79). For past several years, the planning department has been pointing
out the need for a downtown conservation and development plan which
would redefine regulatory structure in downtown, without seeing fund-
ing for such a plan.
Is it worth preparing a citywide urban design plan if no system-
atic action can be taken to implement it and resources are too limited
to keep monitoring its effect? Review of uses and effects of the Urban
Design Plan has offered a case for having a citywide urban design plan
(especially in the area of neighborhood planning and review of private
development projects in San Francisco).
Increased public awareness about conservation and growth manage-
ment issues and a sense that the Urban Design Plan has not been doing
22its job well in the downtown and in some other areas, especially
during the late 70s, has been creating strong pressure for more city plan-
ning.22 With the successful placement of the third height-limit
initiative on the November 1979 ballot, the planning department finally
saw the city fund the first phase of the long-awaited downtown study.
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(The study was completed in October 1979 and the Proposition 0 was
defeated at a close margin -- 98,248 to 82,333.) While the planning
department has not been successful in securing necessary funds for the
second and the third phases of the study (by late 1980), the pressure
for a comprehensive look at downtown conservation and growth issues has
remained with anti-highrise groups standing ready for further action,
possibly another initiative (San Francisco Progress, December 5, 1979).
This pressure must be beneficial to the further development of the
San Francisco urban design program.
Reflecting the context of the San Francisco
urban design program
San Francisco seems to have a special environment that supports a
citywide urban design plan -- especially in the late 60s and early 70s.
Presented below is a brief discussion of the following factors:
- The general social-political environment of the city: demand
and support from the people of the city;
- The urban design capability;
- The already advanced theories and techniques of urban
design; and
- The governmental context: relative independence of the
planning function in the San Francisco government and
discretion of the planning director.
At first, there were demand, pressure, and support for immediate
public action to protect the form and character, and livability, of
the city (Jacobs, 1978b: 191; San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 7-8). A doubt
had been increasing among San Franciscans during the 60s about the
virtue of continued growth in the city, especially about highrises in
downtown. Major development projects tended to be controversial
throughout the city. The city's superb environmental setting was
unequalled by other major cities in this country and San Franciscans
were well aware of the rich but fragile nature of their assets. In
this city, it was not just urban design-related issues raised citywide
that were important, but the scale of city mattered: city-
scale views and image of the city as a whole. Urban design studies
short of citywide ones would fail to address the most important issues
in the design of this city and have only limited uses.
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It is significant that the planning director was the urban
designer in this city. Allan Jacobs, upon his arrival in San Fran-
cisco, saw a need to develop a citywide urban design plan. He was
ready to exercise his leadership in initiating and carrying out a major
study to produce such a plan. Also, the planning staff was relatively
strong in the area of urban design (Jacobs, 1978b: 7) and the depart-
ment was ready to expand already existing urban design capability to
support a major study. Moreover, there were additional planning
resources available in the San Francisco-Berkeley area. Especially
important were urban design talents necessary for such study. Some
major planning and urban design consultants located their offices in
San Francisco and some faculty members at the University of California
at Berkeley were among those who had been leading the urban design
scene of this country.
Less visible but crucial was the fact that the theories and tech-
niques of urban design had already been well developed by the late 60s.
On the one hand, there had been only a limited number of precedents in
citywide or city-scale urban design studies in this country. Little
knowledge had been shared among professionals about experience of cities
in this new area of practice. Virtually no other cities had ever formu-
lated urban design policies for a city as a whole on the basis of
systematic studies of physical form and character. On the other hand,
there was no major breakthrough necessary technically. Advanced
theories and techniques allowed the production of tangible outputs in
a study in a relatively short period of time.
Finally, the San Francisco government gave the planning director
a broad range of discretion in defining his approach. This was because
the city's administrative structure put the planning department under
the planning commission which had relatively independent power over
city planning. With some tradition of city planning and comprehensive
plan making, there was no problem of securing the status of city plan-
ning or comprehensive planning involved in embarking on the preparation
of a citywide urban design plan. Financing was a major problem, but
the federal 701 program limited the local share of the cost of compre-
hensive planning to one-third of the total cost and allowed the
planning department to have only limited dependence on the city's
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coffer. You might also add that highly dipersed nature of the city's
government stimulated and supported the planning staff's idea of devel-
oping sophisticated methods of communication and control in urban
design such as a citywide urban design plan, while the same factor made
urban design difficult to practice.
Considering these factors, it is not surprising to find an urban
designer who subscribed to a comprehensive plan (Jacobs, 1978b: 190;
Herald, December 11, 1978a) chose to conduct a major study ("compre-
hensive planning") to quickly produce a citywide urban design plan.
CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY 3: THE CITYWIDE URBAN DESIGN FRAMEWORK,
AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM IN DALLAS?
Introduction
In 1971, a nationally recognized planner/urban designer came to
Dallas to head the urban design division newly established in the
planning department. Only a few years later, his division with an
active program of urban design surprised the people of the city and many
professionals in this country by winning national recognition for design
excellence (e.g. the 1974 HUD Design Award). According to Andrew
Euston (1975), HUD urban design program officer and chairman of the
HUD Design Award jury, Dallas had the most innovative urban design
concept of any major American city. The urban design director himself
later wrote as follows:
The design office has become an important unit of the city's
administration, because its program is structured within
the city's decision-making processes, which are in turn
closely linked to overall growth management.(Lu, 1979: 33)
This is a surprising achievement given that the planning department had
just been reorganized to do more than zoning administration around the
time. Both city planning (especially comprehensive planning) and urban
design had been virtually non-existent in the Dallas government in the
60s. Never before had the city been known for good urban design or city
planning.
On the other hand, the Dallas urban design program accomplished
little in the late 70s. You learn that major development decisions in
the city were made without much input from the urban design staff
(e.g. ReUnion Project). Talking with some architects and planners in
the city, you learn that many of them see the urban design division's
work quite disjointed, just having several nice projects like Akard
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Street Mall and Thanksgiving Square here and there beside its relative
success in historic preservation. They find the division largely
unsuccessful in affecting the city's important decisions and creating
a network of relationships with city departments that would be essential
to an effective urban design program. They tend to think that the urban
design staff emphasized too much on actual physical design (e.g. Akard
Street Mall) at the cost of influence on the decision-making process.
How can such widely divergent observations be possible? What
happened around the Dallas urban design program? As we shall see, the
Dallas urban design program was very active, multi-faceted, and complex,
even if it was small. Divergence in observation, I think, is one indi-
cation of the richness of the urban design program. Different groups
of people saw different facets of the program. It follows that in
what perspective I see the program could make my observation quite
different. My task of writinga short case report, then, must be a
difficult and challenging one.
In this chapter, I will give my attention primarily to the staff's
approach to urban design that was carried out on a citywide basis --
what they called "jointed-incrementalism" -- and how it worked. At the
end of this chapter, I will speculate what affected the nature of urban
design practice in this city.
Dallas: an unplanned city of phenomenal growth
The City of Dallas, Texas, was originally founded in 1841 as a
small village encampment on the Trinity River, and has since seen a
phenomenal growth. The city today has the seventh largest population in
this country (844,401 in 1970) and encompasses a huge area of 350 square
miles within its city limit. The city forms one of two centers of an
eleven-county region called Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, some 2.4
million in population (as of 1970). This is one of the fastest growing
urban areas, boasting one of the strongest regional economies in this
country.
Dallas is a city of business run by businessmen for businesses and
real estate development is the big business in this city. Developers
in this city are those with real power to influence the city's development
decisions and, in fact, move the whole city. (Robert Folsom, a North
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Dallas developer, has been the mayor since 1976.) Important part of
Dallas' politics is played out in a place difficult for city planners
to reach. Much persuasion takes place on golf courses, over drinks,
and in private gatherings (Betty C. Ecker, News, April 28, 1974). The
Goals for Dallas program is indicative of the nature of power structure
in this city: there haven't been strong neighborhood-based groups.
The early 70s was the era of rising neighborhood interests in Dallas
as well. However, neighborhoods meant deteriorating inner-city neigh-
borhoods and those with little power. In this city, discussions and
politics that have been played out before the public are not as powerful
as you might see on the surface.
Dallas as a city of business goes back to 1907 when the powerful
business leaders who were getting increasingly dissatisfied with the
reality of an aldermanic government formed an association to institute
a City Commission. The City Commission governed the city untill it gave way
to the council-managerform of government in 1931. Today, an eleven-member
city council, including the directly elected mayor, runs the city through
a city manager. The city manager and his office, the Office of Management
Services, act as intermediaries between the general city service depart-
ments under him (including city planning) and the decision-making
administrative boards (e.g. Parks and Recreation) and legal and financial
departments.
Dallas has always been with problems associated with its phenomenal
growth. As early as the 1870s, after the railroads had come, congestion
on the business streets downtown was no new problem. The streets of the
city were not planned -- they just grew.(Reece, 1976) The first real
challenge to this unplanned city was the 1908 flood of the Trinity
River. As a result, the leaders of the city formed an organization
called the Dallas City Plan and Improvement League, which hired a
planning engineer George E. Kessler. Kessler's master plan presented
in October 1910 called ambitious projects which were "a little too
rich for Dallas' frontier blood" at the time (.Reece, 1976), but in some
twenty years some of major projects proposed were completed.
Since then, however, Dallas has remained in the business of getting
bigger, richer, and busier, away from city planning (Reece, 1976).
Problems of growth. -- congestion, delivery of services, etc.
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remained unaddressed.
The situation began to change in the early 60s. The city council
became less interested in economy and more in projects to improve the
city, reflecting the changes in the outlook of the business community
and probably also of the electorate.(Kovner, 1969) (During the 60s only,
the city's population increased some forty per cent, adding some 40,000
new residents). Growth management was beginning to be a real community
concern. The city had come close to a point where it could not afford
to grow without limit. Problems created by the unparalleled growth in
the northern half and neglect in the southern half of the city were
increasingly visible (Stahl, 1980). The fact that Dallas had little
historic heritage and unspectacular natural landscape did not make
those resources unimportant.1
In parallel to the nation-wide environmental movement, awareness
ofpollution, energy, and protection of natural and man-made resources
increased as the 60s went by. People in Dallas were increasing their ex-
pectation that the city government should take some action to ensure the
quality of their lives and the future of the city.
Goals for Dallas: a victory of. "comprehensive planning"
In 1964, an old mayor resigned and the city council appointed
Erik Jonsson to the council and, then, chose him as acting mayor.
Jonsson was an immensely wealthy and prestigeous businessman who had
been active in civic affairs. It was known that he wanted to "repay
Dallas for all it had done for him" with public service of some kind
(Kovner, 1969). On November 11, 1964, in an address before the Dallas
Rotary Club, Mayor Jonsson proposed the main idea of what was later to
become the Goals for Dallas Program: "We in and for beautiful Big D
develop goals for Dallas ... to ensure accomplishments of the level and
scope which we desire and of which we are capable."(Jonsson, 1966) The
idea was to bring the best minds together to solve the problems of
Dallas by the methods of research and analysis and the formal planning
system that had been successful in big business. As applied to a city,
the program would be a form of participatory democracy, involving citi-
zens in debating and deciding the future of the city and communicating
their wishes to public and private organizations changed with specific
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functions of the city.(Goals for Dallas, 1979c)
In the spring of 1965, Jonsson ran for the mayor's seat, campaign-
ing for his goals program. Jonsson won an overwhelming victory with
seventy-three per cent of vote. This gave him a popular mandate to
engage in "comprehensive planning". The Goals for Dallas program was
formally instituted in December 1965 as a privately financed project,
with Jonsson providing most of the fund. The program followed Jonsson's
three-stage process with massive citizen participation:
1) Setting goals by widespread citizen participation, 1965-
1967;
2) Developing plans and priorities for achieving those goals,
1967-1969; and
3) Evaluating progress toward achieving the goals, 1970-1972,
and revising goals as circumstances change.
(Goals for Dallas, 1979c)
More than 50,000 people attended neighborhood meetings in the goal-
setting stage and over 50,000 people, in the planning stage. News-
paper and mail surveys were conducted during the process to ensure the
formulation of broad-based goals.
Dallas had been a city of free enterprise. The idea of council-
manager government was, among other things, to maintain an efficient
government -- a small government which would keep interference in
private businesses minimal. The city had been largely without city
planning and design controls for fear that these should interfere in
private businesses and hinder development and economy. The beginning
of the goals program became a turning point:
Alden Deyo, director of the city plan office, says, Dallas
needs a comprehensive plan. ...
Dallas City Manager Scott McDonald said he is personally in
favor of a comprehensive plan.2
City councilman Jack Moser said he believes the city needs a
comprehensive plan.
Dallas Mayor Erik Jonsson...
(Herald, November 5, 1967; cf. Herald, November 12, 1964,
and September 24, 1967; News, September 25, 1969, and December
22, 1970.)
Goals for Dallas (1967, 1970 as revised) presented twelve general
goals, each accompanied by a set of specific goals. The goal of
overriding importance, thus presented first, was the government of the
city:
We should continuously examine our government to
assure that it is sufficiently representative and
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responsive to the needs of the area and its
people. ...
Second on the list was the design of the city:
We demand a city of beauty and functional fitness
that enhances the quality of life for all its people.
A series of studies and plans must be made which will
become a continuing dynamic, living design for our
city.
Nowhere in the document was any explicit statement that the design of
the city was second only to the government of the city in its importance
as some took (Euston, 1975; Webb, 1976; and News, August 29, 1969),
but the order of presentation inevitably suggested the strategic impor-
tance of this goal among others such as health, welfare, and the
economy of the city. Special attention given to this goal, if only
implicit, is not surprising, however. The image of Dallas as a beautiful
city was important in the mind of Mayor Jonsson (1966). More importantly,
it was the time of rising concerns about the problems of growth in Dallas.
The design of the city, especially comprehensive planning, was the
beginning of the future. Achievement of other goals like transportation
and communication, recreation and entertainment, and cultural activities
would hinge upon the physical framework of the city.
Birth of the Dallas urban design program: the planning department
reorganization and creation of the urban design division
The Goals for Dallas program proved to be very influential, affect-
ing many decisions in the Dallas government. As early as
as August 1970, Goals for Dallas (1970: x) reported that work was
under way on almost ninety per cent of the goals and some had already
been achieved. During the evaluation stage, they found that seventy-
five per cent of the goals were well on their way to being achieved
(Goals for Dallas, 1979c). Regarding the design of the city goals,
the first two of ten specific goals in the document adopted in 1967
were specifically concerned with the organization of the city planning
function within government:
1. Develop a continuous and coordinated city planning
process; to that purpose strengthen the Department of City
Planning.
2. Appoint a Municipal Design Advisory Commission to counsel
city officials.
(Goals for Dallas, 1967)
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The proposal for achieving the goals specifically recommended the locus,
role, staffing, and budget of the new department to be called the
Department of Planning and Urban Development (DPUD) (Goals for Dallas,
1969: 192; 12). The impact of these recommendations was significant.
The city took a series of actions largely following them. With voters
approval of 1968, the city council activated a charter revision in 1969
with a new ordinance, creating the Department of Planning and Urban
Development. James T. Schroeder, Jr., was appointed as acting planning
director. A major reorganization of the planning department to more than
double the staff (a staff of 142 was authorized) was announced in June
1969 and the staff was actually increased to 86 permanent and 22 part-time
members by mid 1970. Two branches then existed were expanded into five
including urban design.
Meantime, Manager McDonald officially directed a request from
Schroeder to the Dallas Chapter of the American Institute of Architects
for assistance in the development of goals, guidelines, and priorities
for the urban design devision. Subsequently, in July 1969, the AIA
Dallas Chapter formed the Urban Design Task Force as a panel of
architects, urban designers, and planners.3 The first set of recommenda-
tions mapping the initial course of the urban design division came out
in September 1970 (The Urban Design Task Force, Dallas, 1970). The
Urban Design Task Force was also instrumental in recruiting Weiming
Lu, then chief of the environmental design team, from the City of
Minneapolis. Lu became the Assistant Director for Urban Design Cthe
urban design director hereafter) early in 1971 and began an active
program of urban design with a new staff.
The Urban Design Staff's Approach to Urban Design
Comprehensive approach as an- ideal
The urban design director was a comprehensive planner. He regarded
"comprehensive approach" as one of three main characteristics of the
Dallas urban design program along with interdisciplinary team work and
active public participation:
People are increasingly aware that the quality of life
relates to the quality of the environment, and they demand
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more commitment to solve environmental problems, A
comprehensive approach generally proves the most pro-
ductive in addressing urban environmental issues. A
specific problem seldom is resolved in isolation, but
through measures tailored to serve interrelated community
goals. ...Dallas' urban design program consistently has
promoted -- and been an example of -- the application of a
comprehensive approach to meet the challenge of enhancing
the urban environment.CLu, 1979: 49)
To use a language of the Urban Design Committee of the American Institute
of Planners (ca. 1976), which the urban design director chaired in the
mid 70s, urban design had to be "inextricably linked to all levels
of government and institutional process". Interdisciplinary teamwork
and the high-voltage staff were essential requirements for dealing with
diverse design issues in a systematic manner.
With support from outside groups like the Goals for Dallas and
the Urban Design Task Force, he was able to begin an urban design
program with a broad definition of urban design. The division's
responsibilities, according to him, included the following among
others as well as the development of design frameworks to deal with the
city's visual form:
- Improvement of the decision-making process affecting city
design;
- Assistance in- the refinement of administrative and budget
procedures for the division, the department, and the city; and
- Programs to increase public awareness and support for urban
design and improvement of urban environment.
(Lu, 1979: 38)
The urban design division's work encompassed, "all aspects of environmental
quality, ranging from street sociology and downtown economic viability
to creating new urban spaces and strengthening a sense of civic identity"
(Lu, 1979: 33).4
The key element of the "comprehensive approach" was the development
of citywide and community design frameworks. The work was to identify
issues, formulate goals, order priorities, and articulate city policy
regarding the built environment. Standards and principles would evolve
out of this work to guide large-and small-scale decisions.CLu, 1979: 38)
A work program for a citywide urban design framework was prepared as
early as 1971 (ca.) (Dallas DPUD, 1971a). The work program as proposed
(or considered) recommended that the urban deisgn staff start a series
of surveys and analyses in October 1971 and complete urban design framework
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and structures for ecology, visual form, and visual image in two years.
Jointed-incrementalism as a model for practice
As we shall see, this work program was never followed systema-
tically while the preparation of a comprehensive plan including urban
design was a mandate from the Goals for Dallas (1970: 39-42). The
planning department could not afford a luxury of doing one-time studies
to prepare an all-inclusive plan for the city. Its attention in com-
prehensive planning in the late 60s to the early 70s was directed pri-
marily to overriding issues of growth management (the land use element).
Neither was the urban design division ready to go ahead with a major
citywide urban design study to immediately complete the citywide urban
design framework. Initially, staff size was small and staff capability
yet to be developed.
The Dallas urban design program, rather, evolved as the result
of the urban design staff striving for the ideal of what Lu called
"jointed-incrementalism". Lu (1979: 83-5) has not offered us a precise
definition of this strategy. To characterize it according to him, it
was a response to "a challenge before the field of public administration
... to devise ways to minimize the disjointed nature of incremental
decision-making". To realize "jointedness", long-range goals
(comprehensive planning which includes urban design) would help but there
also needs to be a realistic agenda of short-range projects keyed to
maximizing the long-range goals.
Implementation of the jointed-incrementalism approach
Lu (1979: 39-42) has distinguished three stages in actual development
of the Dallas urban design program. During 1971-72, the urban design
staff selected relatively noncontroversial projects that would show
results in a reasonably short time. It was essential for a newly created
office to demonstrate what it could do, establish its own identity,
and develop relationships with public and private interests, while
starting basic studies. Akard Street Mall and Thanksgiving Square
(underground pedestrian pathway redesign in conjunction with Phillip
Johnson's design of the square itself) are examples of early "demonstration
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projects". The large projects that were carried out later in this stage
included the Study 10 completed in July 1972 as part of the Community
Analysis Program (CAP). Surveys for the citywide urban design framework
were initiated in two areas: the ecological study and the historic
landmarks survey. Outside consultants played essential roles in pro-
viding necessary technical expertise and augmenting the young staff in
these highly specialized areas of concern.
The urban design division entered an intermediate stage in 1973.
The staff started to tackle more long-term, increasingly complex, and
often more controversial projects. Positive results from those projects
were not necessarily visible immediately. Also important during this
stage were more of basic studies. The visual form survey was carried
out and the inventory data was published in July 1974. A systematic
study of visual image had to wait till 1976 but the staff instituted
public attitude surveys as component of various planning projects. This
helped them understand public attitudes toward neighborhoods and prio-
rities for solving problems. The staff began to work on their own and
learned themselves in these studies.
The urban design division began to mature in 1975. The office was
firmly established and could take on projects of still greater scope and
complexity, including growth strategy (the planning department's work
on the comprehensive land use policy plan) and an urban design framework
for the city. As we shall see later, the urban design program began
to meet serious obstacles around this time, however. The preparation of
a citywide historic preservation plan had remianed to be on the agenda of
the planning department for quite some time (Dallas CPC Annual Reports,
1973-74, 74-75, and 75-76). In 1976, a systematic survey of neighborhood
identity and environment was carried out withotu the staff seeing the
completion of the entire analysis and the publication of the data.
As Lu (1979:- 84) has suggested, environmental planning and manage-
ment activities represents a rather successful application of the jointed-
incrementalism approach. I will at first review how this approach worked
in this area. I will then point out some "jointedness" that is found
in the area of neighborhood conservation and historic preservation
and discuss inherent problems of disjointedness in this approach,
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* Success in environmental planning and management
The urban design staff completed no comprehensive policy frame-
work to work from but successive projects carried out opportunistically
in the area of environmental planning and management were effectively
linked to next ones and to a larger purpose of developing an urban design
framework. Crucial to the relative success in this area are two
factors:
- A systematic data base and staff capability developed early
in the program (a citywide ecological study); and
- A comprehensive agenda developed in corporation with
an outside group (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee,
1974).
These and accumulating experience allowed the staff to anticipate new
problems and increase ability to deal with city officials, developers,
etc.
At first, increased environmental concerns in the city resulted
in the urban design staff's early effort in the ecological study during
1971-73. In 1973, the staff completed the study with major technical
assistance from consultants, scientists, and environmental groups and
support from a council-appointed citizens committee called the
Environmental Quality Committee. An ecological data bank thus developed
helped the urban design staff identify "fragile zones" and became part
of the basis for critical decisions on large-scale physical changes.
6
The most dramatic example of the use of the data was the escarpment
study during 1974-75. City officials reviewing a plan for a $200
million "new-town-in-town" project to cover 1,800 acres of the city
areas consulted the data bank and found that some of streets designed
to cut through the project would severely damage the ecologically
fragile White Rock escarpment. The urban design staff worked with the
developer, developed guidelines for the escarpment area, helped him to
revise the plan and assisted the city redraw street routes. Subsequent
to this study, the city adopted policies for the escaprment area and
rezoned critical areas (Dallas DUP, 1977b; Lu, 1979; 54).
The ecological study also became a basis for later work in the area
of flood plain management. Flooding had been a major problem in the city
and region due to rapid development of unimproved land and encroachment
of flood plains over years. Goals for Dallas (1970) thus called for the
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preparation of an areawide drainage plan to insure an effective flood
control program. In 1975, the urban design staff initiated the Newton
Creek study in anticipation of a flood plain management problem. This
enabled them for major responsibilities in the Upper White Rock flood
plain management study (Lu, 1979: 85). The latter study was carried out
in 1976 and guidelines were drafted by the urban design staff working
under the supervision of the city manager's office and in corporation with
the city attorney's office and the public works and parks developments.
In November 1976, the city council adopted a set of general guidelines
governing filling in all flood plains without management plans.(Dallas
DUP, 1977c and d; Lu, 1979: 85) The product of the flood plain management
study, together with that of the escarpment study, became an important
part of input to the natural open space plan completed in 1979 (an
element of the comprehensive plan).
Another source of "jointedness" went back to 1972. Upon the city
council's request, the urban design staff started a program of technical
assistance to the Environmental Quality Committee. This expert citizens'
committee was authorized by Mayor Eric Jonsson's council in September
1971 and appointed by Mayor Wes Wise's council in January 1972 with a
mandate to survey environmental conditions citywide and recommend en-
vironemntal policy to the city council. The committee conducted a series
of studies, field investigation, and public hearings for two years and
developed a comprehensive set of goals and policy recommendations. The
committee's 185-page report, covering ten areas of environmental concerns,
was intended to be a comprehensive framework for future action of the
city (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee, 1974). Subsequently, the
city council established a permanent committee in November 1975 to monitor
the environmental quality and the progress in the city's programs. The
urban design staff provided technical support to the committee, coordinated
inputs from other departments, and assisted the committee's environmental
policy formulation.
The progress of environmental quality management in Dallas rested
on a fine balance of power within the city and environmentalists had to
make some retreat later as we shall see. The impact of the urban design
program is nevertheless significant. It was instrumental in eliciting
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the city's initial commitment to environmental protection and raising
the level of public awareness about environmental issues in the mid 70s.
The city's decision-making framework was strengthened by the ecological
data bank, policies for escarpment and flood plain areas, and increased
staff capability. Internally, the urban design staff was able to pro-
duce basic materials for the ecological (environmental planning and
management) element of the urban design framework after several years of
work in this area. A body of data and experience developed over years
amounted to de fact urban design framework, if only internal to the urban
design staff.
* Some "jointedness" in neighborhood conservation and historic
preservation
In other areas of urban design, "jointedness" is less obvious.
Neither the urban design director nor his staff has left us much account
of how individual studies and projects were linked with each other and
with a larger whole to begin with. However, detailed examination8 shows
links that are worth noting in the areas of historic preservation and
neighborhood conservation, though not as dramatic as those in environmental
planning and management. It appears that the urban design staff was
gradually proceeding toward the completion of an urban design framework
for the city.
The basis for historic preservation efforts in Dallas is the histo-
ric preservation ordinance passed in March 1973 in the process of creating
the Swiss Avenue Historic District (designated in July 1973). Designation
of three more districts and several individual structures followed.
Again, in this area, there was no citywide policy framework to work from.
Urban design worked rather effectively, however, perhaps because the
historic preservation ordinance was flexibly designed and played a role of a
policy framework. It defined historic preservation process, allowing
designation of each district or landmark to be made case by case through
individual ordinance. This framework became effective as there was a
systematic data base created early in the program -- historic landmarks
survey data (Alexander, 1974) supplemented by more general visual
form survey data (Dallas DUP, 1974b). Once things got started, constituen-
cies developed to support the process of historic preservation and
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historic preservation has become a citywide movement. Among many
organizations and individuals involved in historic preservation are
the Historic Landmark Preservation Committee (HLPC) and the Historic
Preservation League. The former was created in accordance with the
historic preservation ordinance and has become a group to continuously
advocate historic preservation. The latter was incorporated by a group
of the Swiss Avenue area residents in the process of creating the Swiss
Avenue Historic District (The Historic Preservation League, 1975) and
has become a citywide advocate for historic preservation. Quite a
few neighborhood groups have since made a request for historic district
designation (e.g. the third district, South Boulevard/Park Row,
designated in August 1976 and the fourth one, Munger Place, designated
in March 1980).
A more general basis for the urban design initiative was an urban
design study carried out at a major district ("community") level -- the
Study 10 of the Community Analysis Program (CAP). This study began in
1971 and produced a report, Design Guidelines for Inner City Neighborhoods,
in July 1972 (Dallas DPUD, 1972a). The staff directed their attention
to two communities, Oak Lawn and East Dallas. From a physical design
point of view, the staff inventoried design elements, identified typical
environmental problems, recommended remedial projects and, finally,
suggested design guidelines. No official action was taken on the study
but the study was well received by neighborhood groups and offered
valuable inputs to later projects the urban design staff carried out.
A few projects can be clearly identified as the offspring of this study:
the Pike Park project (El Barrio Study) and the Turtle Creek Environmental
Corridor.9 The study also allowed the staff to learn historic signifi-
cance of the Swiss Avenue area, leading to an idea of creating an
historic district. The fact that a few areas considered for conservation
district designation are located in Oak Lawn also suggests long-term
benefits of early studies in strategic places like this one.
Basic studies on a citywide basis to prepare for the latex urban
design initiative in ordinary neighborhoods were begun while the urban
design staff was working on the most urgent task of protecting elegant
mansions and venerable warehouses (cf. the West End Historic District, a
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downtown warehouse district, designated in October 1975 after three
years of staff efforts; Lu, 1980): the visual form survey and the neigh-
borhood identity and environment survey. The former was carried out
in 1974 (Dallas DUP, 1974b). Viewed as an analysis of neighborhood
environment, this study systematically described visual characteristics
of every neighborhood in the city.10 Viewed as an analysis of city-
scale form structure, it mapped major visual elements such as nodes,
landmarks, focal points, views, and tree cover. The report of the survey
issued in July barely drew public attention. However, the use of data
bases could be quite different from the use of published reports. As a
neighborhood data base, the visual form data, and perhaps the whole expe-
rience staff members had gained in the survey, proved to be invaluable
in later projects (Lu, 1979: 44-5).
The visual form survey report wrote that a study to develop an
urban design framework as part of the planning department's interim
comprehensive plan program was being initiated for the 1975-76 fiscal
year (Dallas DUP, 1974b: 149). An "attitudinal survey" suggested in the
report produced in July 1976 a report, "Neighborhood Image: An Initial
Analysis of Data from the Neighborhood Identity and Environment Survey"
(staff working paper). According to the report, the staff conducted a
questionnaire survey with a citywide random sample of 400 households to
find out how citizens perceive their city and neighborhoods in terms of
visual form, physical amenities, public facilities, and other attributes
and problems. The entire analysis initially conceived was never completed
but, according to Lu (1979: 44), the data became a primary tool for
subsequent neighborhood improvements.
The impact of the visual form survey may be traced into 1) a quick
response the staff made to a group of residents in the process of
creating the South Boulevard/Park Row Historic District, 2) the special
importance of a Mexican-American neighborhood, "Little Mexico", it
confirmed for the Pike Park project (El Barrio Study) and, perhaps,
3) the Neighborhood Notebook, a series of inexpensive how-to pamphlets
intended to guide citizens in self-help neighborhood improvement
activities. Threads that link the citywide visual form and image
studies to specific projects are not quite visible, however, This may
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be taken as an indication of the relative weakness of the citywide data base
not supported by a citywide policy framework.12 A case in point is a
project of strategic importance to the whole city -- the conservation
district ordinance proposal. The ordinance never took off the ground,
suggesting a problem of drafting an ordinance for specific design controls
without initial public consensus as to the desirable nature of design
controls at a general, policy level (cf. the Minneapolis master design
district ordinance). 13
* Disjointed "jointed-incrementalism"
If urban design with citywide data bases alone -- without agenda
of short- and long-range projects or a policy framework -- was vulnerable
to some "disjointedness", it is likely to have been difficult to create
"jointedness" around projects that were carried out without any framework
(excepting the first Goals for Dallas). The two city-level studies,
the sign ordinance and the arts facilities plan, and one special project,
Akard Street Mall, may be viewed as cases.
The former two projects began upon a request of the city council.
In either case, the first Goals for Dallas (1967, 1970) created a mandate
and political pressure was building up for the city to do such a study.
At first, an intensive two-year study during 1971-1973 paid the staff
as it produced a new sign ordinance to tighten controls that had already
existed on commercial signs, which proponents had long desired. More-
over, the process of debating and winning the ordinance raised the level
of public consciousness about design issues and demonstrated the
strength of citizen expectation for improving the quality of the visual
environment. Passage of the ordinance also showed how citizens could
organize themselves to win a battle against big businesses (sign industries
and related business interests). And the effect of the ordinance is
gradually revealing itself in the visual environment. Second, a pro-
minent planning/urban design consultant completed the final report on
a comprehensive arts facilities plan in October 1977, recommending the
arts district and suggesting ways of creating difficult but important
links between arts facilities planning and work on larger urban design
issues -- neighborhood conservation and neighborhood arts/urban design
programs (Carr, Lynch Associates, 1977). On the other hand, sign controls
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and arts facilities planning, partly due to their very nature, have not
been successfully tied to a larger effort in urban design.14 The problem
here seems to be not so much the fact that the staff had to work in
rather isolated projects as one of missing policy planning that links
one area of urban design to a larger whole in a strategic manner and
allows the building of broad public support.
The latter project, Akard Street Mall, is perhaps the best example
of disjointed project in "jointed-incrementalism". In 1972, the urban
design staff started to develop a concept of creating a three-block
mall on Akard Street, working with the Central Business District
Association (CBDA) and other city departments. The mall was completed
in November 1974, one year after funds were provided in the 1972 bond
program. It was constructed to create a ceremonial link between the
downtown core and the civic center complex (Myrick-Newman-Dahlberg and
Partners, Inc., n.d.) and, along with the new City Hall, became a
brilliant example of what good design would mean in Dallas. However,
the mall never acquired the power to draw people from the downtown core.
The mall, thus, was successful as a beautification project but was lacking
a program to increase use and visibility. It has become an isolated
incidence with little impact on the design of the downtown as a whole.1 5
The mall began to have more problems. At the design stage, the de-
sign consultant saw "clearly defined space with two of the city's oldest
prestigious hotels" one of the opportunities of the mall (Myrick-Newman-
Dahlberg and Partners, Inc., n.d.). Soon after its construction, however,
the mall lost one building in front of Baker Hotel. An open parking space
covering an entire block replaced the building. At the time of my field
visit, in April-May 1980, the Adolphus Hotel building at the one end of
the mall across Market Street remained vacant and the Baker Hotel building
was in a process of demolition. Urban design was not sucessfully tied to
downtown revitalization strategies. There had been no overall policy
framework or plan to see the mall in a larger context. 1 6
National Recognition and Repurcussions
National recognition
The urban design division reached an early period of maturity by
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1975. At the same time, its active program began to draw national
attention. The first reward for its enthusiastic work and insistence
on "comprehensive approach" (jointed-incrementalism) came as national
recognition of their city for its design excellence. In early 1975,
Dallas was cited by the 1974 HUD Design Award jury for outstanding work
(Euston, 1975). In June 1975, another award came. The city won two top
awards for "ecological excellence" in the nation-wide Community Quality
of Life Awards Program sponsored by The Environment Monthly magazine.
One of the two awards was for the city's "innovative sign control
ordinance" "designed to reduce ugliness yet provide necessary graphic
information". (Herald, June 22, 1975) Increasing national recognition
around the mid 70s can also be observed in the number of articles that
reported the Dallas urban design program in professional and popular
journals. 17
The urban design director consciously sought national recognition.
It was his belief that "to get dramatic and meaningful results from an
urban design program you have to start with a staff of carefully trained,
innovative professionals ... " and "in order to build a great city ...
you have not only to attract industry, but planners of vision and
motivation." (Weiming Lu quoted in Reece, 1976) Thus, he made continuing
efforts to recruit creative people for his staff (Lu, 1979: 51).
National recognition of the Dallas urban design program was instrumental
in attracting capable young people to the city.18 The urban design
division in the mid 70s, then, started to follow a good cycle of
"national recognition - capable staff - design excellence".
A step forward with the second Goals for Dallas program
In the mid 70s, the urban design staff was gradually building up
basic materials for a citywide urban design framework. However, they
were not able to bring the work beyond the survey and analysis phase
to formulate policies. On the contrary, the urban design division saw
budget and staff cuts around 1975. iMeantime, an exceptional opportunity
came with- the second Goals for Dallas program.
In late October 1975, civic and plitical leaders announced a major
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effort to revive the Goals for Dallas program. In 1976, the second
goals program started with citizen task forces beginning to write new
goals for public discussion. The program largely followed the three-
stage process that had been instituted ten years ago. This time, the
urban design staff got actively involved in the program from the outset.
They served on panels, recommended goals, and helped develop plans for
achieving adopted goals. Some sympathetic observers of the urban
design program saw the new goals program with a special hope: the new
goals might reiterate the priorities of its predecessor and help improve
the budget and staff situation of the urban design division (Webb, 1976).
In mid October 1976, Dr. Bryghte Godbold announced his resignation.
He had been the director of Goals for Dallas since its inception and
one of the most influential civic leaders in Dallas. Former Mayor
Jonsson had already left the battle front while he remained on the
Board of Trustees of the program. The first stage to set new goals
proceeded well, however. The final set of new goals was published in
April 1977. This time, goals were presented in seventeen topic areas.
New topics -- citizen involvement, housing, energy, and environment
among others -- suggest expanding scope of the program and changing
emphasis after ten years. A dictionary order introduced to present-
the seventeen topic areas had an effect of removing the appearance of a
special emphasis on the design of the city goals in the first program.
Another shot at the planning department did not come. New goals for
the design of the city nevertheless supported good urban design at least
in three ways.
At first, they confirmed the importance of comprehensive planning
(Specific Goals 2 and 3). Second, they spelled out what would constitute
basic values in urban design. Those include:
- The visual character, a sense of history, identity, diversity,
and beauty (Goal 1);
- The quality of life (Goal 3); and
- Protection and enhancement of the natural resources and the
environment (Goal 6).
They also suggested what important areas of concern in urban design were
such as public education programs (Goal 3); revitalization of CBD and
inner-city neighborhoods (Goal 4); environmental planning and management
(Goal 6); and urban design processes (Goals 5 and 13); along with
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broader concerns which would have important bearings on urban design
such as growth management (goal 2) and metropolitan planning (goal 11).
Third, the scope of goals was broadened significantly. For one thing,
specific goals were increased from ten to thirteen in number. Some
goals in a new section "Environment" were also within the scope of
the urban design program. More important, however, is the definition
of each goal. New goals dealt with desirable qualities in the urban
environment and the planning/urban design process rather than desirable
projects. They could mean any number of projects. For example, one
new goal incorporated as many as three specific goals in the first
program along with few others:
Specific Goal 4
Revitalize the central business district (CBD) and
inner-city neighborhoods with specific attention to
stimulate the economy, to rehabilitate inner-city
housing, to enhance Fair Park, ... to construct Town Lake,
and to build substantial additional cultural facilities
within the District. (Goals for Dallas, 1977) [Emphasis
mine on three specific goals in the first program.]
The three earlier goals thus became just lower-level goals, i.e.,
means to achieve a higher level goal. This new approach resulted in
having the thirteen specific goals identified more or less at the
same level, and generally at the highest level, on the means-end
continum. You might say the second program represents better under-
standing of what it means to set goals. One implication of this would
be less imposition of certain solutions (stated in terms of goals as
in the first program) that may or may not be the best way to achieve
important goals (which had been left unstated in the first program)
on those who were responsible for achieving goals. You may not need to
create a municipal design advisory commission (old Goal 2) to establish
within city government a mechanism for coordinating and reviewing the
quality of city-related design (new Goal 13). You may not need to create
Town Lake (old Goal 10) but you would like to revitalize CRD and inner-
city neighborhoods (new Goal 4). The first goals as a wish list of means
imposed; the second goals as a more or less comprehensive set of goals would
encourage the serach for creative solutions and guide decisions. This
was a significant step forward toward the ideal of the goals program. You
cannot deal with such a complex thing as the design of the city by
- 112 -
doing a few pet projects.
In the spring of 1977, the goals program started to develop plans
and to set priorities (within each topic area) for achieving the goals.
With active participation of the urban design staff, this stage ended
in the fall of 1978. Achieving the Goals forDallas, 1978-83 was published
in March 1979. The second goals program saw significant rejuvenation
throughout these two stages. At the same time, it made a significant
headway toward identifying worthy goals of the community and achieving
them. Citizen participation increased and significant broadening of the
base of representation took place.19 The goals program became less
"elitist" and the scope of the goals was expanded -- goals thus formu-
lated could be a good basis for the urban design framework to be prepared
by the urban design division. Moreover, the program was brought closer
to the achievement of goals by a new approach -- by designating about
100 agencies as "lead agencies", obtaining their commitment to the
achievement of goals, having them develop plans, outlining the steps
they would take to achieve the goals and, finally, asking them to period-
ically report the progress to the goals achievement committees.
How did the urban design staff proceed with their work on the urban
design framework? Through active participation in the second goals
program, they had in effect developed a set of goals for the urban
design framework with massive citizen participation. With those goals
and the systematic data bank they had already developed, the completion
of the urban design framework with policies and strategies for urban
design appears to have been just a few steps ahead.
Changing context of urban design
Building a high-voltage staff (Lu, 1979: 51), especially "a diverse
and adequately, sized interdisciplinary staff" (Euston, 1975), was the
key to the achievement of design excellence in Dallas. Around 1975,
things started to change. Webb (1976) reported:
Even in Dallas, which was not hit especially hard by the
recent recession, budget cuts are beginning to eat away at
urban design objectives. With a staff reduced from 20 to 11
The budget and staff cuts had serious implications on the urban design
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program. At first, a need for long-awaited studies increased as
the urban design division entered a period of early maturation. Much
ground work had to be done to develop the urban design framework and
ultimately to fully realize the "comprehensive approach" to urban design.
Shrinking resources meant that basic studies had to make way to routine
work. As the scope of work quickly expanded in the early 70s, routine
work for program maintenance increased to beginwith. The creationof the sec-
ond and the third historic districts in 1975 and 1976,for example, re-
sulted in substantial increase in demand for staff time in administering
those districts (especially in response to design review requirements).
Finally, the division had been the center of activity and the locus of
quality work in the planning department. Resource cuts in the
division created an apparent effect of deterioration in the quality of
work in the department. It was not just the urban design division or the
planning department that was experiencing changes in the mid 70s. The
whole atmosphere in Dallas appears to have been changing, clearly in some
parts and subtly in others.
Most important are changes that were taking place in the city
council through several bi-annual elections, generally from the councils
of the late 60s and the early 70s concerned with issues of environmental
quality and unbalanced growth -- overdevelopment in the northern half
and deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods -- to the councils of the
late 70s oriented toward facilitating development and growth. The data
of the city council and the planning commission's zoning case approval
rate seem to reflect those changes well (rather than just the increase in
sophistication of developers in preparing zoning change proposals):
The city council's zoning case approval rate increased each year since
1972 (73%) to 1977-78 (87%) but one. (During the same period, the plan-
ning commission saw its approval rate increased from 51% to 67%,) The
biggest disparity between the city council and the planning commission
occurred in 1975-76, when the council denied 8% of the proposed zoning
cases while the commission denied 32%.(McCarty, 1978) (As we shall see,
an election of early 1976 brought a developer-mayor Robert Folsom.) Two
cases -- the Environmental Quality Committee and the Comprehensive Land
Use Policy Plan -- illustrate the nature of those changes well.
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The establishment of a permanent committee to monitor environ-
mental programs was the first recommendation of the initial Environ-
mental Quality Committee (Dallas Environmental Quality Committee,
1974: 3). The city council took no immediate action, however. About
six months later, in November 1974, the city council established a per-
manent committee in the face of strong prodding of the former committee
members and increased public attention to the city council's inaction
(e.g. Herald, October 2, 1974), but in a way it would be ineffective
as environmentalists saw. (Herald, November 12 and 18, 1974; News,
November 13, 1974; etc.). The permanent committee had in fact accom-
plished little until it was finally disbanded in mid 1977. There is
little evidence that the permanent committee, the city council, or any
other body found use of the product of the initial committee's two years
of work.
Another case which suggests changes in the city council in the mid
70s is the fate of the comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan adopted by the
planning commission in late 1975. Comprehensive planning was a mandate
from Goals for Dallas (1966, 1967). Given strong public concerns over
issues of growth management, the land use element naturally became the
focus of the whole comprehensive planning effort of the planning depart-
ment during the late 60s and the mid 70s. Beginning in October 1968,
the planning department did much work but the citywide comprehensive
land use plan remained half-complete throughout the early 70s. The
planning department's work on a citywide comprehensive land use plan
began again in 1974 at the directionof the city council (Dallas CPC
Minutes, October 23, 1975).20 On February 17, 1975, the Comprehensive
Land Use Policy Plan (citywide) completed in dispatch was finally presented
to the city council. The first public hearing before the City Plan Com-
mission was held on October 23, 1975. On November 8, 1975, after another
public hearing, the planning commission voted 14 to 1 for approval of the
plan subject to minor changes in wording of the text, and submitted the
plan to the city council.
A city council election followed in early 1976. This election
brought Mayor Robert Folsom. He was reputed to have run for the
mayor's seat to beat the Comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan, being himself
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a North Dallas developer.21 The plan submitted to the council remained
in limbo.
The level of development-orientation of this council was not as
high as that of more recent ones.22 The city council changed further
in the April 2 election in 1977. In September 1977, the planning
commission saw a drastic change in its membership -- ten new faces
were added on the fifteen-member commission. More developers were on
the commission, and it was thought to be far more sympathetic to
developers than their predecessors, shifting toward the increased growth
thinking of Mayor Folsom and others. According to the Dallas Morning
News, the removal of Mrs. Shapiro, chairperson of the commission, and
Mrs. Dunsavage in the commission appointment had been predicted for
months because of their sharp "philosophical differences" with the
more conservative city council members such as Mayor Folsom and Mr.
Leedom (News, August 21, 1977). City planning came to be viewed as an
obstacle to growth and business opportunities with the result of elimi-
nating discussion and debate over what kind of a city Dallas was go-
ing to be.(Mrs. Clegg, member of the planning commission, Herald, December
11, 1978a) Mayor Folsom won the latest council electiont in early
1980, rejecting a challenge of former mayor Wes Wise. General atmosphere
in the city council has remained development-oriented throughout the
late 70s.
The 70s was an era of increasing neighborhood interests. The
Goals for Dallas program of the late 60s raised public awareness about
problems in the city. Older inner-city neighborhoods began to demand
their share of the benefit Dallas was getting from its phenomenal growth.
Meantime, in the early 70s, federal courts ordered the city to devise
a buss a busing plan and a single-member district plan for city
council election so as to enhance representation of minorities. The
city council had been elected entirely at large until then. This
stimulated public discussion on inner-city problems (e.g. the Inner City
Committee of the city council) and issues around representation. More
important in politics, however, was the revival of the ward system in the
mid 70s (nine ward members and three at-large members including the mayor).
The change that was taking place in the urban design scene should be
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viewed in the light of these changes in a larger context. A question
remains as to how well the city council represents public opinion. It
would be appropriate to see the second Goals for Dallas program a fair
representation of public opinion on the future design of the city. What
did the second Goals for Dallas say?
Major citizen involvement programs like Goals for Dallas must
rest on a fine balance of power in the city. It would not be surprising
that the Goals for Dallas program experienced much change after ten years
of experiment with an idealistic tone. However, the change must have
been subtle: you see little change, perhaps a slight progress, just look-
ing at the goals and plans that were printed. What you do not see is
the same enthusiasm -- and faith -- that had been part of the first
program. It is not clear whether the fact that the new goals did not
deal with the staff and budget problem of the planning department and
its urban design.division and they did not give a special recognition
to the importance of preparing the urban.design framework as the initial
Environmental Quality Committee did in its 1974 report is part of the
change. As I have pointed out, the new goals supported comprehensive
planning and good urban design as in the first program. There was no
explicit statement that the design of the city became less of concern.
Thus, we have a disparity: public opinion measured by the Goals for
Dallas program was generally supportive of comprehensive planning and
good urban design; the city council on the other hand was tilted toward
more development and less planning and control -- no comprehensive plan
like the 1975 comprehensive land use policy plan. What would such a
disparity mean?
Repurcussions
* Planning department reorganization
While the context of urban design was gradually changing in the
mid 70s, a sense was increasing in the City Hall that the planning
department was not doing a good job. In August 1977, City Manager
George Shrader told the Dallas Times Herald that the department had
been scheduled for a major realignment (Herald, August 28, 1977).
Details of actual reorganization were still tentative at that time but
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it was soon to change the nature of the work of the urban design division
completely. The basis of this reorganization was a management study
of the planning function conducted by a management consulting firm, Lifson,
Wilson, Ferguson and Winick, Inc.(LWFW, 1976).
In October 1977, a long-time planning director Schroeder was moved
to the Office of Development Services created as part of this reorganization.
One of the city manager's administrative assistants, Rick Douglass,
started to direct the planning department under Assistant Manager Gerald
Henigman. The urban design staff had a hard time under an interim
director who "appreciated little of the use of city planning and urban
design" [a former planning staff person in an interview with me]. In
November 1978, Gary Sieb, formerly an assistant to Schroeder, started to
handle the department's duties.23 The planning staff had to wait till
May 1979 to have a new permanent director. The wholesale turnover of the
planning commission took place in September 1977 and the planning
department had little support from outside during the most difficult
time in its history.
"cler dad ood 2 4An operation to "clear dead wood" from the planning department
was nearing its end in late 1978. Many of the functions it used to perform
had been transferred to other departments and its role and influence
over city policy, especially over capital expenditure, diminished
significantly. This however was part of the purpose of the reorganization.
for example, the 1976 management study recommended that the planning
function be broadened to include physical, economic, and community and
resource planning, and be performed by a group of departments (LWFW,
1976: 5). Planning-related departments were then placed under one assis-
tant city manager (Gerald Henigsman).
The effect was the planning staff experiencing general downgrading
of their status in the city bureaucracy. Some staff members were unhappy,
finding their jobs reduced to processing of papers like clerks (Herald,
December 11, 1978a). Some mysterious stories haunted around the planning
department around this time:
- A few {of the planning staff members] complained that
reports they have written have been mysteriously doctored
before being presented to the commission or to the council.
(Herald, December 11, 1978a)
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- The draft of a 1977 neighborhood plan says it should remain
a four-lane street because the people who lived and worked
in the area wanted it that way. But the planning department
employe Isic] responsible for the draft was accused of being
too close to the people in the neighborhood and was reassigned
to another project. The 1977 plan was never finished. Ten
days ago {December 1, 1979] the planning department recommended
that McKinney be widened from four lines to five [six?]
despite the continuing objections of neighborhood residents
{Roseland Parkway, a six-lane East Dallas thoroughfare to help
relieve congestion on North Central expressway](Herald,
December 11, 1978a) 2 5
On the last day of November 1978, the urban design director announced
his resignation. This came as a suprise to some26 but to many who knew
the situation in the planning department it was not. His resignation
warned Dallas' citizens an alarming situation (e.g. Herald, December 1
and 3, 1978). Several news articles pointed the public to a problem of
not having a permanent planning director (e.g. Herald, December 11,
1978b; News, December 16, 1978). Also, it was the time outside pressure
on the city manager to find a permanent director soon was increasing.
One of the longest searches for a city department director in recent
Dallas history ended in March 1979 with an appointment of E. Jack Schoop.
Schoop had been the planning director of the California Coastal Commission
and former newspaper editor with nineteen years of experience in state and
municipal planning (News, March 9, 1979).
* Demise of "the Dallas urban design program"
Some observers find that the planning function was made more effec-
tive under the city manager's direct control, that it was "at home" in
the Office of Management Services.28 Progress in comprehensive planning
offers us a case. In October 1977, the city manager authorized the
planning staff the restructuring of the planning department's work to
develop a citywide comprehensive plan. The work was separated into a
number of components and, for the first fiscal year 1977-78, two plan
components were selected for development: the parks and recreation
plan and the (natural) open space plan. Coordination and cooperation
with other city departments worked well in these planning projects.
The natural open space plan, for example, was completed in June 1979
by the planning department (primarily the urban design division) with
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the participation of the Departments of Parks and Recreation, Public
Works, and Streets and Sanitation (Dallas DUP, 1979c). A close tie with
the city manager's office also meant better linkage between initial
planning and implementation. The first phase program for the preparation
of the parks and recreation plan, for example, provided data on existing
park land and facilities in each community (planning district) for use in
the development of the 1978 capital improvements and Community Development
Block Grant program recommendations. Studies to develop implementation
programs for the natural open space plan followed immediately upon the
plan's completion. The interim arrangement also resulted in planning
programs closely reflecting the city's priorities as recommended in
the 1976 management study. According to Manager Schrader: "We are working
on an open space program for Dallas. We take each program one at a time,
and the land-use plan will come later."(News, December 13, 1978) The
city was thus effectively planning for the future -- plans for housing,
thoroughfare, and location of new fire stations along with the two
comprehensive plan elements -- according to city officials (Herald,
December 11, 1978a). (The urban design framework was not a priority
item.)
Progress that had been made in some specific planning programs did
not satisfy critics, however. Neither the deemphasized planning
department nor the assistant city manager in charge of planning was
providing necessary overall coordination, according to those critics
(Herald, December 11, 1978a). Moreover, priorities in the City Hall did
not necessarily go well with priorities of people in neighborhoods.
While the city council in the late 70s was supportive of unconstrained
growth -- in effect more growth in the northern half of the city and
toward outer fringes, the first and second Goals for Dallas and others
(e.g. Herald, December 3, 1978) were calling for revitalization of down-
town and inner-city neighborhoods. The planning department came to
receive much criticism that it was insensitive to the needs of people
(e.g. Herald, December 1, 1978), that it had become "a rubber stamp for
highways and huge developments" (Khan Husain, former chief planner with
the planning department, regretting public views of the planning
department, Herald, December 1, 1978). Projects like Roseland Parkway
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and a bridge over Turtle Creek 2 9 support critics' claim that "decisions
were made in favor of quick development and away from long-range planning,
toward facilitating building and away from considering long-range
impacts"(News, March 4, 1979). And there was "a narrowing of access to
city hall that [had] left those with doubt about growth nowhere else to
go" (News, March 4, 1979). Viewed another way, the planning department
reorganization accomplished its objectives rather well. The 1976
management study was carried out "to improve the organization and
operation of the planning process in a manner that {would] allow the
elected and appointed officials of the City ... to have whatever impact
on the evolution of the City" (LWFW, 1976: 1) and Mayor Folsom's main
priority was "to provide a framework for growth" (News, March 4, 1979).
Thus, it was initiated "to add to the convenience and economy of the
system" (Manager Schrader in Herald, August 28, 1977) for those who use
the system -- developers.
Since the arrival of a new planning director in May 1, 1979, the
planning department has been in the process of filling vacant positions
with carefully selected, qualified individuals while working on proposals
to determine its new direction. It would be appropriate to see that
"the Dallas urban design program" which had been begun as a son of the
Goals for Dallas program and with a new urban design director in 1971
ended with the 70s. Many sympathetic observers in Dallas today hope
for a rebirth of a strong urban design program under new leadership.
How to rework on the preparation of the urban design framework or the urban
design element of the comprehensive plan is part of the agenda of the
new planning department.
Epilogue
Issues around Dallas' approach
The accomplishments of the Dallas urban design program in the early
70s owe much to the urban design director's effort to realize systematic
(or "comprehensive") approach upon the jointed-incrementalism model.
A HUD Design Award in the "management approach" category testifies the
visible effect of jointed-incrementalism approach. A close examination
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suggests that the staff's early investment in basic citywide and
district-level studies rather successfully provided agenda and frameworks
for later initiative in specific projects. Many of the seemingly
unrelated projects executed individually were in fact tied to the main
stream of work and contributed to the preparation of an urban design
framework, clearly in some areas like environmental planning and management
and loosely in others like neighborhood conservation and historic
preservation.
However, disjointedness is inevitable in any incrementalism
approach. Disjointedness plagued the urban design program where initial
studies were weak (e.g. downtown development and design -- the Akard
Street Mall case) or when the staff had to work in a completely new and
rather independent area (e.g. art facilities planning). Some projects
the city mandated (e.g. sign ordinance) also helped create disjointedness.
Disjointedness is inevitable not just because jointedness had to depend
on a map in the mind of the urban design staff members (particularly,
the insight and leadership of the urban design director),
agenda (the Dallas Environmental Quality Committee's 1974 report and the
second Goals for Dallas), a systematic data base (in the areas of ecology,
historic landmarks, visual form, and citizen perception) and accumulating
staff experience and because these are just imperfect substitutes for a
more comprehensive policy framework. Jointed-incrementalism assumes
the context in which the urban design staff cannot follow a large-scale
approach systematically (e.g. comprehensive planning). Thus, once
comprehensive agenda, data, and experience are developed through
incremental work on studies and projects over years, the same context
limits their use as a framework for selecting projects to be carried out.
Hence, jointed-incrementalism must always be disjointed-incrementalism at
the same time. (In the long run, it could change the context of urban
design.)
Overall rationality of jointed-incrementalism is therefore doubtful.
It would be difficult to maintain the program's continuity and
direction. Without official recognition of urban design as an area of
public policy, the status of urban design was uncertain in Dallas (cf.
conflicts between the aspiration of the urban design staff and the city
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manager's conservative expectation). Neither was there any way of
materializing the full potential of formulating and adopting city design
policy. For the same reason, the urban design staff's approach and spe-
cific strategies have little significance in explaining the fate of the
Dallas urban design program in the late 70s. What seems important in Dallas
is the city government as it defines the status, role, and client
of urban design within its social-political context. The level of support
for urban design in the City Hall changed significantly in the mid to late
70s. The city council in the late 70s found the planning department (and
its urban design division) not in their service and this resulted in the
planning department reorganization. This in effect dismantled the urban
design program which was effective according to the professional stan-
dards (e.g. a HUD Design Award). In fact, it was the very intent of
the planning department reorganization not to allow city design policy
or its substitutes (agenda, data bank, accumulating staff
experience, etc.) to have much impact on the city's decision-making.
The planning department, rather, should allow the elected and appointed
officials of the city to have "whatever impact on the evolution of the
City" (LWFW, 1976: 1). It follows that the urban design staff should
not define urban design on their own -- broadly and aggressively -- to
justify their intervention in the city officials' businesses. In this
context, "the policy of discouraging neighborhood participation ...
typical of City Hall's current approach to planning" (W.W. Wilson in
Herald, December 11, 1978a) was justifiable, however harmful it might
be to the effectiveness of the urban design program. This is especially
true as the city officials heard little demand for citizen participation
in city planning to begin with.30 It was also the very intent of the
planning department reorganization "to develop a framework for growth"
(Mayor Folsom in News, March 4, 1979). Since the purpose of the urban
design framework was to provide a framework for improving the quality of
the physical environment for those who lived and worked in the city at
large, itwas more or less a part of the "awkward non-system" and obstacles
to development. All these suggest that the Dallas government in the late
70s rejected city design policy formulation or, even, "jointed-
incrementalism". Other kinds of obstacles to the urban design program,
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while there were many, such as
- Weak leadership and poor management practice in the planning
department as a whole, and
- A new urban design division with staff capability yet to be
developed in its early era,
seem rather trivial. The urban design staff's approach -- or innovative
and aggressive nature of the urban design program -- mattered only in
that it made the effect of conflicts between the city officials and the
planning/urban design staff in the mid to late 70s dramatic.
Good urban design according to the professional criteria is not
necessarily good to the city government. Urban design the city government
wants does not necessarily serve the community at large. There is little
way urban designers can sell good urban design to the community -- good
according to the professional standards and good for the community at
large -- if the city government does not want it. The Dallas government
in the 70s decided not to have an urban design framework. The urban
design framework is perhaps not entirely an impossible dream in Dallas,
however.
In a long history of Dallas, the first significant chance for city
design came with the 1908 flood of the Trinity River. George Kessler
completed his master plan which gradually shaped the central part of the
city over next three decades. The second, valuable occasion came in
1965 with the Goals for Dallas program and passed quickly by the mid 70s.
The period was too short for one of the best urban designers in this
country given a reasonably sized staff and strong outside support to
complete an urban design framework. The urban design director or his
staff cannot be blamed, however. He had to start from scratch. Allan
Jacobs, building upon already well established planning department with
relative strength in urban design needed four years to complete an urban
design plan and get it adopted since his arrival in San Francisco. It
is difficult to see when next opportunity will come. But next time,
the urban design staff may very well make it. Urban design has already
been institutionalized within the Dallas government, if in a less than
the optimal way according to the professional standards and the expec-
tation of people in neighborhoods. Also, basic materials for the urban
design framework are already there in Dallas today. This is a great
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contribution of the Dallas urban design program of the 70s.
Reflecting the context of the Dallas urban design program
I have so far outlined the special importance of city government in
understanding the later course of the Dallas urban design program.
Presented below is a brief review of the context of the Dallas urban
design program in terms of the following:
- The governmental context;
- The general social-political environment of the city; and
- The staff capability and the state of the art of urban design.
At first, the status of city planning, especially long-range policy
planning, had not been established well in the Dallas government -- not
to mention the status of urban design as an area of city planning. With
no prior experience in working with the comprehensive plan, it must
have been difficult for the urban design staff to create the understanding
of what a citywide urban design framework would do and generate support
for it. If the status of urban design was left unclear at the beginning
of the urban design program, the locus of the urban design office said
something about the institutional definition of urban design in this city.
The centralized administrative structure of the council-manager government
put emphasis on the role of city officials (the city council members
including the mayor, and the city manager) in giving policy and admini-
strative directions to each department. The planning department worked
effectively when it responded to mandates from the city officials. The
urban design staff had little discretion in initiating projects, and
it had to do so with much friction. This is partly because the office
was new without established jurisdiction, procedures, and links to various
parts of the city's administrative structure and partly, perhaps more
importantly, because it was not an usual, effective way of operation
in this form of government. The federal 701 program helped the urban
design staff finance some of the studies that were important in preparing
an urban design framework largely on their own but with a cost of
upsetting the administrative system whose essence was central control.
It is also important to note that a sophisticated system of communication,
influence, and control in urban design as represented by city design
policy was rather alien to this form of government (i.e. central control).
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An urban design framework, if developed, would primarily look at the
private sector activity.
The form of city governments, along with administrative procedures,
is in an important way a response to the wishes of the people of the
city. A question has to be asked, however: Who are important people?
In Dallas, the people who had been influential in city affairs were
developers and businessmen. In a long tradition of free enterprise in
this city, those "significant citizens", especially those in real estate
development, were not supportive of strong, effective city planning,
especially an idea of preparing a comprehensive land use plan, which
inevitably meant development controls. It was not their preference to
institute a new system of control like an urban design framework which
would allow the powerless majority much say about the future development
of the city. Their business was business and their design, unpretentious
-- or poor as some critics say (Pratt, 1976; Dillon, 1980; and Herald,
September 24, 1967). Neighborhood groups and environmentalists had
been relatively weak in this city. Goals for Dallas which began in 1965
made voices of the majority of citizens, relatively powerless ones,
heard in the City Hall. The group called for comprehensive planning,
rational management of growth, and a beautiful city, but their influence
in the City Hall was relatively limited in the long run, with the
height of their strength felt during the late 60s and the early 70s.
Goals for Dallas also made a tactical error in that, in effect, it
mandated a few specific urban design projects in their wish list, rather
than encouraging systematic approach to urban design, namely the pre-
paration of an urban design framework in close conjunction with the
comprehensive plan for the city. - Thus, neither city government nor
"people" was ready to support an urban design framework. Gradually building
up good results and constructing inevitability were perhaps the only
practical strategy for city design policy formulation in this city. Such
a strategy, at the same time, was adapted to the internal circumstances
of the urban design division.
The urban design staff in a newly created office needed many things
before they began to work- on an urban design framework: they had to
develop their capability, create a network of relationships with other
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city departments and outside groups, establish constituencies, determine
internal procedures, and set agenda for the next few years. There was
the strong leadership of the urban design director but the planning
department as a whole was not in a good shape to support its urban
design program. The planning department had just been strengthened
and was in search of its own direction. Also, some observers find,
the department was under weak leadership, technically and politically.
In short, major planning studies which would not produce immediate,
tangible results, like long-range city design policy.formulation, were
not the right ones to tackle at first. Obviously, the theories and
techniques of urban design (which were already well advanced in the
early 70s) in this context does not seem to be a relevant factor.
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CHAPTER IV
COMMON THEMES IN CASES
A set of common themes have emerged from cases of citywide policy
planning efforts in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Dallas. Those
themes can be described in terms of the intent of urban designers and
key activities:
The Intent of Urban Designers
- To improve the perceptual and behavioral quality of the
physical environment;
- To address citywide issues and to devise overall city
strategies for urban design;
- To be responsive to the needs of the people who live
in the city and its neighborhoods; and
- To increase overall rationality in approach to urban design
-- to develop a systematic data base and pursue the purpose
of urban design consciously by way of making goals and
decision-making criteria explicit.
Key Activities
- City design policy formulation and a series of studies to
support it.
This chapter discusses these themes individually, describing actual
practice in the three case cities and, in cases of some themes,
speculating their implications on the practice of urban design.
The Intent of Urban Designers
The perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment
Urban designers in the three cities have been very much concerned
with the quality of the physical environment as people experience it
and as it accomodates human activities (image and behavior). To
improve the perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment in
fact has been one of the primary purposes of urban design in these
cities. Obvious as this may seem, urban design has often been prac-
ticed without explicit reference to the quality of the environment.
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For example, Bacon (1963), in justifying the place of urban design
in the comprehensive planning process, argued as follows:
Urban design is a crucial force in the planning process,
with the power to transform plan objectives into images
the seize the public imagination and generate widespread
enthusiasm.
Urban design in his view is a means of translating planning concepts
into the physical reality; it is a technical tool of city planning
or urban development.
In San Francisco, urban design was conceived as something that
had to do with the visual and other sensory relationships between people
and their city, with their feelings of time and place and their sense
of well-being (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3). According to the May
1971 document:
Quality means degree of excellence, and when applied to
cities it depends upon pleasing physical relationships,
a fitting together with scale and interest and without
jarring contrasts. Over time, quality means cultural
heritage, and things and values that last. For the city's
residents it means a good life, and the ability to take
for granted a certain measure of security, health, comfort,
enjoyment and convenience and freedom from over-congestion
and pollution. Quality in life must also include a chance
for privacy, for interesting activity and achievement.
(San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3)
In Minneapolis, the Urban Design Plan for Southeast Minneapolis
was "for the enhancement of community images" (Minneapolis CPC, 1964);
the CIP Urban Design Study, "to provide readily acceptable images of
the city's environment, emphasizing its function, and foster the
observer's sense of civic pride in that environment" (Minneapolis CIP,
1965c); the Visual Design Framework, to provide policies "intended
to enhance, protect, and create perceptual quality in the built and
the natural environment" (Minneapolis P&D, 1976a); and the goal for
the Visual Quality Plan, "to protect and enhance the visual quality
of the natural and man-made environment" (Minneapolis PD, 1979a:
IV-79). While emphasis in the late 70s returned to the visual
quality, the traditional core of urban design, the visual quality
has been defined broadly and includes images (legibility, identity,
structure, and meaning).
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The urban design staff in Dallas has not articulated the purpose
or goal or urban design in any official policy statement but similar
purposes are implicit in the visual form and image surveys, the design
of the city goal of the second Goals for Dallas program prepared with
the participation of the urban design staff, and others.
An objective of improving what Lynch (1960) calls the legibility
of the city has been especially important in the three cities and public
perception of the visual environment of the city was studied as part of
citywide urban design studies. For example, urban designers in
Minneapolis purused an objective of projecting "a vivid and coherent
visual image of the city" in the CIP Urban Design Study. In San
Francisco, the desirability of achieving a community where people knew
with ease where they were and how to get where they were going was
accepted as a legitimate and important objective of urban design from
early in the Urban Design Study.
In relation to this, the scope of environmental quality concerns
in the three cities has been broad. Studies and plans collectively
encompass many environmental quality concerns and incorporate a wide
range of values. Issues addressed include more than traditional
concerns in urban design such as appearance and various livibility
and pedestrian amenity factors (e.g. street furniture, access to
recreational open space, and maintenance of streets and properties):
city-scale views, citywide visual form and image structures, visible
activity patterns, visual experience of moving through the city, and
human comfort (e.g. weather protection and safety from traffic, psycho-
locigal as well as physical) among others. Not only issues of
experiencing space, static and sequential, but also issues of experien-
cing time in the physical setting (e.g. historic quality of buildings
and districts and, in Dallas, organization of events such as street-
corner concerts and community festivals) have been addressed. Historic
preservation, neighborhood conservation, access to recreational open
spaces, and development of design controls and development tools have
been important as well perhaps not only because these are important
city planning and development concerns but also they are instrumental
to the purpose of creating a better city in terms of human experience.2
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Attention to the quality of the physical environment as people
experience it and as it accomodates human behavior is found in
Gordon Cullen's studies of English townscapes. Improving the
aesthetic quality -- appearance, views, visual order, etc. -- are
at least implicit in any urban design project. However, the broad-
ness of definition and attention to the perceptual and behavioral
quality of the physical environment together distinguish the urban
design programs of the three cities from others.
Attention to the perceptual and behavioral quality of the
environment in the three cities is especially important because it was
accompanied by efforts to measure them through methods of empirical
reserach. In Minneapolis and Dallas, citizen image surveys were
conducted according to environmental psychological methods. In
Dallas, "street sociology" has been studied by an environmental
psychologist in an occasion to develop performance-based sign
ordinance.
While the purpose of urban design can be broad or narrow and
statedinmany ways, it seems especially important to include the
enhancement of the quality of the physical environment as people
experience it and as it accomodates the spatial and temporal patterns
of human activities. For such a definition gives urban design a focus
for attention and a purpose of its own. Despite its importance, no
other areas of city planning pursue it in any systematic manner. A
purpose of its own justifies and demands its conscious pursuit, and
distinguishes urban design from other areas of city planning as an
area of unique concerns.
There are other purposes as well, such as:
- To get development projects done;
- To unlock space economy and stimulate development;
- To coordinate capital improvements; and
- To enhance functional efficience of the physical setting.
But they do not make urban design special. For example, "to get
development projects done" and "to stimulate the development of the
city" can be a concern in other or all areas of city planning. Since
they imply higher-level purposes such as city economy and job creation,
they make urban design just a means to achieve things that are
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important in other areas of city planning. Urban design as an area of
city planning ought to serve these and other purposes of city planning
anyway (e.g. social equity and access). Moreover, without explicit
reference to the perceptual and behavioral quality of the environment, they
do not necessarily warrant a good city in terms of human experience
(e.g. problems of urban renewal).
The purpose of urban design defined in terms of human experience
is important also because it could naturally lead to a view that urban
design is a central element of city planning as has been the case in
the three cities.3 Traditionally, urban design, visual quality, and
aesthetics have been considered to be somewhat peripheral to more
central concerns in city planning such as housing, land use, and
transportation. To simply put, views and visual images put together
all aspects of the physical environment in our experience: for example,
we see and feel the whole city from a vantage point. This creates
a demand that individual actions you take to change physical environ-
ment be coordinated in accordance with the goal of urban design
(human experience). You might even view that the goal of creating an
expressive and legible environment as well as socially and economically
logical city is in fact the very purpose of city planning (The Joint
Program, 1965). In this view, urban design could help stitch together
various areas of policy which are in fact interdependent. The urban
design goal comes to embrace all areas of policy and relates to the
way you express and carry out policies in other areas of city planning
(The Joint Program, 1965); application of good urban design produces
a logic and cohesion in the physical form of the city, and respect for
the salient features that give character to the city and its districts
(San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 3). Urban design is then inseparable from
economic and social totality and has a major role in making the city
at the same time more noble and more bearable (San Francisco DCP, 1971b:
3). The city's overall development will have to begin and end with
good urban design (Minneapolis CPC, 1964: 41).
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Citywide issues and overall strategies
Urban designers' concerns have seldom extended beyond the scale
of a neighborhood or a small district. Downtown plans and major urban
renewal projects typically represent the largest scale for urban
designers. City planners, on the other hand, have believed that certain
issues of city development ought to be addressed in a citywide plan
while others are better addressed in neighborhood or district plans.
It is not surprising then to find urban designers seeking to make urban
design a legitimate area of concern in city planning have begun to
deal with some design-related issues on a citywide basis. In San
Francisco, the planning staff in Urban Design Study concentrated on
what they called citywide issues. The planning director observed that
the members of the Urban Design Advisory Committe had learned to dif-
ferentiate between "citywide matters that were legitimate concerns"
in the study and specific neighborhood issues that were not (Jacobs,
1978b: 128). In Minneapolis, the Plan for the 80's included both
citywide and community plans since the planning staff recognized that
not all policies and plans that were important to the city could be
generalized citywide. The Visual Quality Plan, a major urban design
element was one of citywide plans. In Dallas, one of the responsi-
bilities of the urban design division was to develop citywide and
community design frameworks (Lu, 1979:37), suggesting a similar
recognition. The actual work of the Dallas urban design staff was
directed primarily to groundwork for the preparation of the citywide
urban design framework.
The three case studies suggest that citywide policy planning means
literally attention to citywide issues and overall strategies for urban
design:
- Issues of those elements of the environment that create a
form pattern extending citywide (e.g. overall patterns of
major roadways, street lighting, landscaping, and natural
base -- hills, valleys, shorelines, etc.) or city-scale
(meaning a scale beyond a neighborhood or a district; e.g.
views in San Francisco);
- Issues of those elements of the environment that form a
citywide system (but not a citywide form pattern), with
significant implications on urban design (e.g. open spaces,
schools, and neighborhood commercial nodes) or some
implications (perhaps, fire stations);
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- Those issues of the environment that are basically small-scale
in nature but are found throughout or in many places in the
city (e.g. traffic through residential neighborhoods and
maintenance of streets and properties in San Francisco);
- Issues of those elements of the environment whose locations
and designs have strategic importance in the form and
character of the city, though limit.ed in number and scale,
warranting formulation of city strategies (e.g. Coit Tower
and Telegraph Hill in San Francisco, a major stadium in
downtown Minneapolis, and the arts district in Dallas
(proposed); and
- Those actions that are best taken at a level of city as a
whole -- those related to
. Things best regulated by a citywide control (e.g. the
height and bulk of buildings in San Francisco); or
. Things addressed best by a city-level organization
(e.g. CUE in Minneapolis); or
. Things best supported by a city-level constituency
that is not found or strong at sub-city levels
(e.g. environmental groups in Dallas); or4
. . Overall city strategies for urban design.
There are strategic reasons for urban designers to address issues
concerning these. A notion that decisions affecting one place or area
of the city ought to be made in view of citywide intentions must be a
primary impetus for citywide policy planning but citywide policy plan-
ning is more than the thinking of a place or an area in terms of the
whole city (e.g. Metro Center '85, Minneapolis, considering the down-
town community as a strategic area for the entire city). It is the
thinking of the form and character of the entire city. An interest in
the citywide visual form structure described in terms of form elements
such as landmarks, paths, and nodes is found in all the three case
cities as well as most of exemplary cases identified in the general-
state-of-art survey of citywide urban design studies, suggesting the
primary source of interest in the quality of the environment at a scale
of city (Lynch, 1960, etc.).
Desirability of addressing citywide issues and formulating overall
city strategies would vary according to cities. For example, citywide
views constitute an important urban design concern in San Francisco
but not so much in Dallas.
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Urban designers for people
It can be expected that citywide policy planning begins with a
view that urban design is for the people who live and work in the city
and its neighborhoods. Neither urban design for artistic expression of
designers (perhaps, monuments, plazas, and grand boulevards) nor urban
design for "elites" (perhaps distinguished commercial and business cen-
ters, cultural complexes, and tourist places) seems to have a place in
ordinary neighborhoods. In fact, urban designers in the three case
cities have intended to be responsive to the needs and concerns of
people. The purpose of the San Francisco Urban Design Plan was "to
respond to the public's interest in a better city" (San Francisco DCP,
1971b: 135). Thus:
If a plan is to be useful and its impact significant, it
must be responsive to citizen concerns. Therefore, one
of the foremost efforts in the Urban Design Study was to
determine what the people of the city identify as the
relevant issues (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 5).
In Minneapolis, the purpose of urban design was to identify "the needs
of the average person", to "help them [average persons or the people
of the city] to fulfill these needs in the environment", and to shape
"the form of their cities to meet their own needs" (Minneapolis P&D,
1970c: 217). In Dallas, the urban design staff helped "residents
articulate their ideas and wishes" and worked to give them tools to
influence policy (Lu, 1979: 51-52).
In practice, urban designer's concern did not necessarily result
in the proposals that were responsive to the wishes of the people.
However, it would be appropriate to view a common theme in cases is
not just urban designers' concern but actual responsiveness of the
proposals to the wishes of people. For proposals that were not
responsive to people in neighborhoods were revised in the process of
adopting them (the Minneapolis Visual Design Framework) and the staff's
approach changed soon to allow substantial citizen inputs early in the
process of policy formulation (comprehensive planning for the 80s).
Increasing rationality in urban design
At the heart of citywide policy planning seems to be an intent of
urban designers to increase overall rationality in approach to urban
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design. To increase overall rationality here means such things as:
- Articulating broad goals and objectives of urban design to
be consciously pursued;
- Searching means of achieving once articulating goals and
objectives more or less systematically by way of formulating
policies or general action strategies;
- Studying ways of implementing policies or general action
strategies to help strategic implementation;
- Making decisions less arbitrary by way of informing
them by empirical data and making decision-making
criteria explicit;
- Coordinating decisions of various actors to ensure that
they are made consistently to further public interest, in
this case, the achievement of publicly adopted urban design
goals, objectives, and policies; and
- Enabling to monitor the effect of goals, objectives, and
policies as they are applied in decisions over time and
feeding the information back into the urban design program.
It is important that the urban designers attempted to formulate
policies or action strategies before the execution of specific programs,
projects, design controls, or decisions. This must be for the same
reasons they attempted to articulate goals and objectives explicitly:
to make decision-making criteria explicit and to encourage exploration
and creativity in the search for means of implementing them.5 Policies
or action strategies, once formulated may be implemented systematically
(like in the rational-comprehensive planning model) or strategically
but in response to rising opportunities (like in the disjointed-
incrementalism model).6
Citywide policy planning in these cities has been advanced by a
new breed of believers in comprehensive planning (e.g. Jacobs, 1978b:
190, 210; Herald, December 11, 1978a; Lu, 1974: 21; 1979). As such,
they have drawn basic concepts from the rational-comprehensive planning
model such as the broadness of the scope of goals and objectives,
systematic search for means, and interrelatedness of plan elements.
On the other hand, they did not stick to incapacitating requirements of
rational-comprehensive planning. For example, in Dallas, they were
ready to adopt incrementalism as their basic approach while preparing
for the formulation of the citywide urban design framework ("jointed-
incrementalism"). Their survey of visual form was less than systematic
in that they examined only several factors in describing environmentally
and visually "common types". (The survey was still systematic in that
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it was carried out citywide, not just in some strategic areas.)
In San Francisco, they were ready to focus on strategic issues rather
than to do comprehensive research in preparing the recreation and
open space element of the comprehensive plan and to follow "a strange
way to set public improvement priorities" (implementation of the plan
via charter amendment) (Jacobs, 1978b: 299).
Naturally, what they did in their studies and how vary much
across cities. In San Francisco, studies of visual forms were carried
out but not studies of visual images (citizen images) while the
opposite is the case in Minneapolis. Studies of the urban design manage-
ment system carried out in Minneapolis (the second-phase CIP Urban Design
Study) suggest a strong interest of the urban design staff in consider-
ing all that were important in improving the quality of the environment:
both the quality of the environment and the process of designing and
changing the city. Later, the Minneapolis urban design staff even
formulated policies for the design management system (the Visual Quality
Plan). On the other hand, the planning staff in San Francisco attended
to implementation, only a part of the design management system. Because
the Urban Design Plan concentrated on citywide issues of the environ-
ment, some important issues of the design management system were not
studied (e.g. design controls that matter at a level of district such
as the downtown zoning bonus system). In Dallas, no studies were
carried out on the urban design management system as a whole (thus,
excepting a few specific elements of it -- the sign ordinance, the
historic preservation ordinance, and a few zoning permit procedures).
City Design Policy Formulation
Of strategic importance to urban designers in the three cities
were citywide urban design policies. Thus they conducted a series of
studies to prepare for their formulation. In Minneapolis and San
Francisco, urban designers actually formulated policies and submitted
them to the decision-making body for public discussion and formal
adoption. In Dallas, urban designers' efforts fell short of policy
formulation but basic data have been developed to allow policy formu-
lation in the future. Viewing the formulation of citywide urban design
policies as the key activity of citywide policy planning, this section
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presents my view as to how this activity relates to at least three of
important concerns in urban design. A brief discussion on strategies
for city design policy formulation follows.
* Reflecting the concern with citywide issues and overall
city strategies for urban design
Citywide urban design policies are formulated to guide decisions
affecting the form and character of the city and to serve as a city-
wide framework within which actions of public agencies, neighborhood
groups, and others could take place. Thus, they necessarily address
citywide issues and define overall city strategies for urban design.
(Citywide urban design policies here are contrasted with policies
for an area or a project -- area or project design policies).8 For
this reason, the formulation of city design policy requires the develop-
ment of a citywide data base and incorporation of considerations to
ensure that individual decisions affecting one area of the city are
made in view of citywide intentions for the form and character of
the city. The purpose of citywide urban design studies is to do these.
o Reflecting the concern with the needs of people
Citywide urban design policies define in general terms what sort
of city the community wants and how it should get it. Because citywide
urban design policies are not just urban designers' vision of a future
city, their formulation presumes studies of citizen concerns and wishes
along with the three factors of urban design -- the quality of the
environment, design management system, and action strategies. Citizen
inputs in the process of policy formulation must be essential while
whether broad citizen participation and public discussion should take
place early in this process would depend on situations (cf. the level
of existing public consensus; the plurality of interests in the
community). Official adoption (by the planning commission and/or the
city council) is important since it is the process of the community
debating and agreeing upon citywide urban design policies following
the formal decision-making procedures prescribed in the community.
So far, I have used a term citywide urban design policies (city design
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policy) loosely, but they should mean city policy officially adopted
by the community for the design of the city. Citywide policy planning
in its ideal must represent a democratic approach to urban design;
it could be "citizens collectively searching for a better city".
* Increasing overall rationality
City design policy formulation seems to help consciously pursue
the purpose of urban design and increase overall rationality in approach
to urban design at least in four general ways. At first, it is in it-
self the process of consciously pursuing the purpose of urban design,
articulating goals and objectives, and searching for means of achieving
them. This process could help create basis for pursuing the urban
design objectives of the community in the long run as well. For this
process could include studies to develop strategies for implementing
policies.
Implementation does not need to be a part of citywide policy
planning given the nature of polciy implementation (the politics of
implementation). Post facto evaluation and information feedback never-
theless have significant bearings on citywide policy planning. They
are one of basic requirements of the comprehensive plan and are essential
in allowing the use, implementation, and revision of policies in an
informed manner. Effective learning through experience hinges on them.
On the other hand, this requirement is seldom put into practice in
cities (e.g. San Francisco's failure to monitor the effect of the Urban
Design Plan). Evaluation and feedback require long-term commitment of
resources, yet the result of such commitment is not immediately visible.
City design policy formulation could facilitate the establishment of
a monitor process by setting forth policies stating the desirability
of establishing such a process, defining its important attributes,
and charting general strategies for establishing it (cf. the Plan for
the 80s, Minneapolis).
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, its product, citywide urban
design policies, would help make decisions more explicit and less
arbitrary. At the same time, they would help ensure that decisions
of various actors would further the achievement of urban design objec-
tives of the community if made in accordance with them. Once agreed
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upon, they would also stimulate pursuit of urban design objectives
on the part of those who are in a place to make decisions affecting the
form and character of the city.9
* Strategies for city design policy formulation
Citywide urban design policies may be formulated according to
various strategies. The planning staff in San Francisco implemented
what might be called the one-time comprehensive study strategy. All
important issues of the environment that were considered to fall within
the scope of the citywide urban design plan at the time were addressed
in a two-year urban design study to produce the Urban Design Plan.
General desirability of one-time comprehensive study is obvious (its
practicality and use in specific situations aside). Given strategic
roles goals, objectives, and policies could play in the whole process
or urban design (cf. Chapter V), citywide urban design policies ought
to be formulated as quickly as possible, even if tentatively. The one-
time study could allow concentrated efforts for this purpose. Urban
designers in the three case cities in fact considered this strategy
to be most preferred, at least initially. This is obvious in San
Francisco and Dallas. In San Francisco, the planning department
actually followed this strategy. In Dallas, the urban design division
in its first year prepared a work program proposing a study to complete
a citywide urban design framework within two years (Dallas, DPUD, 1971a).
In Minneapolis, one of the goals (objectives) of the first citywide
urban design study, (the CIP Urban Design Study) was "to develop a city-
wide design framework within which changes can occur without creating
a blighting effect" (Minneapolis CIP, 1965a: 1; Minneapolis CPC, 1965:
29) while in reality the first-phase study was for the development
of a preliminary plan (Minneapolis CIP, 1965a, b) and the second-phase
study, for the formulation of "some broad outline for the citywide
framework" (Minneapolis CIP, 1966b: 3).
However preferable the one-time comprehensive study strategy may
be, urban designers do (did ) notnecessarily see it appropriate and
useful in the specific context of their practice. Neither can it
always be implementable due to various constraints (funding, staffing,
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technical skills, the purpose of the parent program (e.g. the Min-
neapolis CIP to develop middle- to short-range improvement strategies),
official mandates, outside support, etc.). The urban design staff in
Dallas thus saw what they called "jointed-incrementalism" as their
model. Here, individual studies were carried out opportunistically
and incrementally -- each dealing with only limited aspects of the
environment (ecology, historic preservation, visual form, and visual
image) and primarily in the survey and analysis phase only, although
important studies were carried out citywide.
The urban design staff in Minneapolis could not propose a city
design plan in an adoptable form by the end of the CIP Urban Design
Study. An urban design plan was at first completed at a district
level (Metro Center '85, 1970) and then, much later, citywide (the
Visual Design Framework adopted by the planning commission in 1976).
Their strategy may be viewed as the one-time comprehensive study stra-
tegy repeatedly applied, unsuccessfully initially and successfully
later or, alternatively and perhaps better, a form of cyclic process
or incrementalism with individual imcrements quite large (major city-
wide and district-level studies, each dealing with a wide range of
issues of the environment and going through all phases or elements
of the planning process -- from data analysis to policy formulation).
Reviewing these themes, it can be concluded that citywide policy
planning reflecting several important concerns in urban design as I
propose has been tried fully in Minneapolis and San Francisco and
partially in Dallas. Urban design carried out on an individual pro-
ject or control basis with no citywide policy framework would not
reflect those concerns sufficiently. Moreover, those concerns seem
to suggest the status and role of urban design quite different from
those in more traditional ways of practicing urban design. What are
actual benefits of conducting citywide policy planning of this kind,
then?
141
CHAPTER V
USE AND EFFECT OF CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING
The effectiveness of citywide policy planning can be assessed by
measuring the use and effect of its key element -- city design policy
and the process of formulating and debating it. The use and effect of
another element, citywide urban design studies, can be measured also and
this helps such assessment. This chapter at first presents a framework
to consider the use and effect of these two elements and outlines the
promise of citywide policy planning. Situations with and without
citywide urban design policies in the three case cities are then
reviewed in relation to the promise so as to demonstrate the actual
merit of citywide policy planning.
Assessing the Effectiveness of Citywide Policy Planning
We would like to know how effective or successful each city's urban
design program is with or without citywide policy planning. An attempt
to measure the effectiveness of "citywide policy planning", however,
would not be productive because the unit of analysis is undefinable.
We only know the core of citywide policy planning, city design policy
formulation, without knowing where "citywide policy planning" ends and
other activities in city planning or urban development begin. The
effectiveness of citywide policy planning can be assessed, however, by
examining the use and effect of its two key elements: 1) city design
policy and the process of formulating and debating it; and 2) citywide
urban design studies. Assumed here is urban design that is made a dis-
tinct element of the comprehensive plan. City design policy is
distinguishable in the urban design element of the comprehensive plan.
The process of formulating and adopting it as well as each citywide
urban design study is also definable as a unit of analysis according to
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a work program of its own or as a section of a larger one. (Each city-
wide urban design study may consist of a series of studies in specific
areas of concerns or tasks as in the San Francisco Urban Design Study.)
Assessing the effectiveness of city design policy
The effectiveness of city design policy should be measured in terms
of the use, implementation, and effect of policies (including the effect
of the process of formulating and debating policies). Use, implementa-
tion, and effect are different kinds of activities or consequences,
although the common usage of these three terms distinguishes differences
only loosely. I define them generally below, expanding T. J. Kent's
(1964) five legislative uses of the urban general plan (policy
determination, policy effectuation, conveyance of advice, communication,
and education). There are many ways to implement or use policies.
Also, there are various effects of having policies formulated and agreed
upon. Obviously, there will be much overlap and interrelatedness across
categories.
Implementation is both a process and a product. Generally stated,
it is the process in which the intent of the policy gets translated into
action (the policy being implemented) and the achievement of the intent
as the consequence of the action (the policy having been implemented).
Implementation carried out on the part of city governments may take forms
of direct design (capital improvements), administrative reorganization,
legislation (cf. Kent's (1964) "policy effectuation" 1), etc. Studies
may be conducted to develop implementation programs and plans.
Use in the short run is the application of policies to decision-
making so as to choose among alternative proposals (cf. Kent's "policy
effectuation"). The use value of policies for this purpose is measured
in terms of how well they guide decisions. A good decision guide means
the balance between specificity and generality in its substance and
between conformance and creativity in its effect. Policies could also
be applied to generate proposals for studies, projects, specific designs
of physical objects, etc. Policies in this use are a set of directives
for action, an idea source, and a framework for studies, projects,
programs, etc. In the long run, the use of policies in individual
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decisions that are made in day-to-day decision-making as well as major
ones that take place only once in a while (e.g. locating a sports arena)
is expected to lead to their implementation over years. Use is thus
part of implementation as process. In practice, policies may be used
by urban designers in such ways as:
- Conveyance of advice to the city council (Kent, 1964) and
effectuation stimulation;
- Decision guide in various forms of formal and informal reviews:
Master plan referrals;
Reviews of projects and plans that come before the plan-
ning commission (or the city council) under the
provision of the city planning code;
Administrative reviews by the planning department; etc.
- A framework for capital improvement programming;
- A set of terms of reference for municipal design services
(e.g. furnishing design advice, design guidelines, schematic
designs, etc. to city departments, community groups, etc.);
and
- Education programs and public relations. to raise the design
consciousness of the public and stimulate public and private
actions to implement the plan (cf. Kent's "education").
The city design plan setting forth citywide urban design policies is a
major instrument by which the planning commission and staff present
their findings and recommendations to the decision-makers (the city
council) - in a comprehensively studied and coherently unified form
(conveyance of advice). Actively sought, the city design plan, as well
as the process of formulating it, could be a vehicle to stimulate the
decision-makers' actions to effectuate the policies of the plan (effectu-
ation stimulation). The city design plan as well as reports and working
papers produced during the plan-making process could be useful also as
a record of data for later reference. Published for public distribution
or used internally within the planning department, they form a valuable
compilation of information as to existing and predicted conditions,
problems, needs, and opportunities in the city and the way the urban
design staff has responded to them.
The effect of policies is not only the consequence of using or
implementing them but also the consequence of just having them formulated
and agreed upon. The latter type of consequences cannot be easily
attributed to specific decisions or actions that stem from them, although
it may be consciously sought. To differentiate effect from use and
implementation, I emphasize this type of consequences. The effect may
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be desirable or undesirable; expected or unexpected. The purpose of
my suggesting various effects policies could or might have is to
encourage urban designers to predict and expect the kind of effects
that are important to their communities beforehand rather than to have
them as unexpected "side effects". The effect of policies includes
such things as:
- Communication (Kent, 1964);
- Issue raising;
- Discussion facilitation;
- Educational effects (cf. Kent's "education");
- Support mobilization and implmenting action stimulation;
and
- Public-decision prediction.
Citywide urban design policies may be formulated for other, more specific
reasons as well:
- To unlock space economy and stimulate private development;
- To guide private locational decisions; and
- To coordinate capital improvements; among others.
Our ultimate concern is the effect of policies on the progress toward
the achievement of a better city (in terms of human experience) and, to
this end, the improvement of the decision-making process (design
management system). The purposeful act of use and implementation is
important to the extent it is tied to this effect. In terms of decision
processes, the effect of policies includes such things as:
- Planning coodination ("comprehensive" plan);
- Building of local urban design capability and a whole range
of improvement in the decision-making process in urban
design; and
- Coordination toward rational and orderly development within
a citywide decision framework.
In terms of the quality of the physical environment, citywide urban
design policies are the basis for protecting and enhancing the environ-
ment. Measurements can be taken according to various environmental
concerns such as legibility, conservation, diversity, comfort and
convenience, etc. (Southworth and Southworth, 1973) or environmental
stress, behavioral support, identity, legibility, meaning, etc. (Lynch,
1974; also Lynch-, 1966; 1976). The most basic categories of relevance
to this study are the following:
- Place qualities (which citywide policy planning, as well as
other kinds of activities in urban design would address);
and
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- Citywide qualities (e.g. citywide form and image structures,
including city-scale views, street lighting systems, park
system, etc.), place qualities with a citywide distribution
(e.g. traffic-related problems in San Francisco), and
place qualities of citywide significance (e.g. a major
stadium downtown).
A brief description of the categories I have used so far follows:
Communication
The city design plan communicates city design policy, a set of
general and long-range goals, objectives, and policies for the design
of the city to the city officials, people of the city, and those who
are involved in physical development and change of the city. It puts
public and private interests on notice of the intent of the city and
indicates a set of common goals, priorities for action, and public
guidelines for physical development and change in the city.
Issue raising and discussion facilitation
Citywide urban design policies as they are being developed are a
public response to important urban design-related issues of the com-
munity and have a function of defining issues and stating problems in
objective terms to facilitate necessary research and public discussion.
Once adopted, they express public concerns and offer a common language
or set of terms of reference for constructive public debate on matters
of urban design. They continue to raise issues for public attention
as they clarify what issues have already been addressed (cf. increased
attention to downtown conservation and development issues in San
Francisco in the late 70s).
Education
Citywide urban design policies as well as the process of formulating
and adopting them and the document which presents them (-the city design
plan) can have educational effects. They help the planning commission
and staff educate the city officials, people of the city, and those who
are involved in physical development and change of the city. Education
means many things. To mention just a few: stimulating interest of
people in matters of urban design; increasing public awareness about
urban design-related issues; expanding the scope of environmental values
in the community; informing people of the operation of their local
government in physical development and design, principles of good
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design, and means that are available to them to improve their environ-
ments. Ultimately, all these should increase the personal capability
of people to participate in decisions that are shaping their environ-
ments in an informed manner and build lasting constituencies to support
not only the city design plan itself but also the whole effort to
improve the quality of the environment, i.e., urban design.
The stated purpose of citywide urban design studies and plans
almost always includes education. Individuals and organizations in the
private sector sometimes commission or conduct city-scale urban design
studies to stimulate public action (Georgia Chapter AIA, 1962; Georgia
Urban Design Committee, 1966; Portland Chapter AIA, 1971; and Appleyard
and Lynch, 1974, for the City of San Diego through a grant from the
Marston family). Their primary purpose is education. Education, like
the role of citywide urban design policies to guide decisions, is
perhaps one of the most important functions of the city design plan, while
it does not produce immediate physical consequences. Its effect is not
quite visible because it becomes part of your decision-making process
as it should be -- routinized.
The San Francisco Urban Design Plan has achieved an exceptional
accomplishment in this regard. Almost all the people I interviewed in
the city pointed out that they considered the most important impact of
the plan to be education. Their comments were in no way meant to allude
a plan of inaction. Given the importance of education in public expecta-
tion and in actual achievement, it is not surprising that it is
considered to be one of the key measures of the effectiveness of
comprehensive planning programs (e.g. Real Estate Research Corporation
reported in Hammer et al., 1969: 38). I, however, argue that the
educational effect as evaluation criterion should be somewhat
deemphasized because it is often used as justification for inaction.
Even urban design programs which die on the way, only producing a few
preliminary reports, can have a "significant" educational effect (e.g.
Seattle, 1971).
Support mobilization and implementing action stimulation
Closely allied with the educational effect is the effect of the
city design plan to mobilize support, create a broad-based
constituency which becomes a watch-dog to see to it that the policies
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of the plan are implemented by the city government and other actors in
the city, and stimulate public and private actions toward the implemen-
tation of the plan. Citywide urban design policies are a set of
community agreements to begin with (cf. the profound impact of the Goals
for Dallas program).
. Public-decision prediction
Good citywide urban design policies would guide decisions of the
planning commission (and the city council). It follows that they allow
the property interest engaged in the physical development and change
of the city to predict the position of the planning commission (and the
city council) in its decisions. It is a predictive device, a prophecy
of public action (Kent, 1964). The substance of this effect is rational
and orderly development of the city without unnecessary public conflicts
over projects. For example, city planners in San Francisco have
oDserved that the Urban Design Plan has an effect of preventing the
kind of projects that had created public conflicts in the last 60s and
the early 70s from being proposed (Jacobs, 1978b: 250).
. Planning coordination
This is the essence of citywide policy planning. By studying the
quality of the physical environment and the process of development and
by formulating and agreeing upon citywide urban design policies, stra-
tegic responses to important urban design issues and coordination of
planning decisions become possible. Overall rationality and efficiency
in approach to urban design could be increased in this way.
Improving the local urban design capability and the process
of decision-making in urban design
Citywide urban design policies, if implemented, contribute to the
building of the local urban design capability through organizational and
procedural changes inside and outside the city government. These may
include changes in the following:
- Administrative organization (e.g. creation of CUE,
Minneapolis);
- Administrative procedures (e.g. new procedures for
designating historic districts, Minneapolis);
- Financing and programming device (e.g. tax increment
financing method, Minneapolis);
- Development tools (e.g. development districts, Minneapolis);
and
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- Legal controls (e.g. the height and bulk ordinance, San
Francisco).
Moreover, citywide policy planning always helps improve the local urban
design capability by way of educating the urban design staff members
and those in the city government who are involved in decisions affecting
the design of the city. For this reason alone -- even if citywide
urban design policies cannot be officially adopted, citywide policy
planning would be worth attempting.
Coordination toward rational and orderly development of
the city within a citywide decision framework
Closely allied with public decision prediction is a function of
citywide urban design policies to serve as a citywide framework with
which to guide public and private decisions affecting the design of
the city. It has an effect of coordinating decisions of various
participants in the process of decision-making toward rational and
orderly physical development of the city.
Implementation is perhaps strategically most important of all
that you can do with citywide urban design policies. Implementation,
be it by way of capital improvement projects or legislative actions or,
other public actions, demonstrates the city's commitment to its
policies in the most visible and dramatic manner (cf. the passage of the
height and bulk ordinance in San Francisco). Especially, policies for
action (cf. Chapter VI) implemented in large public projects result in
immediate and symbolic physical consequences (hence, pet projects).
However, I argue that implementation is not the most important criterion
for evaluating the effectiveness of citywide urban design policies.
Citywide urban design policies that see no implementation (in the
short run) can still be useful and effective ("effect"-ful) , with
implementation taking place in the long run (policies being implemented).
For example, citywide urban design policies can guide everyday decisions
in design review. They can eduate people and stimulate public and
private efforts to enhance the quality of the physical environment. How-
ever insignificant use and effect may seem, they should be con-
sidered essential in assessing the effectiveness of citywide urban design
policies. Use is often considered unimportant 1) because people tend not
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to take notice of it once it becomes a matter of course (institu-
tionalization of the use of policies in day-to-day decision-making),
2) because it does not result in dramatic changes in the physical
environment (the effect of use is highly dispersed spatially and
temporally, with many projects, mostly small, being carried out
throughout the city and over years), and 3) because a traditional
notion of plans in the mind of most people pushes them to expect the
city design plan to be "implementable".2 The purpose of formulating
citywide urban design policies could be any and every of functions and
impacts discussed so far, be it in the category of use or implementa-
tion or effect. Implementation as consequence (policies having been
implemented) is not a sole measure of the effectiveness of citywide
urban design policies.3
If all sorts of impact in use, implementation, and effect
represent a range of what you can expect from citywide urban design
policies, a set of basic functions represents the core of it. At first,
citywide urban design policies as they are being formulated are a
response to important design-related issues of the community, defining
issues of the physical environment and its change. They thus become a
basis for beginning studies and discussions. They are an instrument
through which a community considers, debates, and finally agrees upon
"a coherent and unified set of general, long-range policy" for the
design of the city (Kent's (1964) "policy determination"). For this
reason, citywide policy planning may be viewed as the very beginning of
the whole process of urban design.
Second, citywide urban design policies respond to important design-
related issues by identifying basic public values, defining desirable
qualities of the physical environment and the design management system,
spelling out fundamental principles of good design, and charting
general courses of action to be taken along with general priorities.
It follows that citywide urban design policies, if used as a decision-
making framework, should help assure that decisions of various actors
in the city are made with important public values taken into account,
princples of good design followed, important consequences of decisions
considered, and priorities for action incorporated. Once adopted as a
public statement, citywide urban design policies become an expression
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of public concerns for the present issues and future design of the
city, continue to raise issues (as they distinguish those issues that
have already been defined from those that are left undefined), and
facilitate public discussion.
Third as public agreement as to the definition of a good environ-
ment and a good process of development, citywide urban design policies
should become a common goal of public and private actors and a framework
from which many studies, programs, projects, actions, and decisions
stem. They also chart general courses of action to be followed stra-
tegically to achieve or approach what is desired. They thus become a
directive for public and private action and a basis for drawing public
and private commitment to carrying them out. Finally, citywide urban
design policies are a form of communications; they define a common
language or set of terms of reference to facilitate constructive
discussion. As a process-oriented tool, they are a device for public
control through communication and a basis for coordinating public and
private decisions toward the improvement of the city's decision-making
process and physical environment. In all these ways, citywide urban
design policies could become a basis for purposeful pursuit of broad
urban design objectives and help increase overall rationality in
approach to urban design. However intangible these functions may seem,
they are important since they form the basis from which specific func-
tions of use, implementation, and effect derive. The essence of city-
wide policy planning lies in the effort to realize these fundamental
functions of citywide urban design policies. The assessment of the
effectiveness of citywide policy planning is thus part of the
description of urban designers' approaches.
Assessing the effectiveness of citywide urban design studies
The effectiveness of a citywide urban design study has to be
assessed according to the following factors:
- Its contribution to the formulation of city design policy,
including the development of necessary theories and
techniques to allow effective policy formation;
- The effectiveness of citywide urban design policies once
formulated, in terms of their use, implementation, and
effect; and
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- Other uses and effects of the citywide urban design study --
its process and products (e.g. staff experience and the use
of data).
At first, we are concerned with the "productivity" of each study --
how much material it produces for a plan to be prepared and contributes
to the formulation of citywide urban design policies. This directly
relates to the design of strategies for city design policy (e.g.
one-time study vs. incrementalism). A study or a series of studies
which produces a plan quickly and economically in an adoptable from is
a good one. However, the effectiveness of plan-making per se has to be
balanced with the benefits of making the process longer and more costly.
At first, urban designers have to spend some time and money to do good
professional work. They have to produce a plan that is useful,
implementable, and effective ("effect"-ful). The plan should receive
widespread acceptance, adoption, and early and continued use. Some
studies will have to be made specifically on implementation strategies.
Moreover, citywide urban design studies could do many other things that
are good for the city. Production of a data base is one (e.g. Dallas'
ecological data bank). Building of urban design staff capability,
institutional and personal, is another. Furthermore, citywide urban
design studies could involve citizens in discussion about the design of
the city, educate them about concepts and techniques of urban design,
raise their consciousness about the quality of the environment, and
mobilize their support for the plan to facilitate its later
implementation. Such effects are difficult to measure but possible to
assess case by case through interviews and reviews of news articles,
records of public hearings, etc. A series of urban design studies which
never produces a plan is of limited value in citywide policy planning
but it would surely have other values, as we see in the Dallas case.
The citywide decision framework will be complete with citywide
urban design policies. However, just a citywide data base -- always,
the more systematic or comprehensive, the better -- can perform some
of its functions, if combined with "a plan" in the mind of urban
designers. The insight and leadership of urban designers in this regard
is crucial. Better still, a comprehensive agenda identifying issues and
necessary studies, if not action strategies defining the nature of
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decisions to be made in response to those issues, should go with the
citywide data base (e.g. the Dallas Environmental Quality Committee's
report, 1974). The Dallas case suggests inherent limitations of city-
wide decision frameworks short of citywide urban design policies. The
primary source of the effectiveness of citywide policy planning is the
process of formulating and debating citywide urban design policies.
Taking all the fundamental functions, uses, and effects of these
two elements of citywide policy planning together, the promise of city-
wide policy planning is great. Just looking at citywide urban design
policies, they could perform important functions which other elements
of urban design would not do at all, such as:
- Addressing more than one of important citywide issues at a
time and in relation to each other and devising overall
city strategies for urban design;
- Coordinating decisions of various actors within, an official
citywide framework; and
- Allowing the conscious pursuit of the broad urban design
objectives of the community and helping increase overall
rationality in approach to urban design.
Citywide urban design policies could also perform certain functions
much better than other elements of urban design:
- Public discussion and policy determination;
- Conveyance of advice;
- Communication and public decision-prediction;
- Broad educational effects; and
- Building of local urban design capability.
Do actual benefits of citywide policy planning in Minneapolis and San
Francisco match the promise? Are situations with citywide urban design
policies formulated and adopted in fact better than others? Could
situations without policies be improved by formulating and agreeing
upon policies?
Relative Benefits of Citywide Policy Planning in Practice
Because of a number of factors involved, a comparative case study
of urban design practice in Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Dalls does
not offer us definitive cases for the relative merit of formulating and
debating citywide urban design policies. Nevertheless, overall successes
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with citywide policy planning, development projects and design controls
that worked within a framework of citywide urban design policies, prob-
lems that emerged in specific situations without citywide urban design
policies, and the potential for improving present practice in these
cities together seem to point to the desirability of formulating and
debating citywide urban design policies.
My discussion to follow primarily looks at cases in Minneapolis and
San Francisco. When the city has adopted citywide urban design policies,
problems of not having citywide urban design policies in specific
situations can be seen rather clearly. On the other hand, it is
difficult to assess the situation in Dallas because various difficulties
prevented the urban design staff from beginning and completing the
process of formulating citywide urban design policies in this city.
The disjointed and incremental nature of the Dallas urban design program
may be shaped by the nature of its context (e.g. the ideal of city
government and city officals' preferences) much more than by the staff's
approach. Citywide urban design policies, if formulated, might not
change the effect of the context of urban design. Thus, while the
Dallas urban design program as a whole is a case without citywide urban
design policies, I limit my discussion to a few cases in Dallas.
The use and implementation of policies differ according to what they
define -- the quality of the environment, the attribute of the urban
design management system, and general strategies for improving either.
I therefore organize my discussion according to these categories.
With and without policies for the environment
Looking at situations before and after the adoption of the Urban
Design Plan, the whole San Francisco case may be viewed as a case for
having clearly articulated policies for the quality of the environment.
While the plan has had various effects such as education (e.g. neigh-
borhood groups incorporating urgan design principles in their plans)
and facilitating discussion (e.g. focussed attention to the quality of
the environment in discussing project proposals before the planning
commission), it has above all contributed visibly to actual preserva-
tion and improvement of the form and character of the city (e.g. the
effect of the 1973 bay window ordinance and the 1978 residential zoning
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revision incorporating improved controls over bay window design; the
form and character of Telegraph Hill protected by the height and bulk
ordinance and the Jackson Square Historic District). Also important is
the effect of the plan on overall improvement of the process of develop-
ment. According to Jacobs (1978b: 250), public controversies over
development projects, especially those that are related to design
characteristics of the city, its neighborhoods, and buildings, have
been significantly reduced. There have been fewer controversies over
major building proposals and still.fewer related to the height and bulk
of buildings since 1972. As he has speculated, such factors as high
interest rates, over-building, decreased demand and, perhaps, increased
difficulty of assembling large parcels of land may have contributed to
reducing controversial proposals to begin with but the Urban Design
Plan's contribution must not be little.
It is also important to note that with the Urban Design Plan the
project review section of the planning department seems to have had more
influence than it did earlier (Jacobs, 1978b: 250). (See situations
before the plan in Jacobs (1978a: 21).) Again, other factors, like
the strong possibility of a discretionary review, which the planning
commission has begun to use recently, are involved but the effect of the
Urban Design Plan broadly supported by the public must not be little.
Along with focused attention to the quality of the environment made
possible by policies and principles of the plan, this supports a view
that better incorporation of important -community values into development
decisions, more timely input of professional judgement from government
urban designers, etc. as the planning staff hoped (e.g. Jacobs, 1971:
32) have actually been realized.
Minneapolis has had only short experience of working with official
citywide urban design policies and we do not see such a dramatic effect.
The status of highrise controversies in this city nevertheless suggests
important roles citywide policy planning played. From around the mid
70s, highrises, especially those around the Lakes Cedar, Isles, and
Calhoun area, created much public controversy in this city as well.
However, as the 70s came to an end, highrises around lakes became less
of an issue due to two cycles of citywide policy planning efforts as
well as neighborhood residents' actions against specific project
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proposals (e.g. Lake Point and 2900 Dean Boulevard). At first, highrise
issues were publicly debated in occasions to adopt the land use and
visual design framework elements of the comprehensive municipal plan
around 1976. Subsequently areas around lakes were rezoned in accordance
to the land use plan to discourage highrise constuction. Then, compre-
hensive planning for the 80s created another forum and a policy to
establish height limits outside the downtown was incorporated into the
Visual Quality Plan.
Since the definition of the quality of the environment has an
important role in making decision-making criteria explicit and setting
common terms for public discussion, the situations in which project
proposals have to be evaluated and debated without official policies or
guidelines defining a good environment would he problematic. A case in
point is the environmental review process in Minneapolis. Neither the
Visual Design Framework of 1976 nor the Visual Quality Plan of 1979 has
systematically defined the desirable quality of the environment. Thus,
terms of discussing the visual impact of project proposals like one
for the Boisclair East River Bank Development Project were inarticulate
and public debate, without clear reference points:
C. Sensitive Resources
1. Aesthetics
Macro-Scale Impacts. The mass and the height of the
two residential towers have generated considerable visual
controversy. It has been argued that the mass and scale
dwarf and detracts from the Our Lady of Lourdes Church,
that highrise development should be kept on the West Bank
of the river in the central business district.
These arguments are vigorously disputed by the
project sponsor, other area residents... .
The City Planning Commission staff made particular note
of the visual aspect of the project, finding it the "best
solution" for the site. There is a subjective element in
aesthetic judgements, and the perspective figures allow
the reviewer to judge this impact directly... . [Emphasis
mine.] (Minneapolis PD, 1979b: 14-5)
Compare this with the situation in San Francisco (e.g. a case of the
final environmental impact report for the Crocker National Bank Northern
California Headquarter building). With a set of policies and "funda-
mental principles" defining the quality of the environment as a
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checklist of concerns and as a set of decision criteria, design evalua-
tion was more systematic and explicit:
C. Urban Design
Relationship to Comprehensive Plan
The Urban Design Element of the San Francisco
Comprehensive Plan provides a basis in City policy for
summarizing the urban design implications of the proposed
project. This summary is shown in Table 12, pp. 90-04.
[See an excerpt in fig. 5-1. Emphasis mine.] (San
Francisco CPC, 1979: 79-94)
With and without policies for the design management system
The process the urban design staff in Minneapolis followed in
proposing the master design district ordinance is problematic. I pre-
sent this as the first case for formulating policies for design
management tools and subjecting them 'to public discussion. The concept
of design districts was initially developed in the CIP Urban Design
Study as one of a few legal tools to implement urban design frameworks.
Subsequent efforts of the urban design staff to draft and pass the master
design district ordinance began without a broad public agreement as to
the general desirability of creating such a tool. Neither did the staff
have good knowledge of public views at the outset as to the desirable
attributes and roles such a tool should have in the process of physical
change.5 Thus, the process of adopting the ordinance had to carry the
burden of creating necessary public consensus as to these -- unsuccess-
fully, in this case. The result was a controversy and deadlock. The
circle of public discussion expanded gradually as the controversy
developed, each time following a discovery that certain important groups
of people had not been consulted. The positions of participants in
debate became firmer as time passed. It became more difficult to make
tradeoffs and compromises as more details were set. Ultimately,
disagreement on a few specifics of the proposal determined the whole idea
of establishing design review procedures to protect the visual character
of key locations in the city.
It is important to note that the process of citywide policy plan-
nign as a stage for defining the desirable nature of design management
tools like design districts was soon realized in Minneapolis. The Visual
TABLE 12: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPLICABLE URBAN DESIGN POLICIES OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND THE PROPOSED PROJECT
APPLICABLE URBAN DESIGN POLICIES*
A. Policies for City Pattern
1. Policy 1. "Recognize and
protect major views in the
City, with particular
attention to those of open
space and water." (p. 10)
2. Policy 3. "Recognize
that buildings, when seen
together, produce a total
effect that characterizes the
City and its districts."
(p.10)
3. Policy 6. "Make centers
of activity more prominent
through design of street
features and by other means."
(p. 12)
RELATIONSHIP OF PROJECT TO APPLICABLE POLICIES
The project site is outside the City's major
designated view corridors along Pine St.,
2 blocks to the north, and California St.,
3 blocks north. The project would interrupt
some views of the Bay from the Aetna Bldg.,
and toward distant open space to the south and
west (including Twin Peaks and San Bruno
Mountain) from the 111 Sutter Bldg. and
neighboring high-rise structures to the north
and east.
The project would block few views to the Bay
from neighboring buildings located to the
west, because most such views are already
blocked by intervening structures.
The proposed project would be visible in many
distant views of the downtown skyline. It
would join a number of other comparably sized
high-rise buildings in the Downtown area.
Collectively, these towers provide the major
visual identification for the central business
district.
The galleria would provide a prominent
pedestrian activity center vacated to adjacent
streets.
Pedestrian seating, bicycle racks, and
interior plants would be provided in the
galleria. Landscaping and outdoor seating
would be provided on a rooftop terrace above
the galleria. Awnings would be provided at
street level along the Kearny and Post St.
frontages of the proposed tower. No street
trees or street furniture are proposed for
public sidewalks. The arched, glass roof of
the galleria would be a distinctive design
treatment, which would help set off the
project as an activity center. Continuation
of existing horizontal facade lines (see
Figure 16, p. 26) would help clarify the
extent of the Crocker complex.
8. Policy 8. "Maintain a
strong presumption against
the giving up of street areas
for private ownership or use,
or for construction of public
buildings." (p. 28)
C. Policies for Major New
Development
9. Policy 1. "Promote
harmony in the visual
relationships and transitions
between new and older
buildings." (p. 36)
10. Policy 2. "Avoid
extreme contrasts in color,
shape, and other-
characteristics which will
cause new buildings to stand
out in excess of their public
importance." (p. 36)
Lick Pl., a private street which extends
through the site from Post to Sutter Sts.,
would be closed to permit construction of the
gallerja. Above-grade circulation through the
site would be limited to.pedestrians. Ver
Mehr P1. would remain open and would Orovide
pedestrian access to the Kearny St. level of
the galleria; the eastern end would be vacated
as a public right-of-way.
See Item 7, above. According to the Urban
Design Plan, the surfaces of large buildings
should be articulated and textured to reduce
their apparent size and to reflect the pattern
of older buildings. The probable masonry
exterior finish materials of the tower would
be similar in character to those of most
neighboring buildings. Details of surface
articulation and texture have not yet been
developed. The horizontal building lines at
the lower levels of the No. 1 Montgomery
Bldg., the 111 Sutter Bldg., and the Sutter
Hotel would be continued in the facades of the
galleria and tower. Differentiation in the
surface treatment of the mechanical level at
the top of the tower would help visually
terminate the structure.
See Item 9, above. The tower would be
basically rectilinear in shape. The light
gray reflective glass and light-colored
masonry exterior materials would impart medium
to light color values to the tower. These
values would shift, depending on time of day,
natural lighting conditions, and reflected sky
colors.
Fig. 5-1. Evaluating Urban Design Implications of Proposed Projects:
A Case of the Crocker National Bank Northern California
Headquarter Building, San Francisco.(San Francisco DCP,
1979: 90, 92)
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Quality Plan of the Plan for the 80s incorporates policies and implemen-
tation strategies defining the limited but legitimate roles design
review procedures and the design review board should play in the
decision-making process (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-92, 93, 98-100).
The plan also recommends an action to develop design review guidelines
(Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-102). Public agreement was possible at a
general policy level on a once controversial issue. It would be appro-
priate to see that it is the nature of design review and its procedures
that were in question in the design district controversy, not the con-
cept of design districts itself.
In Dallas, the fate of the conservation district ordinance suggests
similar problems. Given general applicability of conservation districts
to many areas of the city (which were yet to be identified except for a
few), citywide policy planning to establish broad consensus as to its
desirability and basic attributes seems to be due. The success of the
historic preservation ordinance suggests that the need for citywide
policy planning depends much on situations. The historic preservation
ordinance was successful without initial policy planning efforts
perhaps because it had a clearly established constituency; the ordinance
proposal received strong backing of a group of residents in the Swiss
Avenue area and the area was the only one specifically considered for
historic district designation at the time.
The success of the height and bulk ordinance in San Francisco may
be contrasted with the Minneapolis master design district ordinance
case. Potentially controversial actions of the planning commission to
enact the interim height and bulk controls and the Board of Supervisors
to approve the permanent controls were possible importantly because the
Urban Design Plan had established basic community agreements on policies
to regulate the height and bulk of buildings and the height and bulk
guidelines. Broad public support was created. The planning director
could argue for the interim controls before the mayor on the ground that
the action was a step toward implementation of a plan which the mayor
himself had praised.
Citywide policy planning to define the desirable nature of the
design management system may be suggested as a general way of improving
the present practice in San Francisco in two respects. At first,
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certain qualities of the environment defined in principles and policies
of the Urban Design Plan have proven to be difficult to obtain through
reviews of individual building proposals. Crucial here are not only
tradeoffs among principles and policies but also tradeoffs between urban
design considerations on the one hand and other considerations,
especially economics of real estate development, on the other. Here,
I see policy issues regarding the desirable roles of design review and
other means in obtaining important qualities of the environment -- more
than those of policy implementation. An argument that the city planners
would not be able to go further without a public statement of what the
city should look like (Jacobs, 1978b: 190) must apply equally to issues
of the design management system: unless a broad consensus is formed as
to what the city should get, at what cost, and by what means, the city
planners would not be able to go further. The Minneapolis Visual Quality
Plan suggests how the Urban Design Plan might deal with such issues.
The Minneapolis plan clearly defines the roles design review should play
in the decision-making process, although design review is given very
limited roles to play.in Minneapolis.
Second, the planning staff in San Francisco has not been successful
in establishing a process of continuously monitoring and occasionally
reassessing the use and effect of the Urban Design Plan. Recent public
attention to the downtown conservation and development issues points to
the problem of not having such a process which would work as an early
warning system. Perhaps, the planning staff in San Francisco could have
elicited public support and commitment for establishing such a process
by way of proposing policies stating its desirability and defining its
basic attributes. Again, the Plan for the 80s of Minneapolis suggests
how such policies might look (the Implementation Plan, Chapter XX).6
Much support for the Urban Design Plan and high expectation for its
implementation that existed at the time of adopting the plan seem to
warrant inclusion of such policies.
Viewed this way, the Visual Quality Plan may be taken as a case
of judicious use of policies for the urban design management system and
action strategies. The urban design staff, knowing the difficulty of
7
agreeing upon the definition of a good environment in their city, at
first established public consensus as to the need of identifying
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desirable qualities of the environment to be enhanced (Policy 33),
developing design review guidelines (Recommended Action), and estab-
lishing design principles for citywide systems such as street lighting
and traffic signs (Implementation Strategy)(Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-94,
98-100, 102). They can thus legitimately and, perhaps, with broad citi-
zen support embark on the work to define the desirable quality of the
environment. This has to be contrasted with the way development of
design review guidelines for an unsuccessful experimental design district
(the Whittier East Design Study) and drafting of the master design
district ordinance were begun.
With and without policies for action
In contrast with the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan as part of the
Plan for the 80s, the San Francisco Urban Design Plan does not treat
oerall city strategies for urban design as a matter of policy. If
important decisions as to action strategies that are basically policy
matters have been made under the guise of policy implementation internal
to the planning department, that would be problematic. However, a more
important issue here is one of missing opportunities. If important
decisions as to action strategies that could be treated as policy matters
have been reduced to matters of policy implementation, that would mean
the benefits of formulating and agreeing upon policies as discussed in
the preceding section have not been materialized. A case presented
earlier, a policy that the city should encourage an ongoing partnership
with responsible local citizen groups in identifying desirable qualities
of the environment to be enhanced (Policy 33, the Visual Quality Plan),
for example, allows the urban design staff to work on studies legiti-
matesly and perhaps with braod citizen support. With a policy in the
same plan to establish height limits, neighborhood groups can see to it
that the city takes appropriate action. To have such a policy at first
would be much more effective for neighborhood groups than to propose a
specific set of height limits from the outset. In San Francisco, a few
drafting errors damaged two Duskin proposals (height limit initiatives).
Specific proposals that have to be prepared in dispatch and by a small
group of people cannot be free from flaws; specifics of the proposals
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would make them difficult to agree upon.
In San Francisco, the planning department could have at least
subjected the general implementation strategies once developed and
presented in the May 1971 document to the formal consideration of the
planning commission. In this way, policy issues could have been
discussed as such and the staff could have been able to improve upon
their proposals, incorporating public preferences and insights in basic
action strategies. A bonus of such a rigorous approach would be a
higher level of citizen support and public commitment for carrying out
recommendations of the plan. An argument that urban design would not
go further without a public statement of what the city should look like
(Jacobs, 1978b: 190) may be extended to issues of basic action
strategies. In San Francisco, the planning commission endorsed the
implementation program for the recreation and open space element of the
comprehensive plan in July 1973, suggesting the practicability of such
a procedure.
Cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco suggest the actual merit of
citywide policy planning that match its promise. At first, citywide
policy planning in these cities reflects several important concerns in
urban design in a way urban design carried out on an individual project
or control basis would not do (e.g. keen attention to the quality of
the physical environment as people experience it; responsiveness of
proposals to the needs and concerns of the people who live in the city
and its neighborhoods). The overall process of urban design and
development in these cities seems to have worked better with citywide
policy planning (e.g. before and after the Urban Design Plan in San
Francisco; the process of formulating the Visual Quality Plan following
the adoption of the Visual Design Framework). Not only projects or
design controls initiated within a framework of citywide urban design
policies worked well (e.g. design review in San Francisco vs. that in
Minneapolis) but also problems often emerged in specific situations in
which projects or design controls of citywide significance were proposed
without initial policy discussion at a level of city (e.g. the Minnea-
polis master design district ordinance). In addition, some situations
in Minneapolis and San Francisco seem to be improved by formulating and
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debating urban design policies on a citywide basis (e.g. the role of
design review in San Francisco).
Dallas offers us a case suggesting that citywide decision frameworks
short of citywide urban design policies (e.g. the visual form survey
data and the Environmental Quality Committee's report) cannot entirely
correct basic problems of urban design carried out incrementally.
However, "disjointedness" in the Dallas urban design program may have
derived from the very nature of the context of urban design in this city.
Full-scale citywide policy planning, which seems not entirely impractical
in this city, might not have changed the context and increased
jointedness signficantly.
In this way, cases from the three cities individually are not
conclusive but together they seem to point to the desirability of
formulating and debating citywide urban design policies whenever issues
involved are citywide in nature and policy matters in substance or overall
city strategies for urban design are in question.
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CHAPTER VI
MAKING CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING WORK
There would be many issues urban designers attempting citywide
policy planning must face. There would be many decisions they must
make to begin and complete formulation of citywide urban design policies
and use them to make their urban design programs work better. There
would be many factors that would affect the nature of decisions they
make and their results. Generally, urban designers must deal with issues
at least in the following areas of concern:
- The theories and techniques of city design policy formulation;
- The governmental context -- the city government as it defines
the status, role, and client of urban design (urban designers)
and the politics within the city government; and
- The context of citizen participation and the role government
urban designers ought to play in the planning process (the
politics of city design policy formulation).
This chapter discusses several issues that seem most important in
conducting citywide policy planning, drawing upon the three case studies.
Some issues are important because they suggest special difficulties in
the practice of citywide policy planning (especially in regard to
the second and the third areas of concern). Others are important
because the way urban designers respond to them significantly affects the
nature of their practice (especially in regard to the first area of
concern).
The three case studies suggest that various difficulties experienced
in the three cities should not entirely prohibit citywide policy planning
in these cities. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, city design policies
were formulated and adopted officially with much public support. Even
in Dallas where staff efforts fell short of policy formulation, most of
the basic materials that would be essential in beginning policy formulation
had been accumulatedby the late 70s. Also, the basicurban design goals on
which policy formulation could be based were identified through staff par-
ticipation in the second Goals for Dallas program. City officials in this
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city were not supportive of this kind of activity in the late 70s but
the city councils of the late 60s and the early 70s encouraged the plan-
ning department to work on the comprehensive plan (the planning depart-
ment made urban design one of its elements to be prepared) and speci-
fically requested the preparation of the comprehensive land use plan.
Conceivably, the staff could begin the formulation of citywide urban design
policies anytime with new council's support. Thus, my attention in
discussions to follow moves to a question of how urban designers should
respond to important issues of practice in order to make citywide policy
planning work better.
City Design Policy Formulation
There are at least two kinds of issues that are important to urban
designers considering strategies for city design policy formulation:
- The substance of city design policy:
What do you define or prescribe in your policies?
What is the importance of defining a good urban design
management system relative to that of defining a good
environment?
- The form and content of policy:
How do you define or prescribe in your policies?
Especially, how do you balance specificity and generality in
policy statement? (How can a policy be specific enough to
respond to issues of today, yet general enough to meet the
needs of tomorrow? How can it be specific enough to guide
decisions to reduce public conflicts and poor design solutions,
yet general enough to stimulate creativity in design?)
There is another kind of issues that are more general: How do you create
links between policy formulation and implementation?
Deciding upon the substance of city design policy
Citywide urban design policies, in contrast with area or project
design policies, address various sorts of "citywide issues" and define
overall city strategies for urban design. Important distinctions can
be made of individual policies in regard to what they define or prescribe:
the quality of the physical environment; the attribute or component of
the urban design management system; and general strategies or courses of
action to improve either. Thus, there are "environmental quality policies",
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"design management policies", and "action policies". The environmental
quality policy, while cast in the statement of a general course of action,
defines (suggests) more than anything else what it is that is desirable
in the physical environment:
- Recognize that buildings, when seen together, produce a total
effect that characterizes the city and its districts.
(Policy for City Pattern 3, the Urban Design Plan, San
Francisco DCP, 1972a)
[Suggesting that a good environment has buildings producing
a total effect that characterizes San Francisco and its
districts when seen together. Viewed as a definition of what
and how of action, "Recognize such a design principle" defines
little.]
- Street layouts and building forms which do not emphasize topo-
graphy reduce the clarity of city form and image.
A. Tall, slender buildings at the top of hills and low
buildings on the slopes and in valleys accentuate the
form of the hills.
(Fundamental Principle for City Pattern 2, the Urban Design
Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)
- Trees, vines and other landscape materials should be used to
integrate freeway rights-of-way into residential neighborhoods
and to screen and soften the appearance of noise barriers and
other visually incongruent structures.
(Policy 6 - Residential Areas, the Visual Quality Plan,
Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
{This is a "checklist-type" environmental quality policy
according to a definition given later. This policy generally
suggests that it is a good environment which has trees, vines,
etc., used to integrate freeway rights-of-way into residential
neighborhoods without suggesting how those landscaping materials
should be used. Viewed as a directive for action, this policy
defines little as to how to go about obtaining such land-
scaping.]
Similarly, the design management policy defines (suggests) more than
anything else what it is that is desirable about the design management
system or its element:
- Design controls should integrate visual considerations into
the decision-making process. They should rely on specific
standards and requirements as much as possible in order to
minimize the need for discretionary judgement and design
reviews.
(Policy 28 - The Decision-Making Process, the Visual Quality
Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
- Rehabilitation should be favored over clearance as a renewal
technique in order to preserve the visual character of resi-
dential neighborhoods.
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(Policy 1 - Residential Areas, the Visual Quality Plan,
Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
- Review proposals for the giving up of street areas in terms
of all the public values that streets afford.
Every proposal for the giving up of public rights in
street areas through vacation ... [etc.] shall be
judged with the following criteria as the minimum basis
for review:
a. No release of a street area shall be recommended
which would result in:
(5) Elimination or reduction of open space which
might feasibly be used for public landscaping
or public recreation;
(Policy for Conservation 9, the Urban Design Plan, San
Francisco DCP, 1972a)
[Defining the desirable performance of the process that had
already existed to review proposals for street vacation,
while the criteria listed suggest the desirable qualities of
street space at the same time.]
The action policy defines a course of action to be taken in general
terms. The virtue of this type of policies is their capacity to suggest
a specific program or course of action, a litter control program in the
following example:
Litter control should be encouraged through educational
efforts and the provision of trash receptacles, particularly
in pedestrian areas and new fast-food, carry-out restaurants.
(Policy 12 - Commerical Areas, the Visual Quality Plan,
Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
[This may be taken as a suggestion of a good urban design
process (It should incorporate educational efforts... .),
though only weakly due to specificity of prescription for
action ( ... provision of trash receptacles, particularly ...
Each city can determine how specific or general their policies can be.
There is nothing that prevents cities from adopting a policy to carry out
a specific program or course of action: e.g. "Create a Town Lake." (The
Design of the City - Goal 10, Goals for Dallas, 1970).
Like goals and objectives, environmental quality and design manage-
ment policies set broad quality or performance goals. Because they do
not prescribe specific courses of action to be taken while they might
imply some, action strategies (general courses of action) must be identified
before the implementation of these two types of policies begin. Cities
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could even adopt some of such action strategies as part of citywide
urban design policies perhaps as in the following example:
The feasibility of purchasing scenic easements at key
bridgehead locations should be assessed.
(The second sentence of Policy 20 - Scenic Assets, the
Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
The relationships of implementing and being implemented are all relative
and there could be "layers" of policies in a plan in this way.
The point of my introducing distinctions among these three kinds of
policies is to consider what sorts of issues are addressed as a matter of
city policy and whether each of the three essential factors of urban
design -- the quality of the physical enviornment, the urban design
management system, and action strategies -- is defined in city policy.
In reading the following qualifications, attention should be directed to
the core of each policy type, not to its boundaries.
Whether a policy defines a quality rather than a course of action is
a matter of relative emphasis. Technically, this is because all policies
are stated in terms of a course of action. Distinctions among the
three types of policies can be made only in terms of the substance they
define, not their forms. The following is an action policy, viewed as
a directive for an education program; a design management policy, viewed
as a statement pointing to the importance of design-conscious citizens
in creating a good urban design process:
Encourage a continuing awareness of the long-term effects
of growth upon the physical form of the city.
(Policy for Major New Development 9, the Urban Design
Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)
Some policies might even define both a quality and a course of action at
the same time as in the following example:
Visual clutter at bridgeheads should be avoided. The feasi-
bility of purchasing scenic easement at key bridgehead loca-
tions should be assessed. (Policy 20 - Scenic Assets, the
Visual Quality Plan, Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
The first sentence of this policy suggests an environmental quality policy
setting forth a broad goal which in effect defines a desirable quality of
the environment ("A good environment has visual clutter at bridgeheads
avoided.") rather than a course of action (What shall we do to "avoid"
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it?) or a nature of design management system (What sort of design con-
trols, procedures, etc. should we have to "avoid" it?). The second
sentence suggests an action policy defining a course of action (to assess
feasibility, i.e., feasibility studies) to realize the quality of the
environment suggested in the first sentence, more than a quality of the
environment or design management system. Together, these two sentences
form a policy which is both environmental quality policy and action
1
policy. Similarly, the following policy at first defines a quality of
the environment, and, then, an action strategy:
The City should prevent development that blocks or has a
significant negative impact on key scenic views and encourage
design which preserves, enhances, or creates key scenic
views.
18a. The City should establish height limits in areas outside
of Downtown. Buildings taller than those limits should
be permitted as a conditional use after adequate review
of their visual and other impacts. ..
(Policy 18 - Scenic Assets, the Visual Quality Plan,
Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
An immediate issue that faces urban designers is one of allocating
their resources (funds, staff, and time) to more or less studies of
policies of each type. The general desirability of having as many types
of policies as possible must be obvious. It means that more of impor-
tant factors in urban design are explicitly defined in terms of what is
good or bad and subjected to public discussion as a matter of city policy.
Urban designers' decisions should not be so much choices from among them
(as a matter of style or approach) as attempting to incorporate as many
of them as possible in city design policy within constraints. Their
resources, jurisdiction, mandate, and outside support in a given situation
may not allow them to work on certain kinds of policies. For example,
the urban design staff in Dallas was rather away from studies of the
design management system perhaps because such studies were within the
jurisdiction of the city manager's office rather than the planning depart-
ment.
Relative importance of the environment, the design management system,
and action strategies depend upon situations and urban designers will
necessarily have to make decisions strategically case by case. For
example, problems or urban design around the late 60s in San Francisco
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as the planning staff saw derived from the lack of an environmental
quality definition. In fact, basic procedures and design controls
were already in place at the time (e.g. project reviews and historic
preservation procedures). Thus, it seems sensible that they defined their
urban design plan primarily as a definition of the quality of the environ-
ment. However, once the Urban Design Plan had been formulated and
adopted, problems of the design management system and action strategies
became visible. This suggests a need to incorporate policies for these
in the future revision of the plan.
In practice, urban designers' theories seem to count for much in their
decisions, relative to actual constraints and opportunities. In Minneapolis,
the urban design staff did not attempt to define the quality of the
environment in the Visual Quality Plan because they saw little prospect
for obtaining public supprort for such an effort. On the other hand,
citizens were generally supportive of an idea of defining the quality of
the environment. Part of the problem seems to be the staff's theory
which put design (review) guidelines at a level of policy implementation,
not at a level of policy. Also, the staff does not seem to have held
a notion of policies to define the quality of the environment (environmental
quality policies) distinguished from a plan mapping or defining fixed
"end state" visual image (blueprints) (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79).
Similarly, a decision of the planning staff in San Francisco to make
the Urban Design Plan a definition of the quality of the enrivonment, at
first sight, seems to have been made for reasons of the limited resources
the planning department had for the Urban Design Study and the juris-
diction of the planning commission. For example, the staff could not
afford to prepare district-level plans while they knew areas like Van
Ness Avenue were of strategic importance to the design of the city.
Also, the department was distant from the mayor, Board of Supervisors,
and development and budget functions of the city. However, it is the
staff's theory that allowed a conscious decision that they stay away
from defining a good process (design management system) at a policy
level:
The substantive issues [of development] can be addressed
in a plan for urban design, but the process of achieving
the plan must depend upon the sincerity, high motive and
- 170 -
skill of the leadership chosen by the community. (San
Francisco DCP, 1971b: 10; cf. also p. 11 of the same
document and Staten, 1973: 21)
The planning commission in reality had important roles to play in imple-
menting the plan (e.g. project reviews and recommending planning code
revisions) and there were important policy issues that were within their
jurisdiction (e.g. the role of project review and principles of choosing
among alternative design control mechanisms).2 One purpose of my suggesting
the environment, the design management system, and action strategies as
important substance in urban design for which policies might be formulated
is to encourage urban designers to consider issues around them more
openly in deciding what to address in their plans. There is no outright
prescription for what city design policy should define.
Deciding upon specificity in policy statement
How you state a policy or what you specifically define in it is an
important question each urban designer has to ask. Viewing the policy
as definition of who (the actor), what (the environmental quality and
form, or the design management system attribute), how (the action),
where (the location), when (the timing), and for whom or to whom (the
client or the target), this question may be interpreted as a matter of
specificity in regard to these. Especially important are the following:
- Environmental quality-specificity (the level of operation-
alization);
- Location-specificity;
- Form-specificity; and
- Action-specificity.
The actor and the client (or the target of action) are often unstated
because they are already implied or naturally follow from the statement.
Also, they are generally difficult to agree upon (e.g. Who should pay
for the bill?). Citywide urban design policies (general and long-range)
emphasize the timing of actions least.
The key variable in defining the environmental quality policy is
the level of operationalization. A policy can at least name what it
is that is valued in terms of the quality of the environment and that
has to be considered in designing projects without precisely defining
it and without determining how it should be considered. A city design
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plan consisting of such policies suggests a checklist of important
enviornmental quality concerns. Such a plan defines the quality of the
environment only weakly since it just lists important attributes.
Policies for the environment in the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan
(contrasted with policies for the decision-making process) are
generally of this type. For example, Policy 6 would make you wonder how
trees, vines, and other landscaping materials should be used to inte-
grate freeway rights-of-way into residential neighborhoods. Many of them
are better classified as action policies than environmental quality
policies. Policy 18 to establish height limits, if viewed as environ-
mental quality policy, just says that the building height is an important
design consideration.
The San Francisco Urban Design Plan has demonstrated that urban
designers can do more than this, however elusive the quality of the
physical environment may seem. They treated good design relationships
as measurable (cf. "measurable. and critical design relationships" --
fundamental principles). The level of operationalization could be low
(principles) or high (guidelines or standards). Conceivably, standard/
guideline-type policies (including principles) must be more difficult
to formulate and agree upon but more useful as decision guide than
ckecklist-type policies.
The decision as to whether urban designers should prescribe specific
requirements or do no more than to indicate the type of result they
favor is a strategic one. Urban designers' decision will be affected
by various factors. At first, what quality is in question matters. Some
qualities of the environment allow the level of operationalization that is
higher than others. The height of buildings and the number of high-
voltage transmission lines (Policy 21, the Visual Quality Plan) are at
one extreme. Close to these is the bulk of buildings but the planning
staff in San Francisco has not been entirely successful in translating
the visually perceived bulk into measurements (e.g. diagonal rules).
At another extreme, they left the darkness of building surface color
without any precise definition. Thus, to some observers, buildings like
the State Compensation Insurance Fund building are too dark while they
went through a series of reviews (project review of the planning
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department; conditional use permits and environmental review of the
planning commission).
Whether a city design plan remains to be a checklist seems to be
more than a matter of the nature of qualities which the plan deals with
and, thus, the nature of the city's environment, however. The theories
and techniques of policy formulation and the amount of experience that
has accumulated in the city by the time must be important. Various
policy statements and action recommendations in the Visual Quality Plan
suggest that efforts to make the definition of a good environment
explicit have just begun in Minneapolis (e.g. a policy to identify
desirable qualities to be enhanced).
Each policy can be specific or general in terms of the location of
things. At one extreme, the policy would not determine location at
all. A policy for appearance and maintenance of streets and properties,
for example, may be applied citywide as in the following example:
Use care in remodeling of older buildings, in order to
enhance rather than weaken the original character of
'such buildings. (Policy for Conservation 5, the Urban
Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a).
At another, a policy may be formulated for one specific location (in
a citywide plan perhaps because it has citywide significance). For
example, a policy might be set forth for recognizing and protecting
design characteristics of Telegraph Hill, San Francisco. Somewhere
between these two extremes is a policy in the Urban Design Plan to pro-
tect residential areas from the noise, pollution, and physical danger of
excess traffic (Policy for Neighborhood Environment 1). This policy
is location-specific: the Plan for Protected Residential Areas (a map)
determines where residential areas should be protected from through
traffic. Within those protected residential areas, however, detailed
examples of ways to divert or slow neighborhood traffic (design proto-
types) were placed in a general policy context, without location-
specificity.
The San Francisco Urban Design Plan includes several location-
specific elements (mapped plans and guidelines) while the Visual Design
Framework and the Visual Quality Plan in Minneapolis have none except
one. There are at least two prerequisites for location-specificity:
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- The location-specific knowledge of the existing quality
of the environment -- citywide visual form surveys; and
- Readiness to prescribe a good environment for the city in
more or less location-specific terms on the part of the urban
design staff, and public support for this.
The difference between the San Francisco and Minneapolis plans seems to
be explained by these two factors.
Each policy can be more or less specific in terms of its prescrip-
tion for the form of the environment. The San Francisco Urban Design
Plan incorporates much form-specificity through its principles. In
contrast, the Minneapolis Visual Quality Plan has few form-specific
elements. Unlike in a blueprint plan, form-specificity in a city design
policy plan does not always come together with location-specificity.
An example is a set of design prototypes for street intersections to
divert or slow traffic presented in the Urban Design Plan. They are
form-specific (defining form patterns) but general in terms of location.
Finally, each action policy can be specific or general as well.
While action policies tend to be rather specific, measurable, and
achievable with the commitment- of a certain amount of resources, some
action policies may just outline general orientation or approach, re-
jecting an idea of achieving those policies. Not all of such general
and unimplementable action policies would be ill-formulated and bad.
Viewed as design management policies, they could be important and useful
in their own ways, perhaps educational and inspirational.
It is often said that comprehensive plan policies are unimplementable
and useless because they are too general (and too long-range). It is
important, however, to define generality-specificity more precisely as
I have done in terms of quality, location, form, and action. To for-
mulate a policy that is specific enough to guide day-to-day decisions
should not mean simple "insistence on greater detail in plans" (Catanese,
1974: 171). It should be an act of balancing each type of specificity
with generality that makes application of the policy to various situations
that are considered important. Urban designers have to make strategic
decisions in terms of these factors of specificity (location-specificity,
form-specificity, etc.), considering the purpose of formulating each
policy. The form-generality of a policy to protect residential areas from
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through traffic has helped the adoption and implementation of the policy
in various situations, rather than made it "too general to implement".
Similarly, the planning staff in San Francisco successfully combined
form-specificity and location-generality in defining design prototypes
for protected residential area projects. Traditional conceptualization,
blueprint plans vs. policy plans, viewed in this context is too general.
While citywide urban design policies ought to be general, there are many
ways they can be specific at the same time. Blueprint plans suggest
just one way -- location-specific and form-specific at the same time
-- that is rather ineffective in guiding the physical development and
change of the entire city.5
Finally, it is important to note that how specific a policy can
(and should) be is determined as part of the "politics of policy formu-
lation". Not only the policy should be specific in regard to what needs
to be agreed upon but also it can be specific only in that aspect on
which the community can agree upon. Taking the earlier example of a
policy for freeway landscaping as a case, increased specificity in terms
of actors (e.g. "The city should do something.") and methods (e.g. "increase
expenditure on landscaping" or "provide incentives for property owners")
may be not always be desirable in view of encouraging.the consideration of a
broad range of alternatives (e.g. the possibility of the city using the
policy in persuading the State Highway Department to put more money into
highway landscaping: "This is a dominant public sentiment of our com-
munity."). It is also possible that no agreement was possible in regard
to actors because no one wanted to spend more money (the state or the
city or property owners or else). Whatever the case may be, the policy
is a record of an important agreement of the community, in this case,
an agreement as to the importance of someone doing such landscaping
somehow. Less specificity in terms of who, how, and when here should
not necessarily mean that this is a poor policy statement. In this way,
strategic decisions urban designers must make in regard to various
factors of specificity are both technical and political.
Deciding upon strategies for linking city design policy formulation
to implementation
The definition of policy implementation as well as the process,
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methods, and consequences of policy implementation varies according to
the type of policy. Different sorts of issues are involved in implementing
different types of policies. For example, implementing an action
policy means carrying out a specific -course of action which belongs to
a general course of action specified in the policy. A policy to establish
height limits, for example, may be implemented by a height ordinance.
You will have to follow a series of studies to draw up specific zoning
standards and maps, public hearings, planning commission and city
council actions, etc. The way you go about the process defines a specific
course of action. Involved here are traditional problems of beginning
and completing implementation such as "aspiration too high" and "things
go wrong during the course of action in one way or another."
Beginning and completing implementation of an environmental quality
policy involves different kinds of problems. Policy here is given as
broad environmental quality goal rather than more or less specific means.
Nothing is said about what might be specifically done or whether
anything has been or will be done to accomplish that goal. Implementation
of this type of policy thus requires that you at'first find appropriate
means, perhaps initially defined in terms of general courses of action
which could be translated into more specific courses of action to be
actually carried out. For example, to implement a policy to increase the
visibility of major destination areas and other points of orientation
(Policy for City Pattern 8, the Urban Design Plan), you might 1) preserve,
2) create, and 3) improve views from streets and other public areas where
they include the water, open spaces, large buildings, and other major
features of the city pattern (San Francisco DCP, 1972a: 13). Each of
these suggests more specific courses of action such as purchase of
hilltops for parks, incentives for observation decks at the top of highrise
buildings, and selective pruning of street trees. When you actually
carry out such specific courses of action, you have almost implemented
the policy, but not completely. The implementation of an environmental
quality policy should mean that you get the quality the policy defines.
It is difficult to begin implementation of this type of policy and it
is still more difficult to get things going and complete them. Problems in
the implementation of this typle of policy have much to do with the "theories"
that link courses of action to their effects on the quality of the environment.
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(To what extent will the purchase of hilltops increase the visibility
of major destination areas and other points of orientation?)
It follows that the relative emphasis the city design plan puts on
each type of policy should necessarily be reflected in urban designers'
decisions as to overall strategies for plan implementation. From the point
of view of making citywide policy planning work, my question is: How
do you link city design policy formulation to policy implementation?
Here I do not discuss specific methods of implementation such as legis-
lation, direct project, and administrative reorganization.
At present, urban designers have only a small repertoire of specific
approaches to create good linkage between policy and implementation, not
to mention implementation mechinisms and strategies sufficient to ensure
"a tight fit" between policies and the day-to-day decisions that regula-
tory agencies and departments must take (Susskind and Aylward, 1976:
55).6 Looking at the two case cities in which citywide urban design
policies have been formulated, the urban design staff in Minneapolis
sought to create structural linkage within their plans to help link
them to design controls. Their approach was to define a desirable visual
image structure as environmental quality objective or performance speci-
fication (the visual image framework) and suggest how they might be
achieved in terms of the visual form structure of form pattern (the visual
form framework). Their concept of new zoning controls to implement the
visual form framework has not been tried.
The planning staff in San Francisco adopted a more traditional,
yet not always practiced approach: they did an implementation approach
study as part of the Urban Design Study (a general strategy -- at a macro
level). Also, they kept asking, "How would you implement it?" (Jacobs,
1978b: 219) Some policies, especially those that could be implemented
through zoning, received special attention. For example, they developed
a set of height and bulk guidelines for policies relating to the height
and bulk of buildings so that those policies could be readily translated
into specific zoning standards (specific policies -- at a macro level).
Subsequently, those guidelines were used as interim controls (Svirsky,
1973: 13). Likewise, they developed detailed criteria to govern street
vacation procedures for a policy relating to the vacation of street space.
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Finally, the recognition of the urban design management system or decision-
making process (rather than the implementation process) as a legitimate
subject of citywide urban design studies as in the Minneapolis CIP
Urban Design Study suggests another approach. Improving the performance
of the design management system (including implementation) could and
perhaps should be among the purposes of citywide policy planning.
Cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco also suggest that the
organizational integration to create closer ties between city planning
and implementation functions should help the formulation of the policies
that can be implemented. In Minneapolis during 1968-77, the urban design
staff in the city coordinator's office had a good access to the know-hows
of implementation in the same office and -saw important plans being imple-
mented quickly due to the power of the city coordinator to coordinate and
develop. (Plans, on the other hand, were formulated in the way they could
be implemented by departments under the city coordinator: much emphasis
was placed on capital improvements as in the Metro Center '85 downtown
comprehensive development plan.) In San Francisco, the planning department
combined long-range policy planning and zoning administration functions.
Thus, the urban design team had a good access to the know-hows of policy
implementation through zoning. (On the other hand, they were distant
from other implementation functions, especially development-related
functions.)
It is important that the question of how to organize the urban
design function in a municipal government be viewed in a larger context,
not just from a point of view of creating links between city design
policy and implementation. I shall now turn to issues around government
organization and the locus of urban design within administrative structure.
Urban Designers. in City Government
To have urban designers practicing in city governments must have
important implications. In designing their approach, urban de-
signers must define 1) the status and role of urban design and 2) their
client and the way they relate themselves to the client. City governments
are of fundamental importance since they provide, or could provide,
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urban designers with basic definitions as to these. City governments
do this from three sources:
- The formal structure (the charter and municipal codes, the
administrative structure, and the ideal of city government
behind them);
- The city officials as they translate the formal structure
and as they act as personalities (e.g. a developer-mayor);
and
- The process of administration that actually takes place in the
city government, both as precedence and as the reality at the
time.
Each of these may mandate or prohibit, encourage or discourage, suggest
to do or not to do certain things, explicitly or implicitly.
At first, city governments, by providing basic definitions as to
the status and role of urban design through these three sources, condi-
tion urban designers in determining what they should be doing (e.g. policy
formulation vs. policy implementation) and how they should go about it
(e.g. citywide, one-time comprehensive study vs. incrementalism). In
Dallas, for example, the formal structure puts the urban design staff
in the planning department away from the central management function
performed in the city manager's office. The ideal of the council-manager
government is to give the entire policy-making role to elected officials
(the mayor and council) and the policy implementation (administration)
to the bureaucracy under the council-appointed city manager. The urban
design staff may be involved in city design policy formulation only upon
a request of the city council. In the late 70s when the urban design
staff completed most of surveys and analyses for the citywide urban
design framework, the city council was not inclined to make such a
request.
City governments, especially their forms and processes, are important
in another way. They create more or less of demand for sophisticated
mechanisms of communication and control in urban design which citywide
urban design policies represent. In San Francisco, for example, it was
difficult for the planning department to carry out its responsibilities
in coordination and priority setting since other city officials also had
responsibilities for coordination (especially, the Mayor, the Chief
Administrative Officer, and the Controller) and other departments had
considerable autonomy in carrying out their projects and programs
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(Jacobs, 1978b: 44-5). It was thus essential for the planning department
to develop sophistication in ways of influencing various actors away
from it. Comprehensive planning was a way to develop necessary sophis-
tication. The citywide urban design plan was a source from which various
design controls would stem and itself a device for communication and
control.
Second, city governments, through the three sources, provide basic
definitions as to who may be urban designers' primary client (e.g. city
officials vs. citizens), who are significant citizens the city government
should serve (e.g. developers vs. neighborhood residents), and how
urban designers should relate themselves to various groups of people in
the city. City governments thus explicitly or implicitly encourage or discourage
participation of various groups of people in the process of city design
policy formulation. In Dallas, for example, it was reported that
city officials discouraged the planning staff from involving neighborhood
organizations in neighborhood planning programs and citizen representation
in committees and commissions were reduced in the late 70s (Herald,
December 11, 1978a). Obviously, the people of the city or its social-
political context conditions the city government. The form and process
of government ideally is the reflection of the wishes of the people.
In fact, the recent trend has been toward city governments' opening up
the process of city planning and urban design to the people of the city,
especially to neighborhood groups. In this context, technical and poli-
tical issues around citizen participation have become important concerns
of urban designers. On the other hand, the people of the city would come
to have direct relevance to urban designers' practice only when the city
government encourages or accepts citizen participation (in the short run).
Otherwise, what would become relevant is the nature of inconsistency
among definitions given by the city government, urban designers, and
various groups of people in the city as to the client of urban designers
and the role each group ought to play in the process of citywide policy
planning. The way the inconsistency is resolved in the long run would
be also important (cf. the planning department reorganization of the late
70s in Dallas).
Finally, city governments through the three sources direct or suggest
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how urban designers should relate themselves to the city officials,
especially the chief executive and policy-makers (the city council).
In fact, urban designers' relationship to the city officials is of
fundamental importance since they are primary clients of the urban
designers (collectively, they hire the urban designers). Urban designers
not in service of the city officials would be deemed to be ineffective.
In sum, city governments have fundamental importance as a source
of basic definitions and demand that direct, suggest, guide, constrain,
or facilitate (depending upon your perspective) the practice of urban
designers attempting citywide policy planning. They are urban designers'
primary client and they represent the city's people whom urban designers
must ultimately serve. The definition of urban design, the role of urban
designers, and the place of citizen participation in the process of city
design policy formulation, all depend on the governmental context among
other things. It is important to note that, as city governments can
define these, they can choose not to do so themselves, allowing urban
designers or others to define as they best can.
Part of the problem in practice is that the definitions that come
from the three sources are not always clear and explicit and that they
are not always consistent. Obviously, the actual processes of government
do not necessarily follow the form of administrative structure or direc-
tives from the city officials. To the extent the city officials are not
a unified body and to the extent they do not always represent the people
of the city in regard to specific issues, urban designers cannot merely
respond to their directions by simple conformance.
The effect of the three factors of government (sources of definitions)
as observed and as speculated seems to fall into a certain pattern
that can be described well in terms of several situations:
- Urban designers under the independent planning commission
(within a city government which attempts to disperse power
broadly) (e.g. Minneapolis before 1968; San Francisco);
- Urban designers dominated under the city manager (the
dominance-subordination situation, complete or obscured; e.g.
Dallas);
- Urban designers with the city manager (the integration situa-
tion; e.g. Minneapolis, 1968-77);
- Urban designers under the strong mayor (cf. Catanese, 1974); and
- Urban designer under the weak mayor (cf. Minneapolis since
1978).
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These situations seem to allow good prediction of the urban designers'
relationships to the chief executive and policy-makers. The similarities
and contrasts in responsibilities and behavioral and personality charac-
teristics of actors involved could take quite different expressions
depending on these situations. Also, the way city governments define
the status and role of urban design and the way they define the client
of urban designers and the client-urban designer relationships seem to
vary, in large measure, according to these situations. Presented below
is a speculation of the nature of the parctice of urban designers attemp-
ting citywide policy planning in the first two situations. The first
one seems most conducive to citywide policy planning; the second one
seems to make it most difficulty to practice. The purpose of my presenting
this on the basis of only three case studies is at first to illustrate
how a basic framework to consider issues of urban designers' practice
in city governments outlined so far might be applied and, then, to
suggest that in no case citywide policy planning is entirely impractical.
* Urban designers under the independent planning commission
(within a government which attempts to distribute power broadly)
The situation in San Francisco comes close to this model. This
situation has a few important implications on the status and role of
urban design. Obviously, this situation placing urban designers away
from the city's decision center and implementation functions (especially
development and budget) restricts urban designers significantly as to what
they can do. The same factor, on the other hand, creates much demand for
citywide policy planning. It is essential that much research be made
to develop sophisticated mechanisms of communication and control so as
to deal with a multitude of actors in this situation. Also, citywide
urban design policies backed up by citizen support could be an indispen-
sable source of power of the planning agency. This situation supports
citywide policy planning also because urban designers have much discre-
tion in determining their approach.
Urban designers in this situation are relatively free in defining
their client. The urban designer-chief executive relationship would not
have a tone of personality conflict. Perhaps, more important in this
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situation is how urban designers relate themselves to policy-makers in
conducting citywide policy planning. Close communication or even close
working relationships with policy-makers during the process of city
design policy formulation would be essential. On the other hand,
policy-makers may not wish to be involved in the process (e.g. San
Francisco).
In sum, city governments in this situation would not be so much a
set of constraints as a source of challenges and demands for technical
and political sophistication in urban design, to which citywide policy
planning can contribute much.
* Urban designers dominated under the city manager
(the dominance-subordination situation)
Unlike o-ther forms of government, the council-manager government,
in its form and ideal, clearly suggests a certain status and role of
urban design, which are not quite supportive of citywide policy planning.
At first, this form of government attempts to clearly separate government
administration (policy implementation) from the policy setting function
and politics. The role of urban designers under the city manager is
primarily policy implementation. Second, this form of government
attempts effective reflection of public opinion in city government. This
means not only that urban designers' time horizon has to be middle- to-
short-range but also that the very idea of formulating general, long-range
policies runs counter to the image of governments that are highly respon-
sive to public opinionsince the former implies the generation of agenda
and, then, programs and projects internally according to directives of
goals, objectives, and policies. (Obviously, this is to be done in response
to public opinion at the time. Urban design with citywide urban design
policies is not totalitarian urban design.) Third, the council-manager
government is a government for businesses. It strives for the ideal of
efficient government and efficiency in one sense means fewer government
controls over private businesses. Citwide urban design policies which
represent a form of control and from which design controls stem do not
sit well in this situation unless businesses want them. Finally, the
council-manager government values the centralization of control. The
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situation in which urban designers are placed under the city manager and
away from him (the dominance-subordination situation) makes the practice
of urban design as part of the central decision-making function of the
city difficult. In sum, urban design in this situation is defined as
policy implementation function in a staff department or, even, urban
design as engineering, as far as the formal structure is concerned.
The Dallas case suggests that the city officials may very well interpret
the formal structure strictly.
The way city governments define urban designers' client could raise
another set of serious questions as to the practice of citywide policy
planning in this situation. The city council, being the only body of
elected officials to perform the overall policy-making function repre-
senting the entire voters of the city, can define who should be the client
of the city government in a project or a program or a study. Urban
designers' client definition and citizen participation strategy ought to
be consistent with the city council's wishes. Some social-political
context makes the client definition of the city government and that of
urban designers inconsistent and puts urban designers in a problematic
situation. In Dallas in the late 70s, "significant citizens" to the city
council (and the city manager) were developers; they did not quite coincide
with the planning staff's concept of client.
The urban designer-city manager relationship in the dominance-
subordination situation is equally problematic. While the city manager
and urban designers have overlapping responsibilities to compete for,
especially in regard to coordination of city decisions pertinent to the
physical development and design of the city and, thus, more or less of
interdepartmental relations, the two actors have very contrasting
behavioral and personality characteristics. Thus, the role urban
designers define for themselves could be very well in conflict with the
city manager's definition of the role his urban designers should play.
Urban designers could unwittingly run into an adversary relationship
with the city manager. The dominance-subordination situation demands
that any conflict be resolved through more or less formal and explicit
processes while it does not offer mechanisms to facilitate such processes.
Contrasting behavioral and personality characteristics, assumptions, and
- 184 -
languages of the two groups of actors make communication difficult
and hinder timely conflict resolution.
In the complete dominance-subordination situation, the initial
role assignment is made directly, clearly, and completely to make the
city manager superior and urban designers subordinate. This prevents
conflict, competition, and interference. Urban designers would be placed
at a level of staff departmentsunder the city manager and away from him
to perform staff functions like those of the city architect and the city
engineer. Interdepartmental coordination, be it design-related or not,
ought to be made through the city manager. Any conflict in roles and
responsibiliteis should be resolved by the city manager from the top.
In reality, the dominance-subordination relationship is bound to be
obscured and urban designers are vulnerable to various problems as out-
lined so far. In case of Dallas in the late 70s, conflicts were resolved
from the top and the function of the planning department was redefined
to conform to the formal structure of the Dallas government. Overall,
the dominance-subordination situation could make citywide policy planning
in urban design very difficult to practice. However, the Dallas case
suggests that even in this situation citywide policy planning is not
entirely impractical.
Citizen Participation and the Role of Government Urban Designers
in the Planning Process
Sometimes, and increasingly, city governments require city planners
to involve citizens, especially neighborhood residents, in a substantive
way in planning programs. However, citizen participation at a citywide
scale is not easy to practice even if there is such official support.
Thus, urban designers attempting city design policy formulation face
many issues that are usually not around traditional urban design practice
at a scale of project or a small area. For example, it is often said
that neighborhood groups dissociate themselves from general, long-range
policy-oriented studies carried out citywide and wait until matters get
boiled down to more specific ones at a level of neighborhood or specific
project.8 The complexity of social context, at a scale of city (Who
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should be involved and how can they be reached?) and resource problems
(How much time and money can you afford?) add to difficulties of citizen
participation in citywide policy planning.9 Can you involve citizens
meaningfully in decisions on citywide urban design policies? Can you
really discuss urban design issues productively on a citywide basis?
Can you make citywide urban policies really responsive to various groups
of people in the city? In addition, the formulation of citywide urban
design policies (or policy alternatives) inevitably involved the act of
balancing various interests in the city. Can government urban designers
(rather than elected officials) be effective in this? These are questions
that might be raised to challenge the practicability of citywide policy
planning and the use of citywide urban design policies. Experience
in the three case cities, while problematic in many ways in present
practice, suggests that city design policy formulation can be made pro-
ductively with citizen participation.1 0
Citizen participation
In Minneapolis, five years of "public review" resulted in little
revision of the proposed Visual Design Framework. The staff proposal
had to be rewritten almost entirely, however, once an intensive neigh-
borhood review process began. This process took no more than a year.
It would be appropriate to see that the Visual Design Framework had to
accommodate wishes of neighborhood residents whenever neighborhood
groups' involvement took place. Early participation of neighborhood
groups in this case, could have prompted the whole process of formulating
and adopting city design policy.11 There were some drawbacks to neigh-
borhood groups' involvement. Important value premises and design stra-
tegies were struck out with some specifics of design concepts (e.g. those
related to highrises and freeway corridors). This, however, must be a
problem of the urban design staff not having been prepared well for
intensive involvement of neighborhood groups, not a problem of citizen
participation itself. For the staff was successful a few years later in
balancing the responsiveness to the concerns and wishes of people and the
professional judgement as to what a good city would be and how it might
be realized. They were successful in putting some important design
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concepts back into the Visual Quality Plan and, at the same time, made
an important progress in the development of the theories and techniques
of urban design in Minneapolis (e.g. the status of urban design and
explicit statement of basic value premises).
Experience in Minneapolis and San Francisco offers us a few lessons.
At first, in Minneapolis, such a limited participation mechanism as public
hearings resulted in substantial citizen input in the process of revising
staff proposals for the Visual Design Framework and the master design
district ordinance. Public hearings in both cases triggered off a series
of working sessions with neighborhood group representatives. Neighborhood
groups had most of their wishes through in this way. The planning staff
in San Francisco also depended on public hearings, here as a primary
mechanism to elicit substantive citizen inputs. It is important to note,
however, that neighborhood groups are not just one to be involved in
the process of citywide policy planning and that public hearings do not
necessarily assure involvement of other groups of people. For example,
influential civic groups like the Minneapolis Citizens League are usually
not represented in public hearings (cf. Catanese, 1974: 121).
Second, the same cases in Minneapolis suggest that the existence
of neighborhood groups that would speak for the interests of neighborhood
residents, especially if they are official planning groups like PDCAC's
in Minneapolis, could help broaden the basis of citizen participation in
citywide policy planning significantly. Minneapolis, neighborhood
residents participated in debate over the Visual Design Framework and the
master design district ordinance through neighborhood organizations and
PDCAC's once a neighborhood review process began. A citywide umbrella
organization, the Council of Community Councils, facilitated the staff's
access to neighborhood groups. In San Francisco, neighborhood groups were
already a strong force around the late 60s to the early 70s and the
planning department was quite responsive to their concerns in planning
programs.
Attention to neighborhood groups is important because they are
difficult to involve on a citywide basis and because they have often
been underrepresented at a level of city relative to more influential
groups (e.g. the Chamber of Commerce). On the other hand, "broad citizen
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participation" made possible through mass meetings and open public
discussions should not be taken as effective citizen participation.
Other groups that speak for the interests of businesses, users (e.g.
automobile associations for automobile drivers), etc., must be reached.
In Minneapolis, the Minneapolis Citizens League was not involved in the
process of comprehensive planning for the 80s, according to one observer
of the Minneapolis planning scene.
Third, certain situations seem to make direct citizen participation
relatively unimportant. In San Francisco, four factors are important in
understanding the wide acceptance of the Urban Design Plan upon its
presentation to citizens despite relatively limited participation of
citizens in the Urban Design Study:
- The planning staff was sensitive to the concerns of citizens
(Jacobs, 1978b: 248) and sought citizen inputs from other
sources;
- The special political climate of San Francisco allowed the
planning staff to read the concerns of citizens well (Jacobs
1978a: 24-5); active use of public hearings as place of public
discussion was part of San Francisco's citizen participation and
political tradition;
- Important community issues at the time were clear
and unmistakable (major new development and highrises) (Jacobs,
1978b: 213, 220); and
- High level of interest in urban design-related issues existed
but the level of interest in the Urban Design Study remained low;
specific project proposals and, later, the first Duskin
initiative to limit the height of buildings seem to have
absorbed public attention (Jacobs, 1978b: 201; San Francisco
DCP, 1971b: 5).
It follows that massive, citywide citizen participation programs
are not the only way to make citywide urban design policies responsive
to the people of the city and to create necessary constituencies for
their use and implementation. Citizen participation should be part of
the whole system of eliciting inputs from citizens and communicating with
them. Difficulties of citizen participation at a citywide scale and in
general, policy-oriented studies would not make citywide policy planning
an impossible dream in major cities (i.e. large and pluralistic).
There seem to be at least two general prerequisites that seem
important in making citizen participation a productive force. At first,
it is important that the theories and techniques of urban design in
Minneapolis, technical if not political, had already been well developed
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in the 70s. Important urban design tools were becoming part of the
city's decision-making and development process. The urban design staff
had an agenda, basic value premises, and design concepts. There was a
reasonable amount of substantive knowledge. This meant that they had
something with which to guide public discussion and, themselves, advocate,
argue for, and return to (after a defeat). The presentation of the staff's
perspective helped the clear articulation of the neighborhood perspec-
tive and, ultimately, reaching a community agreement upon visual design
policies for the city. Citizen inputs were structured effectively around
staff proposals, and public discussion was given a definite direction and
an image of the desired product (the visual design framework).
The theories and techniques of urban design (technical) per se
brought the staff to a point of the Visual Design Framework. Another
factor marked the departure of the process of preparing the Visual
Quality Plan from its predecessor. The staff, at the beginning of
comprehensive planning for the 80s, had up-to-date knowledge of what were
the concerns and wishes of people in the neighborhoods and what would make
policy proposals controversial -- the whole things they had learned in
the process of adopting the Visual Design Framework just a year or so
before. For example, they knew highrises and freeways would cause
problems. They knew jargons like landmarks, nodes, and paths would
create more skepticism than understanding. Thus, the staff was able
to balance professional demands and neighborhood groups' wishes
effectively. This points to the importance of allowing early citizen
inputs in the planning process (in the absence of up-to-date knowledge)
and designing an urban design program which allows urban designers to learn
through experience in its course. Systematic reviews and revisions of
citywide urban design policies during an early period of their use would
significantly mitigate many of the drawbacks citywide policy planning
might have, especially if it is implemented by way of a one-time
study, and help make the city design plan more than a document of some-
body's neat ideas to sit on a shelf.
Finally, the way urban designers package an urban design program
seems to have important implications on citizen participation. Whether
to do a single-purpose urban design program or to put an urban design
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component in a multi-purpose program must be an important strategic
decision. This is because in many communities urban design is not among
the priority item on their agenda, especially in neighborhoods.
Strategically, packaging an urban design study as part of a large
planning program to deal with a wide range of issues around physical
development and change that are important in the community would allow
better citizen support. It has been the way neighborhood groups studied
urban design for themselves (e.g. Planning Association for the Richmond,
1972; Mission Housing Development Corporation, 1974). To allow focus
on urban design, urban design could be made a distinct element with its
own goals, objectives, and policies. Integration is desirable in theory
but it often results in the loss of the substance of urban design in
practice,without goals, objectives, and policies of its own to stick to
(e.g. the Whittier Urban Design Framework, Team 70, 1977; cf. Jacobs,
1978b: 193-4). Examples in Minneapolis and San Francisco generally support
this view.1 2
City design policy formulation in the political process
Urban designers submit policy proposals or policy alternatives to
policy-makers for consideration. Policy-makers may be the official
policy-making body of the city (the city council) or, as in San Francisco,
a lower-level body (the planning commission) which sets policy for its
own action.13 Whichever the case, city design policy formulation neces-
sarily draws urban designers into the political arena -- politics of
policy setting -- since it involves the act of balancing the interests of
various groups in the city anyway, implicitly or explicitly, whether from
early in the planning process or later in the process of revising and
adopting policies. Viewed this way, it must be essential that urban
designers develop citywide urban design policies (recommendations) not
only on the basis of technical studies but also on more direct citizen
inputs and discussions in one form or another. Citizen participation
comes into the scene in this context. The more pluralistic is the
community in its interests, the more important will citizen participation
in the process of city design policy formulation be. A problematic nature
of the process of developing the Visual Design Framework in Minneapolis
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has already been pointed out.
You might quite naturally argue further that it is desirable to
link the process of city design policy formulation to the political
process. For the purpose of the political process is to allow various
interests to foster their own wants and needs and it, as a result,
incorporates the values which the people of the community hold collec-
tively (Catanese, 1974: 94, 114, 121) -- the values which the urban
designer wants to incorporate in the process of urban design. The
benefits of involving political parties and elected officials early in
the process of city design policy formulation, then, must be obvious:
city design policy is debated in a real public forum to negotiate and
balance various interests in the city. The process of city design policy
formulation can become a process of public discussion to determine the
desirable future of the city in this way. The consensus on common goals
and policies that are formed and the support for city design policy that is
generated in such a process would be valuable.
deviously, citizen and political involvement would make urban design
difficult to practice. Various difficulties exist in the first place to
discourage government urban designers from getting themselves involved
in the political process (cf. Catanese's (1974: 139-141) "anti-political
factors"). The governmental context permitting, they still have to
face many technical and resource problems. They have to spend much energy
and time with people in neighborhoods and with elected officials (Catanese,
1974: 161). However, this is a view that would allow us to overcome that
morbidity long-range plans have. We know many instances in which the
comprehensive plan called for a project or endorsed one and local resi-
dents had to fight later against the project about which they were not
consulted. Minneapolis offers cases to support a view that city
planning and urban design can be a part of the political process to
resolve issues of city development and design in the community. Lakeside
highrises, for example, is an issue close to a settlement today due to
active public debate (as well as neighborhood groups' fight against
specific projects like Lake Point and 2900 De-an Boulevard). The
contribution of city design policy formulation in the mid to late 70s
(the land use and visual design framework elements of the comprehensive
municipal plan and the Visual Quality Plan of the Plan for the 80s)
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is not a little.
Catanese (1974: 139) observed that there were not many cases in
which city planning had been directly linked to the political process.
A case of comprehensive planning for the 80s in Minneapolis is exemplary
among the three case cities, suggesting how productive political parti-
cipation could be in some context. The involvement of the city council
began only later in the process but its committees and political party
groups started early involvement. The Independent-Republican Caucus
of the city council; for example, started to hold a series of seminars
to discuss key sections of the comprehensive plan soon after the publi-
cation of the Discussion Statement. Minneapolis today seems to offer
a political climate especially favorable for city planning and urban
design as policy-setting activity. It is often the case in recent planning
studies that local aldermen initiate a planning program, call in a
community planner from the planning department, and themselves serve
as a discussion leader in the planning process (e.g. the 27th and Lake
commercial node study).15 Good working relationships between city
planners and elected officials must have much to do with the previous admi-
nistrative arrangement in which city planners under the city coordinator
worked for the city council. Whether what Catanese (1974: 131-2) calls
a critical flaw of the executive dominant role of city planners -- their
adversary relationships to city councilmen -- will emerge in Minneapolis
is yet to be seen.
192
PROSPECT OF CITYWIDE POLICY PLANNING
In-depth studies of experience in three cities have offered cases
to support the practicability and actual merit of citywide policy
planning. At first, despite various difficulties, it has been fully
applied in Minneapolis and San Francisco. In Dallas, staff efforts
fell short of policy formulation but a series of citywide surveys and
analyses has prepared the staff for beginning policy formulation any-
time in the future with the city council's support. Second, citywide
policy planning efforts in these cities respond to several important
concerns in urban design which distinguish them from traditional, pro-
ject design-centered or incremental ways of practicing urban design.
Finally, the actual.merit of citywide policy planning which cases in
these cities suggest generally match its promise. The desirability
of formulating and debating citywide urban design policies whenever
issues involved can be regarded as citywide in nature and policy matters
in substance, or overall city strategies for urban design are in ques-
tion, has been generally supported by overall successes with citywide
policy planning, development projects and design controls that worked
within a framework of citywide urban design policies, problems that
emerged in specific situations without citywide urban design policies,
and the potential of improving present practice by having citywide
urban design policies debated and agreed upon in these cities.
Obviously, citywide policy planning would be useful in some
cities but not in others, given its basic functions and common uses.
It would be practicable in some cities but not others even if it
could be useful, given that certain situations of government and people
are not particularly supportive of this kind of activity. While the
three case studies are not sufficient to make broad generalizations,
some speculation is possible as to where citywide policy planning
might be useful and where it might work. With a qualification that
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various factors work together, with some reinforcing and others counter-
acting with each other, and none of them determine the need or
practicability of citywide policy planning alone, I speculate the effect
of factors in four general categories: physical setting, governmental
context, social-political context, and development situation.
At first, of various physical features, some seem especially
important in creating demand for citywide policy planning. Spectacular
land form (e.g. San Francisco) and the system of lakes, creeks, and
parkways (e.g. Minneapolis) which everyone in the city can share are
examples. On the other hand, some physical features would not only
create little demand but also discourage citywide attention. The flat
terrain, for example, allows no major views and makes it difficult for
people to see and feel the city as a whole.
In more general terms, the relative diversity of the physical
setting of the city within which physical changes occur seems important,
this for technical reasons. For example, a number of business and
commercial nodes, each of a scale of small-community downtowns or beyond,
could create a need of general urban design policies for all commercial
nodes citywide, rather than just plans for the downtown and one or two
specific commercial nodes. A variety of residential neighborhoods in
terms of density, use mix, form character, and historical background
would demand keen attention to the fundamental principles of good design
that make the residential environment desirable. Similarly, all sorts
of public open spaces, not just a village common at the town center and
a series of neighborhood playgrounds, suggest a place of citywide urban
design policies in the city. A number and variety of public and private
development projects, especially if they create public conflicts, would
make a need of devising overall city policies for new development to
allow effective response to individual project proposals visible.
Conceivably, traditional ways of practicing urban design -- downtown
planning, prototype designs, direct design in strategic locations, and
design controls in a few specific areas of concern such as historic
preservation -- would suffice in small communities essentially con-
sisting of the downtown and largely uniform residential neighborhoods.
Beautification and appearance plans prepared for small communities
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suggest the urban design approaches which generally support this
observation.
Diversity is implied in the size of cities. Major cities, say
the fifty largest cities in contrast with cities under 50,000 in
population, would necessarily create such demand to justify citywide
policy planning efforts. Not all major cities would need citywide
policy planning, however. We have to look at the governmental con-
text as well.
City governments which attempt to disperse power broadly seem
to create much demand for citywide policy planning (e.g. San Fran-
cisco). Urban designers in such governments would be benefited
greatly by the city design plan which puts various actors in the
government on notice of their intent, explicit and well-researched
decision-making criteria which make it difficult for other actors
to challenge their decisions (e.g. master plan referrals) and, most
importantly, broad public support which this activity creates for
urban design goals, objectives, and policies. Centralized govern-
ments could mean the prospect of creating strong implementation
tools to allow effective implementation of citywide urban design
policies. On the other hand, strong government power to coordinate
centrally and develop directly would create little demand for arti-
culating urban design goals, objectives, and policies generally
and citywide. Those at the decision center can control decisions
of various actors by more direct means each time (e.g. the city
council's policy directions to the city manager; the city manager's
administrative directions to department heads).
The broad social-political context must also be important.
At first, urban designers in socially and politically simple com-
munities could be able to identify the values various groups in
the community hold, and express them in more simple ways such as
direct personal communication with elected officials, community
leaders, and developers. Many of small suburban communities would
fall within this category. Relatively simple social-political
structure would not necessarily mean small communities, however.
Dallas in the late 70s is characterized by strong development
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interests dominating the interests of weak neighborhood groups and
environmentalists in the City Hall. The effect was the clear under-
standing of the city officials as to the interests of the city (those
of developers); they saw little need for articulating goals, objectives,
and policies for urban design.
In contrast, citywide policy planning would be necessary where
demand exists for relating to a multitude of interests in the
development of community. Especially in the communities in which
powerful groups create a deadlock situation in confrontation with each
other, citywide policy planning could play a difficult but important
role of creating a rational basis for establishing community consensus.
The situation in San Francisco around the late 60s may be taken as
a case. In justifying their budget request before the Board of Super-
visors, the city planners could argue that the citywide urban design
plan would provide a framework for private development that would help
eliminate the costly and divisive conflicts that were then becoming
characteristic of major building proposals (Jacobs, 1978b: 195).
Similarly, how well the tradition of development and physical
change has been established in the community would matter. Citywide
policy planning would be necessary in communities in which people
(including developers) do not express a common view of what it is that
is desirable about the quality of the physical environment and how
they should develop and change their city, yet there exists a belief
that something could be done to improve their environment. Citywide
policy planning must have had no place in medieval communities where
everyone built in the same way with common materials and according
to long-established techniques.
The development situation of the community in a historical con-
text must also be important. At first, citywide policy planning would
be in greater demand in cities which have the already established
form and character to be protected from pressure to develop and change
(e.g. San Francisco). For some reason, an idea of city governments
controlling the quality of design in already existing cities is better
supported for the purpose of preservation (e.g. historical preserva-
tion and environmental planning in Dallas) than creation of a new kind
of environment, however good it may seem to urban designers (cf. the
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difficulty of establishing design districts in Minneapolis).
If there is neither expectation nor demand for much physical
change, cities with the already established physical form and character
would have little reason to embark on major citywide policy planning
efforts. Policy planning efforts those cities might make would be ones
for specific areas of concern such as historic preservation or for
a few strategic locations (e.g. urban renewal). Many of the old and
stable communities in the North East region would fall within this
category. Some communities might value citywide policy planning even
if their form and character have already been well established and
not changing much. For example, in the face of population decline and
staggering businesses in the 50s and the 60s, Minneapolis came to recog-
nize that the visual quality was one of the important factors of the
attractiveness of the city and that overall city strategies for urban
design would matter much in an effort to retain people and businesses
in the city.
New communities which are expecting much development and change
would need citywide policy planning for a different reason: they need
to chart a direction for the development of the emerging form and
character of the city and coordinate individual development projects
and design controls toward the direction. Citywide policy planning
could contribute much because this is one of its basic functions.
Whether those communities support this activity is another question.
Often strong preoccupation with development and growth dominates
community consciousness about the quality of the environment. With
the form and character of the city yet to emerge, urban designers
are vulnerable to a criticism that their recommendations are arbitrary.
Without much to protect -- man-made features if not natural assets --
it is difficult to argue for public controls over the quality of
design.
Taking all factors of physical setting, government, people, and
development together, citywide policy planning must be essential if
"citywide issues" and overall city strategies for urban design really
matter in the city. Perhaps, San Francisco is unique in this regard.
The city has the unparalleled quality of the physical environment
with a capacity to make things citywide; there exist the well-developed
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form and character that deserve protection on the one hand and strong
pressure to develop and change on the other; the long-established tradi-
tion of respecting the form and charcter of the city was beginning to
erode in the 60s... . The context of urban design in other cities are
usually ambivalent. However, in most cities, citywide policy planning
seems to have important roles to play. For example, the physical
setting of Seattle, Wash., creates a number of "visual basins" suggesting
localized urban design efforts, but its regional transportation and
travel pattern suggests a need for attending to the form and character
of the city as a whole. Cities of neighborhoods on a flat terrain
may not need citywide policy, planning for one reason, perhaps because
neighborhoods perform important functions in city planning and govern-
ment (e.g. little city halls and neighborhood government) and there are
no major views to see and feel the city as a whole. Yet, citywide
policy planning might benefit those cities for other reasons. For
example, citywide policy planning could be effective in reducing public
conflicts over development projects that are repeated throughout the
city over years.
Not all cities in which citywide policy planning could be benefi-
cial would support it. What the people of the community consider the
important business of the community (e.g. real estate development
vs. providing stable and quiet residential neighborhoods for business-
ment and workers) and how the city government responds to the wishes
of the people must be important. People could mean just a limited
number of "significant citizens". In Dallas in the late 70s, for
example, the influential political and business leaders saw the very
purpose of citywide policy planning (e.g. to guide the development of
the perceptual form of the city) inconsistent with what they consider
the important business of their community (development and growth) and
the role of their government (to remove constraints on real estate
development). The citywide urban design framework which necessarily
implied design controls was not supported in the City Hall.
One predictor of the practicability of citywide policy planning
is the strength of city planning (especially, comprehensive planning)
and the experience of the community in design controls. For citywide
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policy planning could be added as a new element of comprehensive plan-
ning and it could be supported as a way of improving necessary design
controls (cf. Minneapolis). City official's support for good urban
design in general is another predictor (e.g. Mayor Arthur Naftalin and
City Coordinator Thomas Thompson in Minneapolis). There would be many
more. However, there is much uncertainty about whether citywide policy
planning can be successfully practiced in each city. So far, urban
designers have had very little experience in this new area of practice.
Perhaps, urban designers won't know its real practicability in their
cities unless they actually try it. Moreover, its practicability would
change as urban designers experience more. Also, citywide policy
planning would have an effect of changing the context of urban design
to create a better basis for its use, once tried in the city, at least
as an internal effort of the planning agency (cf. the Minneapolis CIP
Urban Design Study).. Too much attention to the present practicability
of this activity in cities would harm its future development. Each
urban designer entering this new area of practice must necessarily
search his own way as part of efforts to devise the process of urban
design that is adapted to his community.
APPENDIX
A SURVEY OF THE GENERAL STATE OF THE ART OF CITYWIDE URBAN DESIGN
STUDIES AND PLANS IN AMERICAN CITIES SINCE 1960
This appendix reports the results of a survey of citywide urban
design study reports and plans prepared in American cities since 1960.
Planning reports reviewed are those which as a whole or in part deal
with large-scale urban design. Reports were identified by title and
by reference in two professional journals.1 The majority of reports
reviewed were funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) or the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA)
through-the 701 or Community Renewal Programs. For those reports, a
computerized key word index to report titles was available from HUD.
Cities of all sizes were included in the survey, while special atten-
tion was given to the fifty largest cities. For the latter, planning
studies for the city as a whole or its major section which might con-
tain an urban design element or contents (e.g. comprehensive plans,
development plans, and downtown plans) were reviewed beside urban
design-related reports identified in the above-mentioned manner. The
special attention paid to large cities is not accidental: the larger
the city, the greater a chance of creating a permanent urban design
staff within city government to support a continuing program of urban
design. Yet, urban design is much more difficult to practice in large
cities due to the complexity of their social needs and physical
circumstances.2
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Relative Emphases on Studies of the Quality of the Environment
and the Urban Design Management System
There are three general kinds of substance each citywide urban
design study could deal with:
- The quality of the physical environment (its performance or
form pattern, general or specific);
- The urban design management system (its performance, ele-
ments, and organization, general or specific); and
- Action strategies or courses of action to improve either
(general or specific).
Not all studies would deal with these with equal emphases. Important
distinctions among studies can be made in terms of relative emphases
on the quality of the environment and the design management system.
Studies of action strategies are something that would follow, or ought
to follow, studies of the quality of the environment and the design
management system and, thus, help us little in distinguishing basic
studies.
In regard to the quality of the environment and the design manage-
ment system, three levels of study are important to distinguish:
- Policies were formulated, officially adopted or not;
- Surveys and analyses were carried out (with or without
strategies for improvement considered); and
- No in-depth studies were carried out (with or without a brief
section outlining general strategies for improvement (or
implementation) or discussing the importance of plan/policy
implementation without mentioning implementation strategies).
The importance of distinguishing the second and the third levels must
be obvious -- study or no study. Whether policies are formulated or
not is an important concern in this survey since city design policy
formulation is the key activity of citywide policy planning. This
offers us a basic framework for describing citywide urban design studies
(.fig. A-1).
A New Breed of Citywide Urban Design Studies
Some cities systematically studied both the quality of the environ-
ment and the urban design management system (Minneapolis and San
Francisco). Minneapolis made "the first large-scale comprehensive
analysis of the form and image of an entire city" (Lynch, 1976: 82) --
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Fig. A-l. Relative Emphases on the Quality of the Environment and
the Urban Design Management System
The Urban Design Management System
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the first-phase (pilot study) of the CIP Urban Design Study
(Minneapolis CIP, 1965k, etc.). The second-phase study during ca.
1966-70 added studies of the design management system (e.g. Barton-
Aschman Associates, 1970) to environmental quality studies. The CIP
Urban Design Study had a significant impact on the Minneapolis urban
design program (Minneapolis CIP, 1971; Lu, 1979): It contributed to
the establishment of the Committee on Urban Environment (CUE), creation
of the Heritage Preservation Commission and subsequent designation of
historic landmarks and districts, freeway beautification projects,
and further studies and projects including a successful downtown
comprehensive development plan Metro Center '85 (Minneapolis P&D,
1970a). At a policy level, Minneapolis' urban designers attended more
to the quality of the environment than the design management system
until recently. The Visual Quality Plan adopted by the planning com-
mission in 1979 as part of the comprehensive plan marks a significant
departure from previous studies and plans in this city in that it
included policies for the design management system (the decision-making
process) (Minneapolis PD, 1979a). In fact, the Visual Quality Plan
is exceptional since no other cities in my survey have articulated this
kind of policies.
Only few cities conducted studies of the design management system
(Minneapolis, San Francisco, San Antonio, Tex., and Albuquerque, N.M.).
San Francisco included in its citywide urban design study a study of
"implementation approach" (San Francisco DCP, 1970e). San Antonio had
a report, Urban Design Mechanisms for San Antonio, prepared by a con-
sultant (SOM, 1972) (which received a HUD Design Award). This city,
however, has not studied its visual form and character. Albuquerque
made an urban design study with the assistance of a consultant as part
of its Community Renewal Program (David A. Crane and Associates, 1970).
While the consultant's report, Quality in Environment: An Urban Design
Study for the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, discusses both the quality
of the environment and the design management system, only a cursory look
is given to various qualities of environment (environmental problems,
potentials, and the broad framework within which environmental action
and design would occur). The strenght of the report is rather in its
recommendations for planning mechanisms and processes. The report also
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suggests major concepts and ideas that might be adopted to guide the
city's future design and development strategies.
Several cities carried out studies of the form and character of
their environments that went beyond the scope of traditional appearance
studies or surveys to identify "blighted areas" and determine "neces-
sary urban renewal treatments". Among those cities, Minneapolis and
San Francisco had policies formulated and adopted for the quality of
the environment as part of their comprehensive plans:
Minneapolis:
- The Visual Design Framework adopted by the planning com-
mission in 1976 (Minneapolis P&D, 1976a); and
- The Visual Quality Plan as a section of the Plan for the
80s adopted by the planning commission in 1979 and before
the city council for its adoption in the spring of 1980
(Minneapolis PD, 1979a).
San Francisco:
- The Urban Design Plan adopted by the planning commission in
1971 (San Francisco DCP, 1971b, 1972a).
The San Francisco Urban Design Plan was the result of a two-year study
carried out during 1969-70 -- "the most thorough set of analysis to
date, covering neighborhood quality, the street system, the general
image, implementation, and objectives -- published in a series of ten
reports completed-in 1971" (Lynch, 1976: 82). The assessment of this
plan varies according to observers. Some see little impact -- perhaps,
only a height and bulk ordinance that was passed in 1972. On the other
hand, other observers including Jacobs (1978a, b) see the plan's impact
significant: the passage of the height and bulk ordinance was a timely
response to an overriding issue of the community at the time and the
plan had furnished ammunition to San Franciscans seeking to protect
and improve the unique character and image of their city (Lynch, 1976:
82). Its impact on the professional community is also important.
City planners in Spartanburg, S.C., for example, learned much from
this plan in preparing an urban design plan for their city (Spartan-
burg, 1977). Some of the policies, principles, and illustrations in
the San Francisco Urban Design Plan have found their way into studies
and plans in other cities (e.g. San Diego, 1979).
Outside city government, Appleyard and Lynch (1974) conducted an
urban design study of the San Diego Region for the City of San Diego
through a grant from the Marston family. Their study, Temporary
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Paradise?: A Look at the Special Landscape of the San Diego Region, was
"the consultants' personal observations" "intended for discussion
purposes only" but it was prepared on the basis of much research
including some 200 interviews (including image map drawing). The
impact of the study was significant while it has remained unnoticed by
most urban designers in other cities. In early 1975, the San Diego
city council accepted the report and asked the planning department to
study questions raised in the report. A task force of various pro-
fessionals was gathered under the initiative of the San Diego Chapter
of the American Institute of Architects to meet with city staffers.
(The Urban Design Task Force, San Diego, 1976) The Urban Design Task
Force completed its work in "1977" [1976], with the publication of a
three-volume report, which defined urban design, its state of art, and
ways of incorporating it into the city's overall planning and develop-
ment program. The report was received very favorably by the public and
by the city council. Subsequently, the planning department took the
report and incorporated it into the comprehensive revisions to the
city's general plan, which was approved by the planning commission in
1978 and by the city council in 1979. Urban design thus became one of
the major components of the Progress Guide and General Plan (San Diego,
1979). In fact, the urban design element was the framework that tied
together all elements of the general plan; urban design considera-
tions were introduced into most elements of the plan. (Mike Stepner,
supervising planner, San Diego Planning Department, in a letter to me,
dated January 25, 1980)
A few cities put together data and recommendations as a result
of systematic visual form studies (Brookline, Mass., Oakland, Ca., and
Jacksonville, Fla.). In 1964, Lynch (1965) conducted a systematic sen-
sory quality analysis, one of the first of its kind in this country,
scrutinizing visual forms and citizen images of the Town of Brookline
for its Community Renewal Program. His report, Visual Analysis, had
some influence in introducing a design review process in the zoning
code (Lynch, 1976: 82), but his recommendations did not find their way
into the city's comprehensive plan. Oakland studied the visual form
of the city as part of its 701 comprehensive planning program (Oakland,
1968) and completed a report, A Design Framework for Oakland: Proposals
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from the 701 Urban Design Staff (DeMars and Wells et al. for Oakland,
1969). Jacksonville studied citizen images as well as visual forms
(Jacksonville, 1971) and put together recommendations, Jacksonville
Form and Appearance: Two, including "central reasons, ideas, and
techniques" for the visual environment (Jacksonville, 1972). The
Oakland and Jacksonville reports present what are in substance policy
recommendations but they were not prepared in a form adoptable as
city design policy. Not much progress has been reported about these
two cities' urban design programs.4
There are a few more cities that conducted exemplary studies of
visual forms but stopped short of producing recommendations for action
(Kansas City, Mo., 1967, Rye, N.Y., 1967,5 Los Angeles, Ca., 1971,
and Dallas, 1974). An early citywide urban design study, Measuring
the Visual Environment, the Planning Department of Kansas City (1967)
conducted as one of the technical studies for the city's Community
Renewal Program does not seem to have much impact. However, recent
progress in the city's urban design program offers us a case for city-
wide policy planning. According to Ray (1979: 217), a four person
urban design staff in the Development Department "viewed their even-
tual product not as a long-range plan, but rather a management process,
a guidebook and mechanism for directing day-to-day development decisions."
The Kansas City Design Guidebook (Kansas City, 1978) provides design
suggestions and techniques that are comparable to the policies and
principles of the San Francisco Urban Design Plan. It is city design
policy, if unofficial. (The guidebook received a HUD Design Award.)
Los Angeles' report, The Visual Form of Los Angeles, describes
the results of visual form and citizen image surveys and discusses
problems and opportunities (Los Angeles, 1971). Like the Oakland and
Jacksonville reports, this report has given only a cursory look at the
urban design process. The report discussed actions that might be taken
to improve visual environment in general terms such as incoporating
considerations of the visual environment into the general plan, con-
tinuing analysis, citizen participation, and considering general ways
of implementing visual objectives.
Dallas conducted a systematic survey of visual form of the city
in 1974 (The Visual Form of Dallas; Dallas DUP, 1974b). The survey
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identified "resource/potential areas" and "target areas", defined
"environmentally common types" and "visually common types", and
mapped "form elements" and "form structure". Description of environ-
mentally common types included brief recommendations for urban design
actions but this report was just a beginning'of further studies and
analyses to be carried out in the process of developing an "urban
design framework" for the city. During the 70s, the urban design staff
completed only the survey phase of the work that had been proposed
initially (Dallas DPUD, 1971a):
- The ecological study (Dallas DUP, 1973a, b);
- The historical landmark survey (Alexander, 1974); and
- The visual image survey (Dallas DUP, 1976a).
Seattle, Wash., produced a visual form survey report, The Deter-
minant of City From: The Urban Design Report No. 1. This report
presenting the data without recommendations "had perhaps the briefest
official life" (Lynch, 1976: 83). Citywide urban design studies have
not been carried out in the city since then while the city has been achieving
good results in urban design at a project level (e.g. Pioneer Square
and Freeway Park) and in management processes (Clark, 1976; Erikson,
1978).
The cities which I consider are exemplary in citywide urban design
studies are the following:
- Brookline, Mass.;
- Dallas, Tex.;
- Jacksonville, Fla.;
- Los Angeles, Ca.;
- Minneapolis, Minn.;
- San Francisco, Ca.; and
- Seattle, Wash.
These cities share the following characteristics:
- Urban design was defined beyond the scope of beautification
or design of the architectural form of the city;
- Value premises in urban design, explicit or implicit in
reports, included those that mattered at a scale of city
(e.g. the clarity and vividness of the visual image and form
structures) as well as a scale of place (e.g. identity,
amenity, beauty, etc.); often, efforts were made to con-
sciously articulate basic value premises in urban design;
- Much interest existed in public perception of the city and
in projecting a vivid and coherent city image (cf. Lynch,
1960) on the basis of citizen image surveys or otherwise
(exception: Oakland, Ca.); and, finally,
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- Much emphasis was placed on systematic (or "comprehensive")
surveys of the visual form and character (and, sometimes,
citizen images) to measure the quality of the visual
environment.
Several other cities share the same characteristics (Kansas City, Mo.;
Oakland, Ca.; Rye, N.Y.: San Diego, Ca. -- Appleyard and Lynch (1974);
and Spartanburg, S.C.).
Downtown Design Plans and Beautification Programs
Some cities had similar studies carried out for a major part of
their territory (e.g. Detroit, Mich., 1969, along with a citizen image
survey (cf. Melting, 1969); Minneapolis P&D, 1970a; and examples to
follow). Some of them were carried out outside city government to
advocate good urban design:
- Atlanta, Ga. -- Georgia Chapter, AIA (1962) and Georgia
Urban Design Committee (1966); and
- Portland, Ore. -- Portland Chapter, AIA (1971).
There are many cities which had a "design" or "urban design" study
or plan prepared for their downtown that do not have the characteris-
tics of exemplary cases (e.g. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1969;
Rogers et al. for Cincinnati, Ohio, 1964; and Okamoto and Williams
for the Regional Plan Association, New York, 1969). "Urban design"
in those cases is usually synonymous with architectural form analysis
and image sketches or development studies or just planning studies.
Numerous citywide urban design studies were carried out to pre-
pare beautification or appearance plans and programs in cities of all
sizes. Some were prepared as an element of the comprehensive plan
(e.g. Meridian, Miss., 1970). Others were prepared independently
(e.g. New York, N.Y., 1968; Chicago, Ill., 1970). Generally,
beautification and appearance plans defined urban design narrowly,
largely in response to the scope of the federal open space and highway
beautifcation programs. Their primary concerns were beautification
and appearance improvements -- facade improvements of commercial
properties; paint-up, fix-up, clean-up campaigns; landscaping of
boulevards and streets; marking of city entrance; etc. In fact, a
term "urban design" was seldom used in those plans. "Urban design",
if used, was usually without much substance -- interchangeable with
"urban planning" or "urban development". Similarly, a term "the
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image and character of the community" may be used but its use departs
from that in exemplary cases. Without articulation of what it was
that defined or constituted the image and character of the community,
it was a good way of referring to the visual attractiveness (beauty)
of the city -- that important, but elusive quality most people would
like to realize in their community. There were also a few "urban
design plans" whose scope was limited to open space acquisition and
improvement programs (e.g. Jefferson Parish, LA., 1974 6). There were
some special purpose citywide urban design studies and plans such as
historic preservation plans, but I have not included them in my review.
There are small cities which made urban design an element of
their comprehensive plans. The following are examples:
- Claremont, Ca., city of 23,464 as of 1970 (1969):
Chapter IX "Urban Design" of The Claremont General Plan
(18 pages of a 66-page report);
- Sebastopol, Ca., city of 3,993 (1969):
"Urban Design Element" of the Sebastopol General Plan
(5 pages of a 40-page report);
- Archadia, Ca., city of 42,866 (1972):
"Community Design Element" of the General Plan Report;
(6 pages of a 93 page report);
- Fremont, Ca., city of 100,869 (1967):
"Community Design Element" of Fremont Planning Program,7
1965-67: Summary Report (7 pages of an 81-page report);
- Moss Point, Miss., city of 19,321 (1970):
the Comprehensive Plan: The Design Element; and
- Cocoa Beach, Fla., city of 9,952 (1960/61):
Chapter VIII "Aesthetics and Civic Design" of the Compre-
hensive City Plan, vol. 2 (4 pages of a 50-page (+ appendix)
report).
I do not attend to these and other examples in small communities for
several reasons. At first, the small size of those communities
(people and environments) and relatively simple structures of their
environment (e.g. the downtown equivalent to one of many commercial
nodes in a major city) do not create much demand for in-depth studies
of the form and character of their environment. In fact, most
examples in this category do not mention systematic surveys. Second,
for the same reasons, small communities do not create much demand for
citywide urban design policies as a device for communication and
control. Prototype studies, attention to key areas and projects, and
policies and recommendations naturally tied to specific places or
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projects characterize most of the examples listed above. Third, small
communities do not always afford to retain a permanent urban design
staff to continue an on-going urban design program. The nature and
quality of studies and plans tend to be determined by their consul-
tants' approach. Naturally, most examples in this category do not
share the characteristics of exemplary cases. They are rather
"development" or "beautification" studies and plans. They seldom
articulate value premises, goals, objectives, and policies for urban
design.8
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FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION
1. Urban design I discuss in this study is Lynch's (1968, 1974)
"city design". I do not use his term here, however, since "city
design" or "the design of the city" as it is used in Goals for Dallas
(1967, 1970, 1977, and 1979) could mean planning or comprehensive
planning for the city broadly. A term "urban design", while it has
acquired meaning of architectural and landscape design for building
groups, streets, and districts (which I do not want), can convey
a modest sense that it is a small area of city planning. Exceptions
are "city design plan" and "city design policy" which I use to mean
"citywide urban design plan" and a set of urban design goals, objectives,
and policies, respectively.
2. According to Hack (1976), environmental programming is the process
of arriving at a set of specifications about what to build or change
in the way of man-occupied settings. This activity takes various
forms, including preparation of architectural programs, the development
of environmental development standards, and ongoing management of built
settings.
3. "System design" literally deals with a functionally connected
set of objects, which may extend over large areas but not make a
complete environment such as an arterial street system and a lighting
system (Lynch, 1968: 249).
4. There are many definitions and kinds of "policy" as I discuss
in Chapter VI. For the moment, I define policy simply as a general
course of action leading to the realization of objectives and goals.
I use "city design policy" in a sense of a set of goals, objectives,
and policies, rather than a specific piece of policy. This follows
common usage of a term "city policy". Distinctions among goals,
objectives, and policies are relative in terms of relationships of
implementing and being implemented. All objectives and some goals
may be seen as higher-level policies.
5. Implementation process exists precisely because no acceptable
tradeoff rules can be formulated in advance of practice. Policy
leaves some decisions to be made later in the process of implementa-
tion that are necessary in putting it into practice. Policy, thus,
is inherently ambiguous. On whatever level or whenever disagreements
are masked by ambiguities, implementation becomes the strategic
stage for resolution. This is what Rein and Rabinovitz (1977: 6, 9)
call the politics of implementation. Also, during the process of
implementation, the urban designer must deal with things that are
inherently changing over time, thus, things that ought to be dealt
with case by case (e.g. changes in the administrative direction,
changing preference of the client and arrival of new actors, and
new factors in construction such as unexpected rate of inflation
and worker strikes). We have no deficiency in cases to demonstrate
the difficulty of implementing city design policies. To list a few
important ones in the three case cities:
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- The Richmond Experiment, San Francisco (failure);
- The proposition J and the open space program, San Francisco
(failure of Proposition C turned into success); and
- The height and bulk ordinance, San Francisco (success with
much "good professional work" in the process of translating
the height and bulk guidelines of the Urban Design Plan into
an ordinance); also,
- The master design district ordinance (failure; a case of
implementing an action strategy internal to the planning
department rather than a policy).
It follows that implementation has heavy demands that go beyond the
scope of formulating city design policy and beginning its implementa-
tion. Thus, it is appropriate to see that the actual process of
implementation is no more a part of citywide policy planning.
It makes sense to conceptually separate implementation from city-
wide policy planning because implementation does not need to be carried
out citywide. "Citywide implementation" is possible (e.g. the San
Francisco height and bulk ordinance) but viewed as an approach or an
area of emphasis it has little substance.
6. Inquiry into other kinds of plans (comprehensive plans, urban
general plans, metropolitan plans, community renewal programs, etc.)
include Kent (1964), Black (1968), Goodman and Kaufman (1975), Boyce
et al. (1970, 19.74), Gruft and Gustein (1972), Lavine (1976), Lich-
field et al. (1975), and Susskind and Aylward (1976). There are only
a limited number of empirical studies of plan implementation: Susskind
and Aylward (1976), Lam (1976), and Southworth and Southworth (1973).
Important contributions to the building of conceptual frameworks in
the planning theory that seem especially pertinent to this study come
from Faludi (1973),-Ravinovitz (1969), Altshuler (1965), Bolan (1967),
Bolan and Nuttall (1975), and Catanese (1974).
7. The urban design management system means the whole set of proce-
dures and devices that make decision-making in urban design and
physical development of the city work, both in the short run and in
the long run. Specifically, it includes such things as administrative
organization, administrative procedures, financing and programming
devices, development tools, and legal controls as well as the general
way of arranging programs, studies, projects, and specific actions
and decisions in the time space -- the whole process of urban design
in the long run. Broadly defined, it also includes various actors --
citizen groups, communication media, architects in private practice,
etc. -- as they play their roles in the process of development.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I
1. Among six areas of general goals was "community appearance"
including three goals:
- Enhancement of the community's natural and man-made assets
to strengthen the image of the University [i.e. Southeast
Minneapolis] Community;
- Improve the appearance of the business centers and industrial
areas in the community; to make them attractive and distinc-
tive in design; and
- Seek proper planning of the freeways in order that they
... tie into the general function and design of the community.
In the "Plan" section, urban design was an element along with land
use, community facilities, circulation, and university campus. The urban
design element defined three "specifications" with which to prepare the
urban design plan and recommended a basic "urban design structure".
Those three specifications were in effect urban design goals or objec-
tives formulated to meet SEMPACC's (Southeast Minneapolis Planning Area
Planning and Coordination Committee) goal: "The natural [and] manmade
assets of Southeast Minneapolis should be enhanced so that the image of
the University Community may be strengthened." They included:
- Every section of the community be distinctive and vivid in
appearance;
- The sections be tied together as one clear image structure;
and
- The image give meaningful expression to the functions of the
community.
The basic "urban design structure" was presented as a schematic model.
The document summarized its major elements in terms of entrance points,
paths, districts, nodes, landmarks, and street furniture (e.g. [S]everal
entrance points to the community be designated and properly designed. ... ).
To illustrate the basic "urban design structure", the document also
included preliminary designs for selected paths (e.g. University Neigh-
borhood Greenway), nodes (e.g. Dinky Town), and a district (Como
Neighborhood).
The urban design perspective was also important in data analysis.
The staff conducted a survey of visual image along with other surveys
(e.g. land use and housing). The staff made a field reconnaissance and
mapped the spatial/image structure of the community in terms of Lynch's
five elements (landmarks, paths, etc.) and defined major assets and
liabilities (e.g. the nondirectional paths and poor use of waterfront).
An accompanied map diagnosed problems of the community image (e.g. dis-
continuity, ambiguous gate, and characterless path).
2. Urban design goals in the Southeast Minneapolis Plan were articu-
lated in terms of Lynch's (1960) legibility:
e.g. The Urban Design -- for the Enhancement of Community Images;
Strengthening the image of the University Community;
... distinct and vivid in appearance [identity];
... tied together as one clear image structure [structure];
and ... meaningful expression to the functions ...
{meaning]; and "Clarity of its image structure" and "vivid-
ness in its expressions" are important to the success of
[the community's] design.
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3. The urban design staff in Minneapolis had a chance to test their
notion of urban design before working full-scale in the CIP Urban
Design Study. While proposing a major city-wide urban design study to
be part of the Minneapolis Community Improvement Program in mid
1964, they were participating in the Joint Program, an inter-agency
land use-transportation planning program for the Twin Cities area.
The program was initiated shortly after the commencement of CIP, and
the Metropolitan Planning Commission, a predecessor of the Metro-
politan Council, was working with local agencies to prepare the
Metropolitan Development Guide.(Star, June 20, 1964; The Joint Program,
1965)
4. It would be appropriate to characterize the pilot study as a
survey-and-plan-and-public review approach with little citizen parti-
cipation during the study process. The final report Toward a New
City (Minneapolis CIP, 1965k) made no mention of the role of the Urban
Design Committee. Except in community-level design studies, the pilot
study was carried out as technical study of the urban design staff,
participating organizations, and outside consultants. Similarly, the
second-phase study was carried out mostly by the staff and consultants,
this time, without presentation of its results for broad public review.
The Urban Design Committee had been dissolved earlier, perhaps at the
time the pilot study was completed.
Citizens' role in the whole CIP Study was more substantive. For
example, it was the CIP Citizens Advisory Committee that recommended
the citywide community improvement program (Summary Report) to the
planning commission, mayor, city council, officials and citizens of
the city. Various groups, including community organizations and
business associations were drawn into the Study.
5. The following are examples of news articles: Minneapolis Star,
June 20, 1964; March 20, September 7, 27, 28, October 20, 22, 1965;
Minneapolis Tribune, September 19, October 16, 1965.
6. The study team had very limited input from people in the city
and those issues identified dominantly reflected urban designers'
point of view at the time. The data from some 4,600 personal inter-
views conducted throughout the metropolitan area in late 1963 and
early 1964 were analyzed as part of the pilot study (the "Livability
Study"). This offered the study team some knowledge as to residents'
attitude toward neighborhoods, housing types, etc. but from an urban
design point of view the questionnaire was rather poorly designed.
The citizen image survey (the "Imageability Study" and "Imageability
Analysis") produced valuable information about how people viewed the
city and its parts but questions had been asked from urban designers'
point of view. Moreover, the Urban Design Committee was never repre-
sentative of the city's people.
The following examples would illustrate how dominant urban
designers' point of view was in the study:
- As we build from 4 to 10 freeways through the city in the
next 15 years, can we make the view of the City from each
of them attractive?
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- More highrise apartments are going to be necessary and
desirable, but should their placement be mainly based on
economic considerations, or should social, aesthetic
considerations be given equal emphasis?
7. In 1968, the city council authorized with the mayor's support
the Minneapolis Beautification Committee, later named the Committee
on Urban Environment. Mayor Arthus Naftalin formed the committee in
the same year. An idea of creating a beautification commission was
developed in an organization study then in progress as part of the
second-phase urban design study. Several environmentalists initiated
a step to create the committee with backing of the urban design staff
(Lu, 1979: 7). The primary responsibility of CUE, among its nine
charges, has been education, information, and voluntary design review
and CUE has been active in these.
CUE has become an important advocate of good urban design and
supporter of the urban design program. For example, it helped the city
obtain three design-related bills in the state legislature in 1971
(historic preservation, design districts, and development districts).
As we shall see, CUE played an important role in balancing neighbor-
hood groups' point of view with the urban design staff's point of view
in the process of public debate over the Visual Design Framework and
the master design district ordinance.
8. The work program (Minneapolis P&D, 1968a, revised in February
1969) emphasized the role of technical and citizen advisory committees
in reviewing the design team's work at critical points in the study
process. However, broad citizen participation took place in the study
perhaps due to the nature of the downtown community. The downtown
business community was well organized around the Downtown Council and
a few residential neighborhoods in the area could be reached without
much difficulty (e.g. Loring-Nicollet Community Council). Thus,
virtually "every segment of the downtown community became involved in
setting goals, developing alternatives, selecting a plan, and outlining
a program of action" (Lu, 1979: 12). The DwonAtown Council played an
especially important role throughout the study. Its contribution went
beyond reviews of various proposals. For example, it hired a consultant
on its own to explore the development potential of the Hennepin Avenue
entertainment area (Lawrence Halprin Associates, 1969).
9. The criteria for developing the visual image framework were:
- Visual diversity and contrast [identity implied];
- Expression of functions and activities [meaning];
- Structure or relatedness; and
- A comfortable visual image, neither visual pollution nor
monotony.
The work to formulate the visual design framework would begin with
surveys of citizen images and visual form. Analysis of the public image
was important because it would give the design team clues for deter-
mining how to shape the form of visual environment. Metro Center '85
used the 1964 survey of the public image of the downtown environment
carried out with participation of a random sample of Hennepin County
residents. The survey drew upon Lynch's method involving a sketch-map
drawing exercise.
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10. Moreover, the new administrative structure allowed the design
team to work with specialists in operating departments and to absorb
essential know-hows in implementation. The administrative reorgani-
zation also increased funding and staffing of the planning department.
The innovation in the theories and techniques of urban design which
made Metro Center '85 so different from the first downtown plan could
not have been possible without these changes in city government.
11. Some urban design-related policies were integrated into the
Program Policies. For example, the Housing and Living Environment
element included a policy concerning "design quality" under an objec-
tive of "choice", and policies of "image" and "reinforcing character"
under an objective of "diversity".
12. The purpose of the Visual Design Framework stated in the "Intro-
duction" can be viewed as a general goal statement: "to provide
policies for evaluating visual issues ... intended to enhance, protect,
and create perceptual quality in the built and natural environment".
Implicit in policies were legibility (identity, structure, and meaning)
in the earlier draft and "visual quality", "primary visual amenities"
and, perhaps, just fine views and atmospheres (e.g. "a parkway-like
visual image") in the revised draft. "Perceptual quality" in the
"Introduction" was not defined.
13. My discussion on the Plan for the 80s hereafter is based on the
Hearing Draft of June 1979. The planning commission made some changes
before adopting the plan and further changes were being made in
community plans around April 1980.
14. According to the Visual Quality Plan, "basic visual design
principles" are:
- Visual diversity among the city's communities and neighbor-
hoods and the individual qualities of each should be retained
and reinforced;
- Visual design should reflect functions and activities and
should provide identifying characteristics which made
functional areas recognizable and the city more understandable;
- The potential for visual clutter and chaos of signs, parking
lots, automobile-oriented establishments and adjacent
incompatible land uses should be minimized.(Minneapolis PD,
1979a: IV-79-80)
These principles are considered to be an expression of the concept
of patterned variety: the (good) natural scienic quality is patterned
variety that is neither monotonous nor visually chaotic. These three
principles, according to the plan, also support policies related to the
visual quality of residential neighborhoods and commercial and indus-
trial areas.
15. Devising effective implementation strategies was an important
concern of the planning staff. Thus, the Plan for the 80s as a whole
gives much attention to implementation. It even includes a plan (a
set of a goal, objectives, and policies) and an action program for
implementation: the second section of the final chapter, "General
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Management/Implementation". This section describes key processes for
implementing the Plan for the 80s and offers guidelines for conducting
each process to assure consistency of programs and actions with the
policies of the Plan for the 80s in regard to the budget and redevelop-
ment processes, land use controls and intergovernmental relations.
The primary implementation tool is the Priority Framework to rate
priorities of capital improvement budget proposals on the one hand and
the Priority Framework in each section of the Plan for the 80s rating
priorities of policies and actions on the other. Each Priority Frame-
work defines priorities according to eight categories distinguished
into five priority groups. A resolution passed by the city council in
January 1979 and approved by the mayor established the concept that
budget categories should match up with the categories of the Plan for
the 80s. Other tools of implementation discussed in the plan are zoning,
legislation, lobbying, planning and research including program
administration.
The "Implementation Strategy" section of the Action Program for
the Visual Quality Plan proposes four basic types of action: educational
efforts; public improvements and capital expenditure; design control and
design review; and city design services.
16. The urban design staff's early problem was thus to win recognition
of fellow city planners. The rule of the battle they had to fight was
well known to all involved -- to develop the theories and techniques
of urban design, technically. Urban design would be secure within
city government if the urban design staff could demonstrate their
capability and win the confidence of the planning director. The whole
thing was largely a matter internal to the planning department. Con-
trast this with the situation in Dallas.
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II
1. After The Ultimate Highrise: San Francisco's Mad Rush Toward the
Sky (The San Francisco Bay Guardian, 1971).
2. Several events heightened the planning director's sense that the
planning department could not go anywhere without an urgan design plan:
cf. the planning commission's decision on the Embaracadero Center sec-
tion of the Golden Gateway redevelopment project and the planning
director's meeting with Justin Herman, director of the Development
Agency, and John Portman, architect-developer for the Embaracadero
Center project (Jacobs, 1978a: 21).
3. In June 1967, according to a report of the planning department,
"Descriptive Summary of the Proposed Urban Design Study and Plan for
the City and County of San Francisco", February 26, 1968 as quoted in
Jacobs (1978b: 191).
4. The Urban Design Plan was prepared and adopted according to a
survey-and-plan-and-public hearing approach. As Jacobs (1978b: 207)
has observed:
Without question, city planners had played the dominant
role in the study. It had been their idea in the first
place and they had controlled the work. They also had a
major say in choosing the [citizen advisory] committee,
which was their brainchild to begin with.
Important and active as the role of the citizen advisory committee,
"For the most part ... the involvement of the committee ended when the
meetings ended." Generally, there was "the apparent lack of public
interest" and the study received little public attention in its first
year. The staff thus hoped to compensate for the deficiencies in
citizen participation by direct contacts with diverse community
groups -- through detailed community studies, ongoing neighborhood
planning studies, interviews (a "social reconnaissance survey"), and
responses to preliminary reports that were distributed in the com-
munity. "Nevertheless, from a look at committee membership alone, one
might well conclude that the urban design study was in the hands of a
somewhat elitist group." (Jacobs, 1978b: 207-8, 201, 197) Broad and
substantial citizen participation began once the staff completed a
plan in an adoptable form.
5. An idea of having a set of principles for good design identified
for a community in the keen eyes of architects and urban designers
(rather than on the basis of analysis of needs and wishes of citizens
and systematic inventory data) reminds us of a then emerging tradition
of urban design along the line of Christopher Alexander's theory
(Alexander et al., 1968, 1969). On the other hand, the fourth prelimi-
nary report represents a different tradition of urban design that was
being developed as an area of city planning, largely on the basis of
Kevin Lynch's work (Lynch, 1960; Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer, 1964).
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6. For example, Alvin Duskin's second full-page ad objecting to
highrise development appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle on
October 19, 1970 ("Skyscrapers are economically necessary; but only if
you own one.").
7. The Urban Design Plan, as well as the whole comprehensive plan
of the City and County of San Francisco, is not the city's official
policy in that the Board of Supervisors has-never adopted it, and it
does not need to base its decisions on it. However, given relative
power of the planning commission and citizens' support for the Urban
Design Plan, it is little different from the city's official policy
for physical development and urban design. Some people in San Fran-
cisco even think that the Urban Design Plan was adopted by the Board
of Supervisors (The San Francisco Bay Guardian, 1971; and my inter-
views).
8. An early statement of goals and objectives for the Urban Design
Study (San Francisco DCP, 1969d) already accepted "the desirability
of achieving a community where people knew with ease where they were
and how to get where they were going" (Jacobs, 1978b: 200) as a legiti-
mate and important concern in urban design. This is what Lynch's
legibility, structure, and identity are about:
Goal 2:
To provide a basis for individual orientation within
the city.
Objective A:
To strengthen the city's visual structure.
Objective B:
To strengthen the distinctiveness and visual order
of the city's districts.
Perhaps, general importance of images in this city as expressed in
the following policy statement in the same report supported applica-
tion of Lynch's city image concepts:
New buildings projecting above surrounding development
should be light in color to maintain the image of a
"white city", contrasting with the dark water of the
Bay and Ocean.
In the fourth preliminary report presenting the results of system-
atic surveys of the visual environment, we see major application of
Lynch's concepts (in the fourth section "External Form and Image" by
Okamoto/Liskamm, Inc. -- e.g. "form and image development within visual
districts" and "visual reinforcement of a citywide pathway system")
and the whole approach of Appleyard, Lynch, and Myer (1964) in The
View from the Road (in the third section "Road Environment" by Donald
Appleyard and staff). While no citizen image survey involving map
drawing was conducted, inventory and analysis of form/image elements
applying Lynch's concepts were made as part of the study (in the second
section "Internal Pattern and Image" by the staff -- e.g. major and
minor focal points and landmarks).
Finally, Lynch's concepts became an important part of urban design
principles in the preliminary citywide urban design plans (especially
in the "Open Space and Landscaping" and "Streets" sections) (San
Francisco DCP, 1970f) and all elements -- human needs, objectives,
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fundamental principles, and policies -- of the final plan (especially
in the "City Pattern" section) (San Francisco DCP, 1971b).
9. As we see in the fifth preliminary report and "fundamental prin-
ciples" in the final plan, a few other urban design traditions --
perhaps, ones like Gordon Cullen's (1960) townscape design and
Christopher Alexander's (1967, 1969) pattern language -- must have
been important also in articulating principles of good urban design.
My emphasis here is on an empirical basis and behavioral significance
of Lynch's concepts.
10. Some principles in the Urban Design Plan stated in terms of a
suggested course of action or alternative ("can") only suggest desir-
able qualities as in policies:
e.g. The city's overall visual structure can be strengthened
and enhanced by use of large-scale planting on certain
streets and open spaces. (Fundamental Principles for
City Pattern 1, San Francisco DCP, 1972a)
11. Alexander defined "pattern" loosely (Alexander et al., 1968,
1969, 1979). Emphasis of his definition is on its form of pre-
sentation (diagram - problem - solution) and the theory of its use.
In terms of its substance, his pattern could be any of Hack's (1976:
28-9) "environmental package", "environmental pattern", "environmental
requirement" and, even, "clientship" or their combination. According
to Hack, these four kinds of environmental programming information
are:
The overall ENVIRONMENTAL PACKAGE -- what is to be included,
how it is to be defined, how it relates to what exists or
might be done in the future, how it meshes with the insti-
tutions which will build or inhabit it, what the schedule
for actions should be.
The ENVIRONMENTAL PATTERNS ... -- specific notions about
spatial relationships or configurations, sometimes in the
form of analogies, sometimes held only metaphorically, and
at other times in the form of partial design solutions,
abstract or precise.
The PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS for -the qualitative dimensions
of the environment -- how it is expected to serve its occu-
pants in behavioral, operational, or maintenance terms.
The sense of CLIENTSHIP -- who the principal groups of users
will be, how they might regard the environment, what typical
routines of use might be, how users might shift over time.
Fundamental principles of the Urban Design Plan comes close to
Alexander's patterns in use and Hack's patterns in content.
12. The four-category issue framework appeared first in the May 1971
document (San Francisco DCP, 1971b). The third preliminary report is
organized according to goals, then, objectives and, finally, policies
without explicit reference to issues:
Goal 1: Safety, cleanliness, and comfort;
Goal 2: Orientation;
Goal 3: Variety; and
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Goal 4: Harmony between new and old. (San Francisco DCP,
1969d)
The fifth preliminary report presenting urban design principles is
organized according to the following conceptual framework:
- Streets;
- Relationships of streets to building facades; and
- Relationships among street patterns, building masses, and
topography. (San Francisco DCP, 1970b)
I have already pointed out that this report was prepared as personal
observations of a consultant, largely departing from the data and
analyses of issues developed earlier in the Urban Design Study. Even
the last preliminary report presenting the basic components of the
final plan is without reference to issues. Five plans in this report
are defined according to "important aspects of San Francisco's physical
form and environment":
- Open space and landscaping;
- Street design;
- The preservation of street space;
- The height of buildings; and
- The bulk of buildings. (San Francisco DCP, 1970f: 3)
13. The city has matured with major public infrastructures
already in place. It is private development that was responsible for
the greatest quantity and variety of changes -- and controversies --
in all development with which the Urban Design Plan was concerned.
Primary emphasis of the implementation approach study was also on
private development on privately owned land as Skaff (1978: 49, 80)
has observed.
14. As Skaff (1978) has observed, developers encouraged by downtown
zoning incentives have created a 550-foot "wall" along Market Street
which is both visually disruptive and out of character with the city's
skyline. The "wall" has resulted in a dark, cold, ominous feeling on
the street on which citizens spent $24 million for beautification.
The original intent of the ordinance was to create a "man-made hill"
in downtown by way of concentric rings of height limits. The bulk
controls have been fairly successful, but had an effect of favoring
odd-shaped buildings due to the maximum diagonal rule. Bulk has
become a problem anyway because of the lack of control over spacing
between towers. Moreover, building bulk and density on a district-
wide basis are not under tight control in terms of the total amount
allowed under the height and bulk envelopes and bonus zoning provi-
sions and the resultant effects on light, air, wind, and views.
15. There is no doubt that the Urban Design Plan had played an essen-
tial role in the whole effort to establish the citywide height and bulk
controls for the first time in this city. Jacobs (1978b: 245) wrote
as follows:
We have been advised that the part of the city planning
process that calls for plans to be adopted and carried out
by a series of actions, including legislation, rarely runs
smoothly. In this case, however, that part of the process
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worked in the way it was supposed to: the ordinance derived
directly from a plan and, with very few exceptions, its
final substance reflected the plan.
On the other hand, the planning staff had to do much work in
translating those guidelines into specific zoning standards -- even
after twenty-five changes were made in the height and bulk guidelines
and the map for building bulk was restructured before the adoption of
the Urban Design Plan subsequent to public comments (Svirsky, 1973:
10). Svirksy (1973) and Jacobs (1978b: Chap. 9) offer us good accounts
of "good professional work" that was done in the process. The planning
staff's work is surely thorough. The fact that the ordinance, once
adopted, had not undergone any serious challenge or amendment by late
1977 but one (the "Executive Park" amendment in 1976) since the flurry
of early, minor adjustments (Jacobs, 1978b: 250) atests this. This had
remained true till the Nob Hill Neighbors managed to win height reduc-
tions in early 1979 and anti-highrise groups put another height-limit
initiative on the November 1979 ballot.
Much work of the planning staff does not necessarily mean enough
research, however. As Skaff (1978: 108) had pointed out, studies to
relate the height and bulk controls to the zoning bonus: provisions and
those to assess economic and growth implications of the ordinance as
it was combined with the zoning bonus system were tenuous.
16. It is not surprising to find project reviews as a means of imple-
menting the Urban Design Plan rather successful in influencing the color
of the facades of highrises (cf. Fundamental Principle for Major New
Development 6) since it has little cost implication to developers.
Prior to the plan, several buildings -- especially, Alcoa, Bank of
America, Great Western Savings, and Bechtel -- began to disturb the
image of San Francisco as a city of light-colored buildings against
the dark Bay. New highrise buildings have been returning to the
light-color tradition. A few rather dark buildings that were recently
built, such as the State Compensation Insurance Fund building and the
Merchandise Mart Extension, make some people wonder if the Urban Design
Plan is really in effect; but these buildings, the planning staff
argues, do not project significantly into the skyline. Also, they are
substantially lighter in color than, say, the Bank of America building.
Improvements are all relative to what was happening before the Urban
Design Plan.
Not so successful are facade articulation, height relationships,
and pedestrian-level amenities among other things. These have serious
implications on the developers' economy. At first, Skaff (1978: 177-8)
has observed that the facade articulation has been encouraged by the
planning staff in project review without successfully influencing
developers' decisions. The Urban Design Plan calls for articulation
of form or surface pattern of buildings to reflect the existing scale
(Fundamental Principle for Major New Development 1E), rich facade
treatment to enhance the character of the street (Fundamental Prin-
ciple for Conservation 3), etc. Developers already constrained by
bulk controls, which in effect limits the maximum size of each floor,
favored slick curtain walls in many of the most recent highrises.
Reviews of individual projects have done little to influence the
form of skyline. Not only cornice lines of adjacent buildings were
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unrelated in some parts of the downtown but alsoa 550-foot wall of
highrises has been created along Market Street, which detracts from
an image of idealized skyline form -- a downtown hill as was assumed
in the height and bulk guidelines of the Urban Design Plan and the
height and bulk ordinance. The bulk controls prescribing maximum
dimensions of each floor have in effect determined how tall buildings
could rise economically -- far shorter than expected (700-foot limit)
at the core. None have persuaded developers to build taller buildings
at the downtown core. The zoning bonuses that allowed developers to
build more elsewhere had an effect of flattening out the skyline.
Wind-blown plazas and plazas left in deep shadow to the north of
highrises are one of common complaints about the San Francisco down-
town, especially because those plazas brought developers bonus floor
areas until recently. Project review offered little to mitigate such
basic problems in siting and design. More generally, pedestrian-
level amenities in the downtown are problematic. The Urban Design
Plan, for example, calls for continuity of interest and activities
in commercial buildings adjacent to pedestrian ways so as to create
rich street life and enhance pedestrian experience (Fundamental Prin-
ciple for Neighborhood Environment 16). While the plan specifically
stated that major office buildings contribute more to street life
if they have commercial activity at ground level (the same fundamental
principle), the planning staff's suggestions for such commerical space
have almost never been taken seriously by developers. Economic and
"image" considerations of developers and building managers have over-
ridden urban design and created highrise development that not only
lacks commercial facilities other than banks and airline ticket
offices, but also eliminated shops that once occupied the ground
level to make way for new highrises. (Skaff, 1978: 174)
17. Jacobs (1978b: 279-301) offers us an in-depth account of the
process of preparing the recreation and open space element and imple-
menting it through the open space acquisition and park renovation
program. In mid 1970, the planning department began its work on the
Improvement Plan for Recreation and Open Space. The planning staff
were not so much worried about getting the plan adopted as they were
concerned about implementing those parts of the plan that would
require major expenditures for land acquisition and physical improve-
ments. There was a clear need for additional open space. At the
initiative of the planning director, a steering committee was formed
in February 1973 to develop the best of alternative methods to imple-
ment the plan that was emerging. The planning staff played a
significant role with the committee in developing implementation
proposals.
In May 1973, by the time the committee finished the first phase
of its work, the planning commission adopted the revised Improvement
Plan for Recreation and Open Space as the recreation and open space
element of the comprehensive plan and, in July, endorsed its imple-
mentation program and authorized the planning director to "take all
reasonable steps" to implement the program. Subsequently, the com-
mittee came up with a proposal to amend the Charter and create an
open space acquisition fund for a fifteen-year period (a tax of 10
cents per $100 of assessed valuation). The first proposal,
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Proposition C, was lost at a margin of only 4,153 votes out of
151,983, but the San Francisco voters passed a revised proposal,
Proposition J, in November 1974, 116,654 to 64,527.
Implementation of the open space acquisitions and park renova-
tion program began in 1976 with the appointment of the Open Space/
Park Renovation Citizens Advisory Committee. By fiscal year 1979-80,
the city has authorized the acquisition of thirty-three parcels for
open space projects, twenty-nine renovation projects, and thirteen
development projects (San Francisco, 1979: 1).
18. According to Jacobs (1978b: 263-4), general attitudes in the Haight-
Ashbury neighborhood at the time was not supportive of government-
initiated planning programs and substantial commitment of the
staff in the study during early 1971 and mid 1973 was not rewarded by
neighborhood support (cf. San Francisco DCP, 1973a).
19. A case of the Richmond Experiment and the progress of the Protected
Residential Area program in San Francisco are discussed below.
Around early 1970, a group of residents in the Richmond District
founded the Planning Association for the Richmond (PAR) and began
efforts to retain the quiet residential character of their district
and improve it (Chronicle, January 15, 1974). This group of no more
than a hundred activists worked voluntarily with staff assistance
of the San Francisco Planning and Urban Renewal Association (SPUR)
and consultants, Whisler-Patri, and developed a plan for their dis-
trict (Richmond District Improvement Plan, December, 1972).
The focus of the group's efforts became the implementation of
the protected residential area concept. The group's immediate prede-
cessor, the "Ad Hoc Lake Street Traffic Safety Committee", was created
for the very purpose of protecting residential environment from
through traffic (Chronicle, January 15, 1974). According to Staten
(1973), the group already published and mailed to residents a news-
letter outlining eleven proposed treatments for streets designed to
control traffic in May 1972. Six of them were drawn from the Urban
Design Plan. In December, the group presented a traffic management
plan to the Department of Public Works for consideration (San Fran-
cisco DPW, 1976b: 2). All details were ironed out with operating city
departments and a series of public hearings were held by the public
works department and the Board of Supervisors. The project went ahead
and the final design was worked out. A contract was let in 1976 and
work started in June with Mayor George Moscone breaking the first hole
in the pavement. This became the first and the largest permanent pro-
ject of the kind in San Francisco.
The project failed. As the contractor began to construct the
various islands and bulbs, phone calls started to come in the public
works department and the Board of Supervisors. As construction pro-
ceeded, initial inquiries were taken over by complaints. As pressure
mounted in July 1976, the Board of Supervisors made a formal request
that the project be stopped and a poll taken of the residents. Most
of the concrete island curbs were then in place. (San Francisco DPW,
1976b: 4) Seventy-eight percent of responses (of 3,095 respondents
out of 6,336 mailed) in the public works department survey wanted the
construction removed (San Francisco DPW, 1976a: 1). After another
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public hearing, the Board made a request that the construction be
removed and all access be restored, which was put into effect with a
signature of the mayor. The Richmond Experiment cost $162,000 to
partially install and then to remove. (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 1)
Because of the controversy generated by this project, the Board
put an advisory measure on the ballot to seek guidance from the elec-
torate:
Proposition R
Declaration of Policy: Shall the Board of Supervisors adopt
the policy of supporting projects requested by residential
neighborhood areas throughout the City that are intended to
impede the flow of traffic by the use of barriers and other
physical means of control? [Emphasis mine.]
The vote was: "Yes", 75,270; "No", 124,206. (Examiner, November 3,
1976) This was a blow to the proponents of the'concept.
Neither the Richmond Experiment nor the voters' response to the
Proposition R should be taken as public rejection of the protected
residential area concept itself. The public works department staff
observed as follows:
- Failure to assess community wants: PAR was not representative
of the Richmond District; volume of traffic was not a major
concern in the district);
- Failure to assess community needs: the public works depart-
ment's traffic counts did not support the innundation of
the area by traffic);
- People did not realize the local impact of the project until
they saw actual changes in streets; people had trouble
relating drawings to what would happen in real life; and
- A formidable group of opponents to this project were resi-
dents of adjacent areas (with additional traffic in some
cases). (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 5)
My interviews add some more:
- The project took some two years to get started after it was
approved and its funding assured. This meant new participants
with different views (Jacobs, 1978b: 217). (The planning
department staff, in view of this delay, advised, not suc-
cessfully, that PAR inform the project area residents broadly
before actual construction.);
- Some people believed that the public works department had
not been willing to slow or divert traffic; hence, long
delay;
- The project, in its final design, was not well landscaped
(concrete islands without landscaping) and construction was
not entirely completed -- what people saw were just holes
and obstacles on the streets; and
- There were some external factors involved as well. The
contractor was in labor dispute and the delay in project
execution was a part of the workers' tactic.
What was in question seems to be how to assure support for the
project from residents in and around the project area and how to exe-
cute the project timely, securing funding and necessary actions of
participating actors. It was a question of implementation more than
that of the protected residential area concept or the Urban Design
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Plan as a whole. Experience in Berkeley, Ca., and Minneapolis, Minn.,
support this interpretation. In Berkeley, proponents of their pro-
tected residential area plan had to fight heavy political battles to
win two initiatives questioning their plan, once traffic diverters
and barriers were installed. In Minneapolis, city planners found
neighborhood residents' responses to street barriers unpredictable.
Thus, they considered it essential to put intensive efforts to com-
municate with residents of the project area case by case.
In San Francisco, the Jordan Park Improvement Association initi-
ated a similar project in 1972 and saw a temporary barrier plan
implemented for a test period in early 1975. Opposition developed
and the barriers were removed in June 1975, approximately four months
and a half after their installation. The result of a subsequent mail
vote suggests the existence of relatively broad support for the pro-
ject: 61% (of 350 respondents out of 696) in favor of permanent
implementation, 38% in opposition. (San Francisco DPW, 1975) In other
areas, application of the protected residential area concept achieved
fair successes:
- Dubos Triangle (a FACE area);
- St. Francis Boulevard at St. Francis Circle; and
- Inner Mission (Folsom, Harrison, and Bryant at 23rd and 24th).
However, the scope of these projects were generally reduced -- "smaller
bulbs and a less severe mender" as suggested by the public works
department (San Francisco DPW, 1976b: 5). Successful projects added
landscaped areas and on-street parking spaces (which contributed to
slowing of traffic and served residents' needs at the same time) with-
out reducing much of traffic capacity. In some areas, through traffic
had not been serious to begin with-- thus, without much opposition.
The protected residential area concept thus was transformed signifi-
cantly as it was implemented.
20. Examples are 1) improvements that took place around 1972 along
Market and Mission Streets where rapid transit stations were soon to
open (Svirsky, 1973: 14), and 2) the establishment of the Golden Gate
National Urban Recreation Area as a national park by the Congress
around 1972 (Staten, 1973).
21. Some architects and developers are critical that the city's
review processes make development in San Francisco very costly. It
is not uncommon that a developer has to go through layers of reviews:
possibly, conditional use permit process (staff review, planning com-
mission hearing, and commission action), discretionary review (staff
review and planning commission hearing and action), and state-mandated
environmental review (environmental evaluation, drafting of Environ-
mental Impact Report (EIR), planning commission hearing, and
certification).
22. According to the Potrero Hill Neighborhood Improvement Plan, a
demand for tighter design/land use control was expressed by the
Potrero Hill neighborhood residents. The plan recommended the creation
of an experimental design review board for the neighborhood to allow
finer control over neighborhood change. (San Francisco DCP, 1977d)
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III
1. According to Reece (1976), there were only five buildings of a
pre-1900 vintage in downtown Dallas, and three of them were threatened
by expansion plans in the mid 70s.
2. Manager Crull resigned in 1966 after fourteen years of service.
According to Kovner (1969), Crull was opposed to the Goals for Dallas
program and Mayor Jonsson's approach to city government -- long-term
planning, capital budget, and other standard practice of large-scale
organizations.
3. Goals for Dallas (1969) recommended much broader representation
on the Municipal Design Advisory Commission than was realized.
4. The activity of the division expanded quickly to encompass the fol-
lowing areas of work by the mid 70s:
- Landmark preservation;
- Neighborhood conservation;
- Downtown revitalization;
- Streetscape design;
- Environmental protection, planning, and management;
- Citywide urban design framework (on-going);
- Improving decision-making processes;
- Design review process;
- Environmental education; and
- Developing staff capabilities.
(Lu, 1979: 38)
The levels of activity and success vary much across areas.
5. The process as proposed generally followed standard planning steps.
Surveys were to be conducted in seven areas such as ecology, visual
image, land use/activity pattern, and historic landmarks. Like in the
Metro Center '85 Environmental Design Program (Minneapolis P&D, 1968a),
the technical and citizen advisory committees were to be the formal
means of citizen participation. The two advisory committees were at
first to review design goals, issues, and studies and, then, "review,
make recommendations and contribute their ideas and reactions to the
alternative design frameworks and in particular the preferred design
framework {and evaluation criteria]". The urban design staff would
recommend the design framework for the city following the second review.
The proposed work program did not describe the process of public review
and adoption.(Dallas DPUD, 1971a)
6. One such example involved a search for the most appropriate new
route between the city and the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport.
7. It is significant that the environmental character section of the
committee's report dealt with major urban design issues (visual character
and cultural/historic preservation among others) -- factors of human
experience. These factors had often been excluded from "environmental
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planning". Also significant is the committee's support for comprehensive
planning. One of the four priority recommendations in the environmental
character section was:
Complete a comprehensive plan for the City and prepare an
urban design framework in close conjunction therewith.(Dallas
Environmental Quality Committee, 1974: 30-31)
8. The concept of jointed-incrementalism assumes that urban designers
consciously create "jointedness" between individual studies and projects.
Links are trivial if they happen incidentally. Thus, two questions
have to be asked: Is there any evidence of intention to link individual
studies and projects on the part of urban designers? Have the urban
designers really influenced later studies and projects by doing earlier
ones?
9. In the Study 10, the urban design staff took a close look at Little
Mexico, one of the three most distinctive neighborhoods in Oak Lawn.
It was a neighborhood with sufficient cultural continuity and solidarity
to be popularly referred to as "Little Mexico" (i.e. a Mexican-American
neighborhood). The neighborhood., however, had been completely broken
into three separate parts by Harry Hines Boulevard and was threatened by
"slow but determined" industrial and commercial development from the
Stemmons area (Dallas DPUD, 1972a: 103). The urban design staff, building
upon this initial analysis, decided to undertake an in-depth survey of
the neighborhood along with other Mexican-American districts in the city.
With a HUD comprehensive planning grant for a more detailed study, the
Pike Park project (the El Barrio Study) was begun in August 1974.
The final product of this study was a plan for the park along with user-
generated design guidelines for park facilities. Subsequently, the park
was renovated according to the users' ideas.
Small as this project may be, its impact was significant. The study
helped institutionalize a structure for citizen action in the area and
established a bond of friendship and communication between the neighborhood
and two agencies of the City Hall -- the planning and park departments.
Moreover, the whole exercise allowed the urban design staff to test and
refine a process for citizen involvement. Subsequently, the approach
used in this study became a model for later neighborhood design studies
(Lu, 1979; Dallas DUP, 1975b).
In the Study 10, the urban design staff also paid special attention
to the Turtle Creek corridor. The late 50s and the early 60s saw civic
outcry for protecting the city's invaluable asset in this area along
Turtle Creek Boulevard/Parkway. Major office and apartment development
and rezoning proposals were threatening the area. In the early 60s, the
city joined with developers by proposing and going ahead with a project
to widen a four-block part of the boulevard into a six-lane divided
thoroughfare. The city's proposal met with much opposition, with involve-
ment of some national figures like Charles A. Blessing, then head of the
Detroit City Planning Department and president of the American Institute
of Planners (News, March 20, 1960). Thus,- in the 60s, the area became
the focus of many studies initiated by citizen groups, the planning
commission/planning department, and the park and recreation department.
In February 1971, the planning commission adopted the Interim Comprehensive
Plan for the Oak Lawn Community, recommending the protection and
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preservation of the Turtle Creek corridor and the expansion of the parkway.
Meanwhile, the pressure for development in "Dallas' finest address"
was increasing. This is the time when the urban design staff started
their study of Oak Lawn in the Study 10. The staff saw Turtle Creek
as the main element that defined the character of Oak Lawn and made a
close examination of the area along it.
The time for action came soon. In 1973, a citizen group SOS (Save
Open Space) asked the planning and park departments to prepare plans
which would protect the area. The urban design staff completed a plan
in May 1974, drawing many ideas directly from the Study 10. The plan
received a strong support of local citizens, the park board, and the
Oak Lawn Community Design Committee of the planning commission (Dallas
DUP, 1974a). Upon recommendations of the planning commission and park
board urging the city council to adopt the plan, the city council held
a public hearing in November 1974 and directed the urban design staff
that an ordinance containing guidelines and standards for the area be
prepared. An ordinance created the Turtle Creek Environmental Corridor
in April 1975.
10. The visual form study identified resource/potential areas, target
areas for physical improvement, environmentally common types, and
visually common types. Needed urban design treatments were suggested
for each common type. Some observers feel the study could have been
more thorough but it was essential that the staff make the survey
manageable. Resources for the study were limited. Many projects had to
be carried out at the same time. Thus, the description of the environ-
mentally common types was made according to five categories of charac-
teristics only (e.g. level of building maintenance, corridor diversity
-- jargons like this were part of the problem of this report -- and tree
and natural features). Similarly, the description of the visually common
types was made according to four categories only.
11. The Neighborhood Notebook went beyond the traditional scope of urban
design since it addressed such concerns as solving neighborhood problems
and getting a neighborhood organized. It was a creative response of the
urban design staff to common urban design problems in neighborhoods.
Those problems were important not only because they were found throughout
the city but because they had a profound impact on the visual quality of
the city. On the other hand, they were largely beyond the easy reach
of city services. Broad education programs like this to stimulate
citizens' self-help improvements were essential. And this is the kind
of project that needs a systematic data base. The urban design staff
had to know what common problems were, where they were located, and how
prevailing/important they were. Also, the more innovative is the staff's
approach as in this case, the more crucial will the role of a syste-
matic data base be in arguing for it.
Those pamphlets were intended for wide distribution through city
officers, neighborhood organizations, and social ageicies,but for some
reason many of them remained in a storeroom of the planning department.
The Neighborhood Notebook was well taken, however, once it reached
neighborhoods. For example, one of neighborhood leaders in the South
Boulevard area told me that he had been using some pamphlets in his
neighborhood newsletters.
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12. It is important to note that not many projects were carried out in
the area of inner-city neighborhood conservation/design to begin with.
The city was growing outward.
13. The development of urban design tools to deal with ordinary neighbor-
hoods in need of public intervention was especially important in a new
city like Dallas. Like in the case of the Neighborhood Notebook,~ the
development of such a tool rested on systematic understanding of urban
design problems in the city (the citywide visual form/neighborhood
condition survey).
In July 1976, the urban design staff developed an ordinance pro-
posal with review procedures and design guidelines, and forwarded it to
the city attorney's office for review (Lu, 1979: 45). Conservation
districts would be established as replacement zones on the zoning map
to control land use, use characteristics, and design features. Unlike
the success in historic districts, conservation districts did not take
off the ground, however. Local residents in one of the areas initially
considered for designation expressed reservation. We have to see the future
of the conservation district concept since awareness that such a tool
is necessary has been increasing and the present urban design staff is
doing further work to get the ordinance passed.
14. In addition, sign control turned out to be extremely controversial
and this project absorbed much energy of the urban design director and
his staff. Unfortunately, as some observers of the Dallas urban design
scene see today, sign control was relatively unimportant an issue in the
long run in the face of larger urban design problems in this city such
as development and design strategies for downtown. .Also, the project
created an undesirable image of the urban design director -- a "sign
ordinance man" and, by extension, an obstacle to major development
interests (which took over the city council in the late 70s). This
image hindered his later work.
It is true that "location of each cultural facility is an important
urban design decision" (Goals for Dallas, 1970: 42), but the relatively
limited impact arts facilities planning has had so far seems to be
attributable to the nature of arts facilities, especially when they are
to be concentrated in a single sector of downtown (arts district).
Urban design in this area is more like project-level urban design than
a policy framework for the entire city.
15. A few factors are important. At first, the mall was located away
from major pedestrian flows and was not made part of a system of pedes-
trian walkways. Second, land use along the mall was never pedestrian-
oriented. Along the mall were offices of a few insurance companies, the
Federal Reserve Bank, and Southwestern Bell Company with the exception
of Baker Hotel. The former establishments had little interest in re-
orienting themselves to open their storefronts to pedestrians on the
mall. The largest property owner along the mall, Southwestern Bell,
kept using the Jackson Street entrance for access to its main building.
One exception is a few "sidewalk symphony" concerts the Dallas Symphony
Orchestra has been offering each year in the past few years as part of
the City Arts Program of the Park Board.
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16. Back in April 1971, the city council adopted two functional elements
of the CBD plan -- "Boulevard and Green Spaces" and "Streets and
Vehicular Circulation" -- but no action, general or specific, was proposed
on that segment of Akard Street (Dallas DPUD, 1971c and d). Neither
did a few studies carried out in the mid 70s include proposals for develop-
ing links to or from the mall (Dallas DUP, 1975a and 1976d). We have
yet to see whether recent and future studies are successful in giving a
new life to the mall (Dallas DUP, 1979a; Ponte, 1979; and Myrick-Newman-
Dahlberg and Partners, Inc., 1980).
17. The following are examples: Lu (1972, 1976), Euston (1975), Reece
(1976), Webb (1976), and Miller (1977, 1978).
18. The urban design director even included the following among major
functions of the urban design division:
It [the division] contributes toward building a national
image for the Department of Planning and Urban Development,
as an innovative center for environmental design.(Lu, 1979: 38)
19. A few noticeable changes of relevance to the setting of the
design of the city goals are as follows. The membership of each task
force or committee was greatly expanded -- more than doubled in size --
and broadened. Just looking at the chairmen of the design of the city goals
task forces and committees, you find a councilman and a developer along
with a developer-architect this time while you only find architect-
planners in the first program. A large group of outside consultants
was no more a part of the program as in the first one. A survey con-
ducted with 8,000 individuals in the second program represents increased
effort to achieve broader representation. A few groups of minorities
-- blacks and Mexican-Americans -- ran parallel programs and set goals
of their own.
20. Obviously, the city council at the time wanted a citywide com-
prehensive land use plan. On January 20, 1975, at the time the plan
was nearing completion, the city council passed a resolution requesting
"the earliest possible completion" of the plan and imposed a moratorium
on zoning reclassification in five critical areas until the adoption of
the plan (e.g. the flood plain, historic districts, and the Turtle Creek
corridor).
21. A section in the Comprehensive Land Use Policy Plan which would limit
the construction of new apartments on the city's outer fringes (out-
side Loop 12) drew much opposition from bankers and those in the con-
struction trade and real estate business. According to the Dallas
Morning News:
Mayor Folsom says the council and planning commission were
becoming increasing obstables to development when he was
elected mayor, and one of his main priorities was to provide
a framework for growth. ...
"When I ran in 1976, I said the council was unknowingly
getting a negative attitude. It wasn't the things they
were for. It was the number of things they were against."
(News, March 4, 1979)
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22. In one instance, the city council supported the planning com-
mission's power. It had been a city policy for more than forty years
to require a three-fourths vote of the city council to overturn a plan-
ning commission recommendation in a zoning case. In 1977, however,
San Antonia court struck down the requirement as unconstitutional and,
when the Texas Supreme Court declined to review the decision, it auto-
matically eliminated the three-fourths requirement in Dallas. The San
Antonio court decision was taken as a major victory by those in the
development business. (News, March 22, 1977) In late March, about
ten days before the April 2 council election, Mayor Pro Tem Adalene
Harrison proposed to ask the Texas Legislature for a bill that would
restore the planning commission's original power on zoning decisions.
One week later, the city council voted 9-2 in favor, with Mayor Folsom
and Mrs. Rose Renfroe voting in opposition. The planning commission
restored its power at least by the end of 1977 (News, January 2, 1978).
Mrs. Renfroe told a reporter that vote would be different if taken
later (News, March 29, 1977), suggesting a subtle balance that existed
in the city council on matters of planning and development at the time.
23. Douglass accepted a job with one of major real estate developers
in the region.
24. Source unknown. The intent of the city manager was to remove all
incapable staff persons. He was ready to lose some of the capable ones
at the same time.(George Shrader in an interview with me, May 1980).
25. The planning department reorganization introduced a new system
called pool planners. Under this system, some planning staff members
do not permanently belong to one section and are assigned to specific
projects as needs arise. Thus, some planners did have to move from one
project to another, sometimes without seeing the whole planning process
through in one project.
26. The following is an example:
Lu's superior, Gerald Henigsman, an assistant city manager
in charge of the planning department, said he was surprised
by the resignation. "We will be losing a talented and
innovative planner," Henigsman said.(Herald, December 1, 1978)
27. The following is an example:
Many citizens have taken the resignation of Dallas city
planner Weiming Lu as a clear indication that the city
planning department is in a sad shape, in fact almost
disappearing as an entity. ... [H]is resignation reminds many
citizens of the once active nature of the department and the
encouragement it formerly gave to citizen participation
in planning.(Herald, December 3, 1978)
28. This interim arrangement during October 1977 - April 1979 comes
close to what the first Goals for Dallas program recommended:
Create a Department of Planning and Urban Development (DPUD)
operating under the immediate direction of the City Manager
to assure coordination of planning among all departments. ..
(Goals for Dallas, 1969)
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29. The project was approved by the city council at the request of
Russell Perry, devleoper and former president of the Chamber of Commerce
(in late 1978?)(News, March 4, 1979).
30. Manager Schrader was reported to have said, "I have seen very little
indication that people care much about participation in city planning."
(Herald, December 11, 1978a) -
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV
1. In San Francisco, public perception of the form of the city
as a whole was not studied but a few studies examined how citizens
viewed a few specific elements of the city. The most important one
is the Street Livability Study. This is a study of the effect of
traffic through residential streets measured in terms of residents
behavior and perception of the street environment. The fourth pre-
liminary report includes another study, which examined the visual
effect of overhead wires conducted according to the method of paired
comparisons.
2. Obviously, emphasis on each area or item of environmental quality
concern varies across cities. For example, environmental planning
(the "ecology" element) has been an important part of the urban design
program in Dallas but not in Minneapolis and San Francisco. The San
Francisco Urban Design Plan defines in detail various qualities of the
environment (such as continuity of interest and activities at ground
level) through its "fundamental principles" but the Minneapolis Visual
Quality Plan offers only a coarse definition of the quality of the
environment. Likewise, human comfort in an environment of harsh winter
climate has been an important urban design concern in Minneapolis
(weather protection -- skyways and enclosed plazas and malls, etc.) but
it has not in San Francisco and Dallas.
3. In Minneapolis and San Francisco, this view has been officially
adopted as part of city policy (the comprehensive plan). In Dallas,
the city has not officially recognized this view of the urban design
staff. However, the status of the design of the city goal in the first
Goals for Dallas suggests broad support for such a view in Dallas.
4. A special case of overall city strategies is the urban design
study itself. To know what is citywide, it would be most effective to
conduct a citywide survey. A citywide data base would be essential in
determining relative urban design significance of such things as his-
torically and architecturally significant buildings, natural/ecological
resources, and problems of neighborhood deterioration.
5. The virtue of articulating goals, objectives, and policies clearly
has been discussed much in the planning theory arena (e.g. Altshuler,
1965). Chapter V of this thesis specifically discusses strategic roles
city design policy could play in the process of urban design.
6. Policies will necessarily be implemented opportunistically and
over years. This is because implementation has a logic of its own
(cf. the politics of implementation discussed later). A notion that
implementation and day-to-day decision-making can be made incrementally
without losing overall rationality so far as you are deciding within
a citywide decision framework is an important part of the idea of
doing citywide policy planning.
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7. For example, Allan Jacobs was reported to have said, "I am a
believer in the comprehensive plan... . Otherwise, you come back to
the question 'What the hell are you talking about?"' (Herald, December
11, 1978a). Also he wrote, "The city planning process begins (if there
is a specific point of beginning) with a comprehensive or master plan."
(Jacobs, 1978b: 190)
8. Note that the citywide urban design plan in practice may be a
simple compilation of district-level policies or even a set of policies
for strategic places and areas. Examples of citywide urban design plans
without any citywide component abound in beautification and appearance
plans.
9. This is a form of community participation in the process of physical
development and change of the city. In this way, citywide urban design
policies could make urban design what a whole community does through
numerous decisions of individuals and groups over time: "citizens
collectively striving for a better city." Regardless of whether such
an ideological view was held or not, urban designers in Minneapolis
and San Francisco, and perhaps those in Dallas, were well aware of
such a role citywide urban design policies could play (e.g. Minneapolis
CPC, 1964; Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79; San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 4;
Lu, 1979).
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V
1. Policy effectuation (Kent, 1964) is a function of the urban
general plan (the city design plan, in this thesis) to be a practical
working guide for the decision-makers (the city council members) in
making decisions to effectuate citywide urban design policies. I use
'-'policy implementation" when actors who make decisions to implement
policies are not limited to the official decision-makers.
2. In fact, some types of citywide urban design policies cannot be
ultimately implemented in theory. Most of the policies defining the
quality of the environment fall in this category for a few reasons.
At first, they are given as broad environmental quality goals rather
than as specific objectives or action strategies as in the following
example:
Respect the character of older development nearby in
the design of new buildings. (Policy for Conservation 6,
The Urban Design Plan, San Francisco DCP, 1972a).
You strive for the achievement of goals. You achieve them only when you
give up further pursuit because further pursuit means too much cost.
Environment can always be better. Unimplementability for this reason
goes with the purpose of setting goals.
Second, this type of policy in most cases relates to a number of
physical elements in the city, infinite or practically uncountable as
in the following example:
Use care in remodeling of older buildings in order to
enhance rather than weaken the original character of such
buildings. (Policy for Conservation 5, the Urban Design
Plan, San Francisco, DCP, 1972a).
Since their changes take place over years through numerous projects and
decisions, you may implement these policies in some projects and some
parts of the city but not in a whole city or even in a major part of it
at one point in time. Unimplementability in this sense derives from the
very nature of the environment.
Finally, many of the important qualities you would like to have in
your city are difficult to define. Combined with the fact that imple-
mentation methods and design controls you have today are not perfect,
this makes implementation difficult. For example, the passage of the
height and bulk ordinance in San Francisco has brought the city
planners closer to the implementation of related policies of the Urban
Design Plan but the ordinance has left some problems (e.g. seemingly
bulkier buildings due to the diagonal rule). On a project-by-project
basis, project reviews allow progress toward the achievement of many of
the qualiti-es defined in the plan that are otherwise difficult to
achieve, but decisions inevitably slip away from time to time, leaving
some policies unimplemented in some parts of the city (e.g. a few dark
buildings recently built in San Francisco). Given that many
environmental changes, once made, are difficult to modify later, you
are away from implementation. Unimplementability here derives from the
way our society works as well as the nature of the environment. None
of these reasons should discourage urban designers from formulating
policies to define the quality of the environment.
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3. There is another reason for suggesting the deemphasis of
implementation as evaluation criterion. However you define citywide
urban design policies and their relationship to the process of urban
design, implementation has a different set of demands, as discussed in
the Introduction (the politics of implementation). There is no assur-
ance that good policies naturally lead to successful implementation.
4. The Visual Quality Plan, for example, primarily defines a good
decision-making process and action strategies. It does not attempt to
define what a good city is in visual terms. It is important to note
that "policies for the environment" do not necessarily define the
quality of the environment. They could instead define the urban
design management system (decision-making process) and action strategies
to deal with the quality of the environment as in the Visual Quality Plan
(e.g. "develop design principles for the street lighting system" and
"establish height limits outside downtown"). In the Visual Quality Plan,
policies for the environment (residential, commercial, and industrial
areas and scenic assets), if viewed as environmental quality definition,
are presented mostly as a checklist of environmental quality concerns
to be considered (e.g. The height of the building is an important con-
cern in this city.) and not so much different from policies defining
action strategies (e.g. to establish height limits outside downtown)
in the way of suggesting what a good environment would be in the city.
5. Design districts must have been subjected to some public
discussion in conjunction with the following:
- Metro Center '85 calling for establishment of design
districts and design review procedures in downtown in its
implementation program, 1970.;
- The city council's request to the State Legislature for a
law enabling the city to establish design review boards and
administer design review procedures in design districts,
1971;
- The passage of the state enabling law, 1971;
- The passage of a resolution approving the state law in the
city council, 1971; and
- The city council's authorization for considering design
district designation in the Whittier East area, 1975.
The process of developing and adopting the Visual Design Framework did
not offer a forum for elaborating this concept. The staff proposal had
no mention of design districts during 1971 - mid 1976. Once a policy
to "consider the use of design districts to protect areas of critical
visual importance" so as to "support individual neighborhoods in
determining the best means for improving visual quality" (action
policy) was incorporated into the proposal, public discussion did not
go further to define the nature and role of design districts (no design
management policy).
6. The Plan for the 80s is exemplary in this respect. Supporting
implementation by "a healthy evaluation and monitoring system which
measures accomplishment and need" is part of the plan's general
approach to implementation (Minneapolis PD, 1979a: 1-49). "Implementa-
tion" in the Plan for the 80s is not only a program for each plan
element but also itself a plan with a set of a goal, objectives, and
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policies. The plan for implementation sets forth an objective of
regularly amending the comprehensive plan (Objective 8) and a policy to
periodically review and amend it on a regularly scheduled basis so that
each section of the plan is updated at least every five years (more
frequent reviews and amendments when warranted by the nature of the
topic area or by changing conditions) (Policy 27).
7. The introduction to the Visual Quality Plan reads, "While the goal
of a more attractive and livable Minneapolis is widely supported, it is
much more difficult to find agreement on what the City should look like."
(Minneapolis PD, 1979a: IV-79)
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VI
1. You might say that the first sentence is also an action policy
due to its implication of regulations, trimming of trees, etc. I suggest
that this is an action policy much less than an environmental quality
policy because such "implication" involves more than translation of a
general course of action (action policy) into specific courses of action
to be actually carried out. What is involved in this case is a search
for appropriate courses of action, general or specific (regulations etc.),
to achieve a more or less general goal or objective ("to avoid visual
clutter at bridgeheads"). A comparison with the second sentence will
make this point clearer. "To assess feasibility" naturally suggests a
general course of action (feasibility studies) which can be taken as
a specific course of action (e.g. a six-month feasibility study to be
carried out by the planning department during the fiscal 1981-82 year
with a $1,000 fund). Similarly, the second part of the next example
(Policy 18) naturally suggests a general course of action (legislative
actions -- a height ordinance).
2. The planning staff was well aware that city development was both
a substance and a process and that there were issues of the process of
development (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 10). Moreover, they knew that the
decision-making process in urban design was important and that there
was something which the Urban Design Plan could do to improve it (Jacobs,
1971: 32).
It is important to note that the staff's theory did not allow
consideration of the process of urban design (design management system,
at least a part of it which was within the jurisdiction of the planning
commission) as something more than the process of implementation and a
legitimate area of concerns in the Urban Design Plan. The concept of the
process of urban design (design management system) was not established
in the Urban Design Plan or elsewhere to begin with, while the concept of
the implementation process was (including the "planning-development
process" (San Francisco DCP, 1971b: 135)). 'This may be because the plan--
ning staff stretched their idea of the comprehensive plan as the beginning
of the whole process of urban design too far. Obviously, the Urban Design
Plan cannot be prefectly comprehensive or all-inclusive. No recognition
of other parts of the process of urban design is a deficiency in the
planning staff's theory. Without such recognition, there was no role the
Urban Design Plan could play in defining their desirable qualities.
3. Policy for Conservation 7 in the Urban Design Plan (San Francisco
DCP, 1972a) comes close to this. It suggests five outstanding and unique
areas in San Francisco including Telegraph Hill.
4. The Visual Quality Plan includes a map presented in conjunction with
a policy to locate "greenway windows" and scenic observation areas along
the Mississippi River, proposed and existing (Policy 26). The plan includes
another map identifying several major "key scenic views" but with a note
suggesting that many other scenic resources unmapped should not be
ignored.(Minneapolis PD, 1979a)
-239 -
5. The concepts of urban design frameworks, concept plans, and design
guidelines are not well understood even among urban designers. Some
reject an idea of government urban designers providing them because,
"You are then designing the whole thing." Not to mention a rather new
concept of poliices that define- the quality of the environment (environ-
mental quality policies).
6. There is virtually no theory about the implementation of compre-
hensive plan policies. Policies that have been studied in the public
policy arena, where much of research on implementation has taken place
in the past several years, are programs (a special kind of policy -- see
below) and, even in this area, the question of how policies change as
they are translated from administrative guidelines to practice is still
largely unexplored. Implementation thus is a matter of puzzlement:
"Men collectively wondering what to do." (Rein and Rabinovitz, 1977:
1, 5) In fact, the implementation of comprehensive plan policies
that are usually given as broad goals or objectives, like environmental
quality policies, have been considered to be undefinable by theorists.
According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: vix), there is no implementa-
tion to study when policy remains a disembodied objective, without
specifying actors in the scene or the acts which are already initiated and
in which they must engage to achieve the desired result. That is, you
cannot finish what you haven't started. According to the same authors,
the subject of study in the public policy arena, policy as program, is
defined as: "Given X, we act to obtain Y." Policies become programs when,
the initial conditions X are created by authoritative action. We ought
to be sympathetic to urban designers concerned with the problems of
beginning implementation.
7. Looking at personality types, some characteristics of the urban designers
who manage urban design studies or projects parallel those of city managers.
For example, -city managers' time horizon is relatively short. They
value maintenance of equilibrium, strive to balance the present and
future opportunities, and respond to changes or innovation with caution
and skepticism. They are ready to make compromises to get things done.
Obviously, city managers are more than these, however. Their training
and experience circumstances differ greatly from those of urban designers.
Their experience would involve management in public or private sector
or both and they would ultimately take executive positions in major busi-
nesses. Their exposure to the political reality of their community makes
them highly astute to politics. Their business, in effect, makes them
the "comprehensive planner" of the community in that they deal with all
matters of their community from the top of government bureaucracy and
that managing means at the same time planning, advocating, and implementing.
Urban designers could have difficulties in claiming their ability to
coordinate things in the face of a strong city manager.
administrator whose business is to coordinate things.
8. The following views are not uncommon:
The stark reality of the matter is that direct and highly
interpersonal citizen participation is not possible in complex
and large-scale problems (Catanese, 1974: 117).
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"Citizen apathy is inversely proportional to the proximity
of a proposed project to the individual and his neighborhood."
Citizens are naturally more knowledgeable and concerned
about the specific areas in which they live, work, and shop.
"When presented with a comprehensive plan for the entire city,
of which only a small part would affect his daily life, the
average citizen is likely to respond with disinterest." (An
often accepted belief that there is a fundamental relationship
between size of area and the degree of participation that
underlay the operational imperative in comprehensive planning
in Fort Worth, Tex., as presented by Susskind and Aylward,
1976: 58-9.)
9. Generally recognized barriers to citizen participation are as
follows:
- Inadequate financial resources;
- Time required to complete planning projects involving citizen
participation;
- Inadequate staff resources;
- Maintenance of adequate interest and involvement by citizens
and citizen groups; and
- Citizen pressure to deliver results sooner than is realistic.
(Thorwood, 1976; cf. Cunningham, 1972: 599)
10. What I have in mind in Dallas is the Goals for Dallas program
rather than the government urban design program. My discussion to follow,
however, primarily looks at cases in Minneapolis and San Francisco where
citywide urban design policies have been actually formulated.
11. As I shall point out later, what seems important in this case is the
fact that the urban design staff did not draft the Visual Design Framework
on the basis of up-to-date knowledge of the wishes of people and issues
in neighborhoods, not the fact that it was developed without substantial
citizen participation per se. The allegation is true that the basic
ideas developed in the mid 60s were presented suddenly to the neighborhood
groups of the mid 70s. Time lag as well as the way citizens were (not)
involved is an issue here.
12. In Minneapolis, the Whittier East Design Study was completed success-
fully but it received much criticism that it was elitist, neglecting impor-
tant social issues of the Whittier East area. The Whittier Urban Design
Framework program, on the other hand, addressed a range of social issues
around physical development and change and received much support from the
neighborhood residents. Minneapolis' Metro Center '85 downtown develop-
ment plan was also a complex package. Urban design was only one element
(the visual image and form frameworks), although it was the most impor-
tant, strategic one. Similarly, attention to urban design was possible
in San Francisco at least in part because other areas of concerns were
to be taken care of by other elements of the comprehensive plan in element-
by-element revisions. (Jacobs (1978b: 218) has observed, however, that
some San Franciscans took the Urban Design Plan as the whole comprehensive
plan -- perhaps partly because it was the first element presented to
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them and partly owing to the very nature of urban design as "'stitching
element".) The CIP Urban Design Study, the Visual Design Frameowrk,
and the Visual Quality Plan in Minneapolis were likewise part of a larger
program.
13. The Urban Design Plan, as well as the whole comprehensive plan of
the City and County of San Francisco, is not the city's official policy
in that the Board of Supervisors has never adopted it, and it does not
need to base its decisions on it. However, given relative power of the
planning commission and citizen's support for the Urban Design Plan, it
is little different from the city's official policy for physical develop-
ment.and urban design. Some people in San Francisco even think that the
Urban Design Plan was adopted by the Board of Supervisors (the San
Francisco Bay Guardian, 1971; and in my interviews).
14. T. J. Kent (1964) has argued that city planning should be part of the
legislative branch of government and that the urban general plan (compre-
hensive plan) should be adopted by the city council since city planning
is primarily a policy-setting activity and the comprehensive plan the
city's official policy document. With increasing awareness of the impor-
tance of relating the planning process to the political process ("politics
of policy") (Catanese, 1974: 141-151; etc.) or, at least the need of
increasing city planners' political sophisticationin recent years, Kent's
idea is intriguing. However, it has never been put into practice precisely
as stated in any major American city.
I believe the council adoption of citywide urban design policies is
a desirable direction as Kent has reasoned, but if only the city's govern-
mental context is supportive of the procedure. Council adoption would
be a natural course of action in the council-manager or similar form of
government (e.g. city planning under the council-appointed city coordinator)
as in Dallas and Minneapolis. On the other hand, in cities like San
Francisco where the planning function is given a relatively independent
power in the city's administrative structure, council adoption does not
seem to make much difference in determining and implementing city design
policy. Rather, city planners in San Francisco (the planning commission
and staff) thought, negative effects of council adoption would override
its benefits.
e.g. The Board of Supervisors had little time to consider details
of the plan;
Political review before the Board would not be supportive of
the plan's orientation to advocate good urban design and setforth
the principles of good design to be flexibly applied.
What is important must be to relate city design policy formulation
to substantive discussion leading to the determination of policy for the
city, not a specific form of council adoption. Each city defines the
roles of elected officials (the city council) and citizens (voters)
differently. In Dallas, for example, elected officials play primary
role in policy making, while in Minneapolis the city council (and,
recently, the mayor) has been encouraging involvement of citizens in the
process of adopting city policy. In San Francisco, where its city design
plan received overwhelming support at the time of its adoption (by the
planning commission), some groups remained critical as to its legitimacy
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as official policy. The Board of Supervisors' formal action on the
plan does not seem to have been a solution anyway: cf. "At no time have
any of the changes codified in these plans [the Urban Design Plan]
been approved by San Francisco voters -- nor will they be presented
to voters in the future." (The San Francisco Bay Guardian, 1971: 26;
Emphasis mine.) This brings us back to the whole issues around the city
government as it defines the status and role of urban design and the
place of citizen participation in the planning process.
15. Another example: In the early 70s, the Model Cities Communication
Center operated a mobile planning van which provided detailed information
on proposed plans and projects in the Model Neighborhood. The van was
also used as a traveling office for local aldermen so that citizens could
voice their views about land use development proposals directly to elected
officials. (Susskind and Aylward (1976: 61) quoting from a report by
the Urban Institute entitled Citizen Involvement in Land Use Governance:
Issues and Methods (Rosenbaum, 1974).)
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FOOTNOTES: APPENDIX
1. Key words I used to identify urban design-related reports include
"urban design", "community design", "neighborhood design", "beautifica-
tion", "appearance", "aesthetic(s)", "amenity", "visual", "image
(-ability)", "identity", "environment", and "(urban) form". The two
professional journals that were reviewed are the Journal of the American
Institute of Planners (the Journal of the American Planning Association)
and the Journal of the American Institute of Architects.
2. Reports were reviewed at the MIT Rotch Library, the Harvard Univer-
sity Loeb Library (the Planning Deposit Library in the HUD Region I)
and the HUD Library in Washington, D.C.
3. The urban design element of the comprehensive plan of Spartanburg
draws heavily from the San Francisco Urban Design Plan in terms of
its format and design principles. The Spartanburg urban design plan
departs from the San Francisco plan in adding more concrete prototype
designs and improvement proposals to its environmental quality-oriented
substance. The result of three interviews I conducted in the city --
with the project director/urban designer, the city manager, and a
representative from the Spartanbug Chamber of Commerce -- suggests
rather divergent views as to its use and impact to prohibit further
comments without more interviews. The interviews did suggest
1) the difficulty of creating enthusiastic citizen support as the
Urban Design Plan had done in San Francisco and in other -cities and
2) a tendency of people to see environmental quality-oriented policy
plans to be "unimplementable". (They have no schedules and cost
estimates to begin with.)
4. Urban designers in Oakland did not see their recommendations
finding their way into a larger work to prepare the comprehensive plan.
See Options for Oakland: A Summary Report on the Oakland 701 Project
(Oakland CPD, 1969). According to Lynch (1976:83), "Oakland, Portand
[Ore.], and Seattle ... did studies that were not long sustained."
5. According to Lunch (1976: 82), an early study of the visual form
of Rye, New Yor, by Alan Melting used many of the techniques that had
been used in Lynch's (1965) Visual Analysis. Melting's report was
not available for my review.
6. Parish in the State of Louisiana corresponds to county.
7. An undated memo inserted in the report reads:"... not acted upon
by the Planning Commission or the City Council."
8. My survey has not identified communities which made urban design
an element or section of their comprehensive plans because urban
design elements and sections could not be located by a report title
survey unless they were issued as a separate volume. I only reviewed
those 701 comprehensive planning reports and plans prepared in
California communities that were deposited in the Region I Planning
Deposite Library (the Loeb Library at Harvard University).
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The small communities which prepared a separate citywide urban
design plan as part of their 701 comprehensive planning program include:
- Acoma Indian Pueblo, N.M. (not an incorporated city) (1973)
Historic Preservation and Urban Design Plan (Work Item 4),
70p.;
- Luna Pier, Mich., city of 1,418 (1970): Urban Design Plan,
43p.;
- Tahoe City, Ca., unincorporated area of 1,394 (1975):
Urban Design Plan; and
- Rosemead, Ca., city of 40,972 (1962):
Community Design Plan.
Some small communities prepared urban design reports as part of their
701 comprehensive planning or community renewal program:
- Elmira, N.Y., city of 39,945 (1965):
Urban Design Suggestions: Interim Report No. 8
as part of its Community Renewal Program, 13p.;
- Leiston (city of 26,068) - Clarkston Urban Area, Idaho
(1968): "Urban Design" (a 5-page report to the planning
commission);
- Zanesville, Ohio, city of 33,045 (1965):
Community Renewal Program: Land Utilization and Urban Design
[Urban Renewal], 30p.
- White Plains, N.Y., city of 50, 125, (1977):
Urban Design: Fringe Residential Neighborhoods, Commercial
Districts and School Properties (findings and recommendations
prepared for the Department of Planning), 60p.
- Fairfield, Ca., city of 44, 146 (1968):
Community Design Study;
- Mesa, Ariz., city of 62,858 (1969):
Comprehensive Plan, Interim Report, Part G: Community Design;
- Milpitas, Ca., city of 27,149 (1966):
Community Design Sketches;
- Twinsburg, Ohio, village of 6,432 (1972):
Comprehensive Planning Report 7: Community Design Manual,
Part 1 and 2;
- Cary, Ill., village of 4,358 (1970):
Appearance and Design Study; and
- Childersburg, Ala., city of 4,831 (1975):
Urban Area Design Study.
Carter, Sumek, and Frost (1974: 257) reports that the City of
Garland, Texas, set policy guides (a general statement of environmental
goal or policy) for urban aesthetics and land management (along with
air pollution, solid waste management, water pollution, and control
of noise) to provide general guidance for the entire city administra-
tion, but I have not reviewed its policy statement. According to them,
explicit statements of environmental goals or policies were not typical:
of 1,094 cities reporting in their survey, 20% had adopted statements
and 23% had them under consideration. Of those cities which had adopted
environmental goal or policy statements, those which included urban
design would be much smaller in number.
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